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This thesis looks at the statistical interaction of credit ratings and Credit Default Swap (CDS)
spreads. Both have been implicated as major contributors to the financial crises of 2007-present.
The body of work contained herein looks to further our understanding of their relationship and in
doing so, I make three empirical contributions to the fields of credit risk and financial economics.
Firstly, in Chapter 2, I uncover a striking empirical artifact contained within CDS correlation
dynamics. Namely, that there is a well-defined credit rating structure embedded in them. Although
much of the extant literature treats credit derivatives and equity as contingent claims on the same
underlying firm value, by contrast, no rating-based structure exists in equity correlations.
In Chapter 3, I demonstrate that rating-based correlation dynamics in CDS markets are not
fully consistent with the traditional framework of financial economics in which a security’s price
merely reflects its fundamental value. I show that the trading behaviour of market participants in
relation to CDS indices, the constituents of which are based on the discrete and somewhat arbitrary
labeling of issuers as either investment-grade or high-yield, drives a distortion in single-name CDS
co-movement. My results can be interpreted as the first evidence of a significant departure from
traditional views of market efficiency in a $30 trillion segment of global derivatives markets.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I go on to explore the complete time-series and cross-sectional interaction
of the credit rating process on CDS spreads. In doing so, I identify that prior to the crisis, credit
rating agencies played a much greater role in the price discovery process of corporate credit risk.
As such, there has been a significant loss of information in credit ratings. This result can be
explained via a loss of confidence in rating agencies due to a spill-over effect of reputational
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damage from their role in the collapse of the $3tn structured credit derivatives market. The use
of ex post hyper-inflated AAA ratings on CDOs and RMBS, and the subsequent fall-out from
doing so, has altered how credit market participants react to the information contained in corporate
credit ratings. These results are particularly relevant in light of impending regulatory reform under
the Dodd-Frank act of 2010.
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’It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to
twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to fit facts.’ - Sherlock Holmes
Since I commenced this thesis in October 2007 the word ‘credit’ has become ubiquitous. The
terms ‘Credit Rating’, ‘Credit Rating Agency’ and in particular ‘Credit Default Swap’ have been
demonized by some of the commentary on the credit crisis of 2007-8, the global financial crisis of
2008-9 and the EU debt crisis of 2010-present. The world continues to reel under the weight of
the deepest global recession in the post-war era, which began as a run on credit, and the future of
the financial landscape remains clouded in uncertainty. At the political level, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in the United States1, signed into law by President
Barack Obama on July 21, 2010, imposes sweeping legislative changes to the U.S financial system.
Its broadly defined goal is to avoid a repeat of the events that culminated in the near collapse of
the banking system in September 2008. New regulation covering credit rating agencies and credit
default swaps are centerpieces of the Act. It is against this backdrop that I present a body of work
which looks at the empirical nature of their interaction.
1European directives such as the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) and European Market
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) are further behind in terms of implementation but look to address many of the same
issues as covered by Dodd-Frank.
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I. Rating Agencies, Credit Ratings, Rating-Based Regulations
and the Financial Crisis
A. Rating Agencies and Credit Ratings
In principle, the major Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) provide two important economic functions
for debt market participants. The first is an assessment of an issuer’s ability to meet its financial
obligations in the form of a credit rating. I.e. ratings should aid lenders in mitigating problems of
asymmetric information that arise with debt issuers by acting as a quality certification. As such,
rating agencies effectively audit an issuer’s debt capacity and then assign them with an an alphanu-
meric risk categorization; a credit rating. The largest international rating agencies are Moody’s,
S&P & Fitch and there is a well known correspondence between their systems. Moody’s rate debt
instruments as Aaa, Aa, A, Baa (Investment-Grade ratings), Ba, B or Caa (High-Yield ratings) and
further divide all ratings except Aaa into three subcategories, i.e. Baa1, Baa2, Baa3. Similarly,
S&P and Fitch rate debt instruments as AAA, AA, A, BBB (Investment-Grade ratings), BB, B and
CCC (High-Yield ratings) with three subdivisions in all but the AAA category, i.e. BBB+, BBB
and BBB-. Secondly, through the usage of standardized risk categories, rating agencies provide
investors with a means of comparing the relative creditworthiness of issuers when making capital
allocation decisions.
Whilst their rating systems are comparable in terms of the categorical assignments each agency
makes, the meaning of their ratings differ. S&P’s and Fitch’s ratings reflect cross-sectional vari-
ation in default probabilities whereas Moody’s also incorporate loss-given-default and hence aim
to capture expected losses. Exactly what information constitutes a rating is opaque however. The
agencies’ corporate credit rating methodologies are sensitive commercial models and they are de-
liberately vague in their published guidelines on exactly what goes into bond ratings. We are told,
for instance, that credit ratings include both public and private information (Moody’s (2002)). The
public information can include financial statement items, such as leverage, profitability and interest
coverage. The private information can include an issuer’s expansion plans, budget, future prod-
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ucts and board meeting minutes as well as advanced notification of corporate events such as debt
issuance and mergers. Also, ratings can also include factors that are entirely subjective, such as
management quality. Ultimately, a corporate credit rating is a team of agency analysts’ subjective
assessment about the overall financial capacity of an issuer to pay its financial obligations in full
and on time.
‘Credit ratings are not recommendations to purchase, sell or hold particular se-
curities. Credit ratings do not comment on the suitability of an investment for any
particular investor.’ -Moody’s Investor Service Disclaimer, Feb 2009.
Credit ratings form an integral part of the global financing architecture. Since their inception
in 1908 by John Moody to rate rail road bonds, their usages have become both varied and per-
vasive within the fabric of financial markets, and within credit markets in particular. Individuals,
companies, municipalities and sovereigns all carry credit ratings and ratings affect both the ability
to obtain debt financing as well as the rate charged when repaying it. Other important (but non-
exhaustive) uses of ratings include bond covenants, loan agreements, collateral agreements, the
investment charters and mandates of most investment firms, index eligibility guidelines, regula-
tion, legislation, supervisory policies and risk management systems. Whilst not recommendations
to buy or sell particular securities, given their extensive use in regulation, ratings changes are some-
times legal requirements for markets participants to sell securities. To highlight this point, I will
detail some of the key regulatory references to credit ratings.
B. Regulatory Reliance on Ratings
In 1936 the U.S. Treasury Department issued a ruling preventing commercial banks from investing
in high-yield debt as determined by the big three rating agencies. This ruling began the process of
enshrining the ratings of the major CRAs into law. The Investment Company Act of 1940 required
money market funds to hold short-term securities rated as one of the three highest rating cate-
gories. This rule translates today into the Security and Exchange Commissions’ (SEC) Rule 2a-7
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which limits their investments to bonds that are rated above A1. In 1951 the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners established the Securities Valuation Office which essentially linked
insurance companies’ capital requirements to the credit quality of their portfolio holdings as as-
cribed by Moody’s and S&P2. In 1975 the SEC designated Moodys´, S&P and Fitch as Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) which qualified their ratings for use in its
regulations around minimum capital charges for broker-dealers under the Net Capital Rule. The
motivation for doing so was to stop the creation of bogus agencies ascribing high-quality ratings
to circumvent regulation. This particular development crystalized regulatory reliance on ratings.
Following the SEC, many other regulators followed suit and made use of the NRSRO category.
In 1988 the Department of Labor regulated pension fund investments in asset-backed securities to
be rated above A2, as ascribed by an NRSRO. In 1989, Savings and Loans were prohibited from
investing in high-yield bonds and in 1993 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision proposed
guidelines that internationally active commercial banks should increase capital holdings against
speculative grade inventories.
NRSRO status is therefore widely adopted within federal and state legislation, as well as by
many other financial regulators, both within and outside of the U.S3. In light of the events of
2007-9 as explained below, an international stocktaking exercise was conducted by the The Joint
Forum (2009) on member authorities’ usage of credit ratings to determine if they felt their reg-
ulations unintentionally gave credit ratings an official seal of approval and discouraged investors
from performing their own due diligence. They found that the five key purposes of credit rat-
ings in legislation, regulations and supervisory policies in order of prevalence are: i) Determining
capital requirements ii) Identifying or classifying assets in the context of eligible investments and
permissible asset concentrations iii) Providing a credible evaluation of the credit risk associated
with assets purchased as part of a securitization offering iv) Determining disclosure requirements
and v) Determining prospectus eligibility. They concluded that whilst some of the authorities had
thought about over reliance on ratings, none had made an formal assessment of whether their usage
2In 1990 they further tightened guideless on investment in high-yield bonds by life insurance companies.
3See White (2010) and Forum (2009) for further clarification.
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of credit ratings deterred prudential risk-assessment. They also found that the U.S. makes greater
usage of credit ratings in regulation than other member jurisdictions4.
For a rating agency, designation as an NRSRO itself carries important regulatory implications.
Foremost among them, is that NRSROs are exempt from Regulation FD which was ratified by
the SEC in October 2000 and mandates that publicly traded companies must disclose material,
price-sensitive information to all investors at the same time. They can however share sensitive
information with agencies and therefore the information set available to agency analysts is con-
siderably greater than that of other market participants, as studied by Jorion, Liu & Shi (2005).
Taken in conjunction, it is understood that regulators use ratings to simplify the task of prudential
oversight by creating and enforcing regulatory reliance on credit ratings. The various financial in-
stitutions who use ratings, by meetings these requirements, may potentially out-source prudential
credit risk evaluation to the major NRSROs.
C. Controversy Surrounding the Rating Agencies
At the congressional level, controversy surrounding the CRAs began in the wake of the Enron
scandal in 2001. Hearings where held to ascertain why they did not pick up on Enron’s finan-
cial position earlier, maintaining their investment-grade status until five days before it declared
bankruptcy5. In light of their findings, the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act was passed
which attempted to weaken the effective oligopoly, which was enabled by government regulation
through the use of the NRSRO designation, held by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. The Act instructed
the SEC to cease being a barrier to entry to the rating industry to increase competition and inno-
vation, specified the criteria the SEC should use in designating new NRSROs in order to increase
transparency in the process, and gave the SEC some limited powers to oversee the NRSROs. The
2006 Act did not however allow the SEC to interfere with the ratings methodologies or busi-
ness models of the incumbent agencies. The Act effectively brought to an end a century of self-
4The appendix of the paper contains a detailed list of the various regulations and legislations that reference credit
ratings in the U.S.
5Their ratings of WorldCom and more recently Lehman Brothers have attracted similar questions; Lehman Broth-
ers’ commercial paper held investment grade ratings the morning of its bankruptcy on Sep 15, 2008.
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regulation in the rating industry; ratings were enshrined in regulation but the rating agencies were
not themselves regulated. Today there are 10 NRSROs licensed by the SEC.
More recently and of much greater historical consequence, credit ratings were at the center
of the mortgage, sub-prime and structured products crisis that started in early-to-mid 2007. The
major CRAs assigned ex-post hyper-inflated AAA ratings to trillions of dollars worth of collat-
eralized debt and mortgage obligations. Commentators have suggested that because of the regu-
latory framework around ratings, rating agencies, rather than performing the economic function
of information production, were in fact engaging in the selling of regulatory licenses. They were
handsomely compensated for doing so; it is well-cited that Moody’s had the highest operating
margin of any company in the S&P 500 for five consecutive years between 2001-6, derived up to
50% of their revenue from structured products ratings, and attracted high-profile investors such
as Warren Buffett who at one time held approximately 20% of their shares. When the U.S hous-
ing market slowed down and delinquencies sharply increased in early-to-mid 2007, the values of
mortgage-backed products, as well as their ratings, plummeted. This led to a string of eye-watering
write-downs by global, systemically important, financial institutions. Estimates vary, but the IMF
put losses relating to so-called toxic assets and bad loans at major US and EU financial institutions
at about $2.8 trillion dollars by 2010 (The International Monetary Fund (2009)).
As I will highlight in Chapter 4 of this thesis, the outstanding rating-based regulation allowed
many rating constrained investors such as money market mutual funds, municipalities and banks
themselves to invest huge sums of capital in the highly rated tranches of securitized products. In
essence this practice was a form regulation arbitrage; they could not invest directly in the under-
lying, often highly illiquid, assets that backed the cash flows of these tranches, or carried a much
higher capital charge for doing so. The resulting credit related write-downs suffered by major
financial institutions and the subsequent fear over who held large, concentrated exposures to secu-
ritized products lead to a run on credit. In turn, liquidity evaporated in over-night funding markets
over concerns about counter-party risk. Ultimately this episode led to the demise or acquisition un-
der duress of a string of major institutions. Northern Rock, Countrywide Financial, Bear Stearns,
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, and
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AIG to name some of the biggest. Hundreds of regional banks, mortgage lenders and participants
in the shadow-banking system also failed.
In light of these events, the Dodd-Frank Act has imposed a series of new measures with regards
to credit ratings and the rating agencies. Broadly, these provisions aim at reducing the role of
the CRAs in the financial system by removing references to NRSROs as well as creating more
competition6 in an industry dominated by S&P, Moodys and Fitch. It has created new oversight
for the CRAs, enhanced the SECs enforcement mechanisms and requires every federal agency to
review rating-based regulations and remove any reference to, or requirement of reliance on, credit
ratings.
II. Credit Default Swaps and the Financial Crisis
Credit default swaps are the most widely used instrument in the credit derivatives market. A
CDS is (historically) a bilateral over-the-counter (OTC) agreement which transfers a defined credit
risk between counter-parties by providing a payoff equal to the loss-given-default on a reference
bond if a credit event is triggered by the reference obligor over the lifetime of the contract. The
CDS buyer pays a periodic premium, quoted as annualized spread in basis points (bps), to the
protection seller and receives a settlement equal to the difference between the par and market value
of the underlying bond should a default event occur. In this way, a CDS functions as a form of
insurance against credit events on the underlying bond. Using standard no-arbitrage arguments,
Duffie (1999) shows that a firm’s CDS spread is closely related to a par-coupon credit spread of
the same maturity. I shall refrain from giving a full theoretical treatment as this is widely available
in financial text-books, as well as many of the references contained in this thesis.
6Several recent studies have examined competition within the rating industry. Becker & Milbourn (2009) show
that the increasing market share of Fitch led to more issuer-friendly, less informative ratings. Bongaerts, Jong &
Driessen (2009) suggest that issuers apply for a third rating in order to facilitate certification with respect to regulatory
constraints, i.e. determining investment-grade status, against alternative hypotheses of a reduction in uncertainty
through information production or to increase their average rating through ratings shopping. Kisgen & Strahan (2009)
use the certification of Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) in February 2003 as a fourth NRSRO to show that
ratings-based regulations affect a firm’s cost of debt capital.
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CDS were hailed as a wonder of modern financial engineering between their inception in the
early 1990s up to the first half of the last decade. Banks in particular, through their loan and
debt issuance businesses, have a legitimate need to free up their balance sheets by hedging or
completely selling-off large outstanding credit exposures. The invention of the CDS played a
major role in allowing them to do so, in turn increasing the supply of credit and, in principle,
achieving greater stability in the financial system through the risk sharing benefits they offer. The
CDS market grew rapidly in terms of both traded volume and notional outstanding and has become
in one of the most prominent asset classes today. To give some context, the Bank for International
Settlements estimates that as of the end of 2010, the total notional amount of outstanding CDSs
was approximately $30tr. This compares with approximately $400tr of interest rate derivatives, the
large sector of the over-the-counter derivative markets, $60tr of foreign exchange derivatives, $6tr
of equity derivatives and $3tr of commodity derivatives.
The role of CDSs in the financial crisis related to the structure of OTC derivatives markets.
Existing practice was to allow certain firms, usually those with the highest credit ratings, to enter
into swaps contracts without depositing collateral with their trading counter-parties. AIG, one of
the worlds largest insurers, had made a transition from traditional business lines in the insurance
industry such as commercial, industrial, auto and travel insurance, to providing corporate credit
protection via CDSs. Ostensibly, these business share similarities; collecting premia to provide
protection against an unlikely, but large, financial losses. AIG’s London unit built up large un-
capitalized exposures by selling credit protection on collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) which
deteriorated massively in value. As one of the largest net sellers of credit protection, they also had
large positions on Lehman Brothers and other financial firms which were becoming increasingly
insolvent. On September 16, 2008 AIG suffered a liquidity crisis following the downgrade of its
credit rating when its major counterparties demanded additional collateral against its positions.
Ultimately, through a series of bailouts by the Federal Reserve, AIG’s total cost to the tax-payer
reached a sum in the region of $182.5bn, the largest bailout of a privately held company in U.S
history. The reason CDSs came under so much fire from regulators, legislators and the media was
that the bilateral OTC derivative market is opaque. When concerns over counter-party insolvency
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spiked sharply, banks stopped lending to each other as there was no way of determining where
large concentrations of exposures lay. This problem was compounded in CDS transaction in par-
ticular as a large back-log of uncleared trades had built up in the system as the market had grown
much faster than the infrastructure required to support it.
Whilst not the focus of this thesis, it is interesting to comment on the future of the CDS mar-
ket also. The Dodd-Frank act has imposed seismic changes to the structure and organization of
the OTC derivative markets, with a broadly defined goal of increasing stability and transparency.
The key derivatives legislation is set forth in Title VII entitled ”Wall Street Transparency and Ac-
countability” but provisions under other titles, such as Title VI ”Banking Organizations”, will also
materially alter these markets. The three major pieces of regulation covered by the act are (i)
the central clearing and exchange trading of all standardized OTC derivatives (ii) the introduction
of the Volcker rule which bans proprietary trading by major banks and (iii) the so-called Lincoln
amendment which requires equity, credit and commodity derivatives business to be managed under
separately capitalized bank subsidiaries. The mandated central clearing of the bulk of OTC deriva-
tives transactions is perhaps the most important consequence of these legislative changes. The
idea is to remake the OTC market in the image of regulated futures exchanges in order to reduce
systemic risk that results from contagious defaults if a systemically important financial institution
fails.
III. The Interaction of Credit Ratings and Credit Default Swap
Spreads
My approach to understanding the interaction of CDS and credit ratings is almost purely data
driven and therefore my work entails largely statistical contributions to the fields of credit risk and
financial economics. Aside from their centrality to the financial system and respective roles in
the financial crisis, what makes this interaction so appealing from an empirical perspective is that
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they are closely related; CDSs are the market prices of the risks that ratings, particularly Moody’s
ratings, aim to capture. That is, probability of default and loss-given-default.
The bulk of my work relies on two main data sets. A CDS data set originally provided by
CMA DataVisionT M and accessed via Thompson Reuters Datastream, and a credit rating data set
provided by Moody’s Analytics and contained within their Default and Recovery Database (DRD).
I return to discussing them in greater detail in the subsequent chapters. To give a first, preliminary
indication of the relationship between CDS spreads and credit ratings I provide the following
simple analysis. I take the daily CDS spreads and credit ratings of a cross-section of 241 of the
most important U.S. debt issuers between February 2, 2004 and June 1, 2010. I then map the first
15 rating categories as ascribed by Moody’s, Aaa - Ba3, onto their corresponding distributions of
daily CDS spreads. That is, I take all CDS spreads that correspond to a given rating level across
all issuers and time. In total, there are 372,827 daily CDS-rating pairs. Figure 1.1 provides a box
plot of the results.
Firstly, we note that the median spread for each rating category increases almost monotonically,
suggesting that the rank ordering of credit risk implied by ratings is to some extent mirrored in CDS
spreads. The relationship is non-linear however, and there is a large increase in median spread for
firms rated between Baa3 and Ba1, i.e. at the investment-grade ratings boundary. The boundary,
which should be considered as a regulatory friction in light of the previous discussion, provides an
important reference point for this thesis and many of the key empirical contributions of my work
are in relation to the distortions in credit markets that can be related to it. Secondly, there is clearly
a lot of variation in spreads for a given rating, which increases as ratings decrease. The fact that
there is variation in CDS spreads for a given rating level is not surprising, ratings are a much lower
frequency signal of credit quality than CDS spreads and are therefore much less volatile. However,
media commentators in particular often appear to interpret credit ratings as an absolute measure
of credit risk, i.e. the rank ordering of credit risk implied by ratings is unconditional. AAA is
more credit worthy than Aa1, which is more credit worthy than Aa2 etc. Yet Figure 1.1 clearly
demonstrates that if one maps credit ratings, which should be considered as a relative measure of
credit risk, onto CDS spread levels which provide an absolute measure, highly rated Aa2 firms
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can have CDS spread levels more consistent (in a distributional sense) with firms in the lowest
investment-grade rating category Baa37. This simple exercise reveals that the interaction of CDS
spreads and credit ratings is non-trivial, but that there are relationships which link them. The
remainder of this thesis documents much deeper aspects of their interaction.
IV. Chapter Outline
The remainder of this thesis consists of three chapters. In Chapter 2, I develop an intuitive and
simple framework in which to study correlation dynamics in the CDS market. My interest in this
topic was guided by the events of late 2008 and the realization that given the economic importance
of credit correlation there was little in the way of extant empirical studies in this direction. The fact
credit correlation is captured by CDS correlations, that empirical literature on equity correlations
existed, and that the two securities can be related theoretically, facilitated a comparative analysis
between the correlation structures of these markets. Through cluster analysis I show that whilst
industry affiliation plays a central role in both equity and CDS correlations, so too does rating
classification as investment-grade or high-yield in CDS correlations. The most profound empirical
result of this chapter is that high-yield rated issuers, from entirely unrelated economic sectors,
form a distinct correlation cluster in CDS markets. As noted previously, an issuer’s credit rating is
effectively a subjective assessment of rank ordered credit risk, made by a major credit rating agency
and the distinction between investment-grade and high-yield originated as a regulatory boundary.
Given these realizations, I interpret this evidence as being consistent with the idea of friction-based
co-movement put forward by Barberis & Shliefer (2003) and Barberis, Shliefer & Wurgler (2005)
in which classification and/or market frictions can drive co-movement in security prices unrelated
to co-movement in fundamental values.
7In the figure, Aa2 appears to be a relative outlier in terms of the corresponding median spread and variation in
spreads. Clearly, the CDS market disagrees with the rank ordering of credit risk implied by credit ratings for these
issuers. Deeper analysis explains why; Aa2 has a high concentration of banks and insurance companies which have
been priced as relatively more risky by CDS market participants given the events of the financial crisis.
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In Chapter 3, I explicitly test this notion and further explore why high-yield rated issuers form
correlation clusters in the CDS market, i.e. what drives this dynamic, and whether it is entirely
consistent with the traditional view of financial economics that a securities price merely reflects
its fundamental value. I show the high-yield issuers that form correlation clusters share a sec-
ond key property; they are essentially all permanent members of Markit’s high-yield CDX index.
By exploiting Markit’s index eligibility rules, which are largely governed by credit ratings and
rating changes, I show that high-yield correlation clustering is consistent with the idea of excess
co-movement in CDS prices. That is, co-movement in prices greater than should be expected from
co-movement in fundamental values. Building on the results of the equity literature that has doc-
umented excess co-movement in equity returns, I suggest that the generating mechanism relates
to the trading behaviour of style-investors around the index. That is, by taking aggregate macro
views based on the somewhat arbitrary high-yield label, and by making capital allocation decisions
at the index level, trading of the entire basket without full consideration of the fundamental values
of individual constituents generates excess co-movement in CDS prices. In this way, the empirical
evidence I present suggests a significant departure from fundamentals-based price co-movement
and is contrary to traditional views of market efficiency.
Chapter 4 then studies the dynamic interaction of CDS spreads and credit rating announce-
ments. In the previous chapters I focused on the discrete labeling of issuers as either investment-
grade or high-yield and the implications this distinction has for co-movement in prices, market
structure and market efficiency. Yet credit ratings have more depth than these dichotomous clas-
sifications and there are a total of 21 ratings an issuer can be assigned with. Also, the full rating
process includes two other important signals of credit quality, outlooks and reviews. The empirical
framework I employ builds on the studies of Norden & Weber (2004) and Hull, Predescu & White
(2004), who have shown that the entire rating process, including these additional signals of credit
quality, are important to the CDS price formation process. However, I focus on whether the events
of 2007 onwards have altered the nature of the time-series and cross-sectional interaction between
rating announcements and CDS spreads. I examine whether the so-called ‘credit rating crisis’ al-
tered the information effects (price effects) of their traditional product, corporate credit ratings.
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Unlike the structured product ratings implicated in the crisis, corporate bond ratings share a long
history of empirical validation. I use an event study to analyze the CDS market’s response to rating
announcements by Moody’s between September 2004 and December 2009 and demonstrate that
CDS price effects were considerably greater in the pre-crisis era. I view this result as consistent
with a loss of information caused by a spill-over effect of reputational damage onto the bond rating
services of the CRAs.
26
Figure 1.1: A box plot of the distribution of daily CDS spreads for each of Moody’s Issuer Ratings. The
tops and bottoms of each box are the 25th and 75th percentiles of the samples, respectively. The line in
the middle is the sample median. Notches around the median display the variability of the median between
samples. The width of a notch is computed so that box plots whose notches do not overlap have different
medians at the 5% significance level using a Mann-Whitney U test. The whiskers extending out of each box
are drawn from the ends of the interquartile ranges to the largest and smallest observations.
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Chapter 2
The Correlation Structure of the CDS
Market: An Empirical Investigation
I. Summary
I begin by examining the correlation structure of five-year corporate CDS spreads. For comparative
purposes, I also examine the correlation structure of the equity returns of these issuers. The key
empirical artifact I document is that there is a well-defined credit rating structure contained within
CDS correlations. Whilst a well-defined industry structure is also present, by comparison, the
correlation structure of equity returns is characterized by industry affiliation alone. This highlights
major differences in the organization of these markets, the salience of the distinction between
investment-grade and high-yield rated issuers in credit markets, and provides the first evidence of
friction-based co-movement dynamics in credit markets.
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II. Introduction
Traditional asset pricing theory posits that, in frictionless markets, prices correspond to risk-
adjusted rational expectations of future cash flows. In this setting, one source of correlation in
prices is due to correlation in shocks to cash flows. However, in economies with frictions, irra-
tional investors and limits to arbitrage, Barberis & Shleifer (2003) and Barberis, Shleifer & Wur-
gler (2005) demonstrate that a class of friction and sentiment-based co-movement theories arise.
‘Style’ investing is one such theory and somewhat behavioral in nature. The basis of which is that
one of the clearest mechanisms of human thought is classification; we do so in order to simplify
problems of choice and the ability to process vast quantities of information. ‘Style investors’ first
categorize risky assets (market capitalization, sector, rating etc.) and then allocate funds at the cat-
egory level. Habitat investors, a related concept, can only trade in a particular subset of securities
due to the presence of trading restrictions. Crucially, in these theories common factors exist in the
returns of assets that happen to be classified in the same category, even if shocks to the assets’ cash
flows are themselves uncorrelated.
One of the most prominent divides of classification in capital markets is that of the investment-
grade ratings boundary; separating investment-grade from high-yield rated issuer based on an as-
sessment of credit risk made by credit rating agencies. The boundary is often cited in regulation,
for instance the The Joint Forum (2009) details member authorities’ usage of credit ratings in leg-
islation, regulations and supervisory policies. Also, many institutional investors are restricted from
holding high-yield debt. Notably, commercial banks and Savings & Loans have been prohibited
from doing so since 1936 and 1989 respectively. The boundary is also referenced in many other
types of financial contracts; sell-side firms utilize the distinction when acting as dealers in OTC
derivatives markets to determine acceptable counterparties and collateral levels for outstanding
credit exposures. Although not subject to regulatory restrictions, bond mutual funds typically spe-
cialize in either investment-grade or high-yield debt and at the very least reference the boundary
with respect to permissible asset concentrations. According to the Vanguard High-Yield Corporate
Fund Prospectus (May 28, 2010), the fund invests “at least 80% of its assets in corporate bonds
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that are rated below Baa3 by Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.”. Pimco, the largest bond mutual
fund, makes similar distinctions in its funds.
In this chapter I look for two important implications of the co-movement theories outlined
above. (i) Evidence of common factors related to issuers’ classification as either investment-grade
or high-yield in CDS spreads and (ii) whether these factors are strong enough in the time-series
and cross-section to have a discernible influence on the correlation structure of the CDS market. I
choose to study CDS spreads rather than bond credit spreads for several reasons. For instance, the
estimation of credit spreads is affected by the choice of risk-free benchmark yield (Houweling &
Vorst (2005)) as well as differential tax treatments (Elton, Gruber, Agrawal & Mann (2001)) and
liquidity (Longstaff, Mithal & Neis (2005)) between corporate and treasury bonds. Also, CDSs are
typically traded on standardized terms, less affected by differences in covenants and contractual
arrangements across issuers, and generally perceived as a timelier measure of credit risk (Blanco,
Brennan & Marsh (2005) and Zhu (2005)). The data set utilized in this chapter consists of the daily
CDS and equity prices of 145 eminent U.S. firms between February 2, 2004 to August 29, 2008.
I make use of a comparative analysis to the correlation structure of the equity market, where no
friction comparable to the investment-grade boundary exists. Also, an extensive theoretical frame-
work is in place that links the two sets of securities. These models, known as the structural models
of credit risk, build on the seminal contribution of Merton (1974). In essence, these models treat
equity (equity derivatives) and bonds (bond derivatives) as contingent claims on the underlying
firm value process. The evolution of a firms’ structural variables, namely asset value and volatility,
endogenously determine the time-of-default of an issuer1. These underpinnings aid in the inter-
pretation of the result I present, particularly in terms of the apparent deviations from prevailing
wisdom.
1This class of model shares a long history of theoretical development as well as empirical testing. Further con-
tributions to the theoretical framework can be found in Black & Cox (1976), Leland (1994), Longstaff & Schwartz
(1995), Leland & Toft (1996) and Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein (2001) among others. The literature that tests these
models empirically does not typically report favorable results. For instance both Eom, Helwege & Huang (2004) and
Jones, Mason & Rosenfeld (1984) suggest poor accuracy and predictive power. Ericsson, Reneby & Wang (2006)
extend the theoretical framework to price CDSs and suggest improved accuracy over bond spreads. In more recent but
related work, Ericsson, Jacobs & Oviedo (2009) find that the variables implied by the structural models are useful in
explaining variation in CDS spreads.
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In more directly related empirical research, the correlation structure of the equity market has
been documented extensively. For example, early work by King (1966) and Meyers (1973) demon-
strates that a large group of individual series of stock returns can be separated into smaller sets of
correlation clusters related by industry classification. As an interesting and intuitive framework in
which to examine correlation dynamics, to the best of my knowledge, no prior study has imple-
mented cluster analysis on a comprehensive sample of CDS spreads. Having reference literature
with respect to equity correlations facilitates the methodological design of the cluster analysis and
also gives a frame of reference in which to interpret my results. However a couple of prior stud-
ies have touched on CDS correlation. Daniels & Jensen (2005) find that industry dummies are
an important explanatory variable in CDS spreads, suggesting that the CDS market may also be
segmented by industry type; this understanding forms the corner stone of the methodology I em-
ploy. Longstaff & Rajan (2008), through Principle Components Analysis (PCA), also suggest that
industry plays an important role in the clustering of CDS spreads in subsets of firms. In line with
their study, I begin by examining the correlation structure of the CDS market using PCA, which
seems logical given that it reduces the dimensionality of the data and therefore helps identify the
main sources of redundancy of information in the panel, of which industry affiliation seems an
obvious candidate. I find that the correlation structure of CDS returns, like that of equity returns, is
indeed characterized by respective market factors and that they are significantly negatively corre-
lated2. Also, factors that affect specific subsets of firms, such as industries or groups of industries.
I also find evidence of firm-specific factors in CDS spreads, consistent with previous evidence on
corporate credit spreads, as noted by Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein & Martin (2001) and Campbell
& Taksler (2003) among others. However differences in the correlation structures of these markets
become apparent; correlations seem less closely related to industry in the CDS market and I also
find evidence of common factors related to oil prices influencing equity and not CDS correlations.
I then utilize an agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis, the Complete Linkage method,
to identify correlation clusters in CDS and equity returns to gain insight into differences in their
cross-sectional structures. My motivation for doing so is that if common factors related to rating
2Consistent with the observation by Kwan (1996) that bond yield changes and stocks returns are negatively corre-
lated.
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classification exist in spreads, and make an important contribution relative to market and indus-
try factors, a segmentation of CDS correlations across the boundary will be observed. I use the
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) as a benchmark for the expected structures of the
CDS and equity clusters; industry groups of firms homogenized due to common factors in their
security prices. However, the CDS clusters demonstrate two patterns in addition to industry in-
fluences. Firstly, the correlation clustering of high-yield rated issuers with no industry links and
secondly, a decoupling of correlations within an industry, across the boundary. By contrast, in the
equity market the clustering is entirely explained by industry; there is no segmentation by rating.
These results provide the first empirical evidence of common factors in CDS spreads related to
the investment-grade boundary, consistent with the predictions of the friction-based co-movement
theories.
To better understand the relative contributions of market, industry and rating factors on correla-
tions, I then remove from the data set all firms which have crossed the investment-grade boundary
during the sample period. As shown by Barberis et al. (2005), and explicitly tested in Chapter 3 of
this thesis, the sensitivity of an asset to factors pertaining to its classification alter when the classi-
fication changes. Subsequently, I control for the influence of market factors on return correlations.
I do so through firm-by-firm time-series regressions of CDS returns on a CDS index and equity
returns on the S&P500, in a similar fashion to existing studies in the equity literature (Livingston
(1977)). By repeating the cluster analysis on the residuals of these regressions, I show that mean
residual CDS correlation coefficients of high-yield clusters with no industry links are of a similar
magnitude to that of investment-grade industry affiliates. When clustered high-yield firms share
industry affiliation, mean residual correlations approximately double, suggesting that high-yield
factors are as important as, if not more than, industry factors in the spreads of the issuers I analyze.
I also find that the market and industry factors play a similar role in CDS and equity returns cor-
relations for well-clustered industries; mean residual correlations are typically half that of mean
return correlations for both sets of securities.
In the final analysis of this chapter, I go on to compare industry factors between CDS and equity
returns. For this purpose, I focus on the Energy Sector as defined by the GICS, for two main rea-
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sons. Firstly, the results of the PCA provide an economically plausible, observable proxy for a key
factor in their equity returns; the return on spot oil prices. Secondly, the cluster analysis identifies
the Energy Sector as being very distinct in the equity correlation matrix; common factors related
to industry are particularly important for this cross-section firms. I find that common dependence
on oil prices does explain the extent to which their equity returns cluster, yet this does not hold for
their CDS returns, where I conclude the common industry factors are more likely latent in nature.
This finding of different sensitivity to industry factors across securities relating to the same set of
firms furthers my explanation of why their correlation structures differ to the extent that I identify.
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. Firstly I provide the first evidence
of friction-based co-movement in credit markets. Secondly, I provide the most comprehensive
empirical analysis of the correlation structure of the U.S. five-year CDS market. Thirdly, this
study provides an in-depth comparative analysis to the correlation structure of the equity market;
Longstaff & Rajan (2008) argue for a better understanding of the cross-sectional structure of CDS
and equity prices of the corresponding firms. Finally, it adds to the growing empirical literature
that demonstrates the importance of the ratings boundary in financial markets. Recent research has
shown that the distinction between investment-grade and high-yield affects a firm’s cost of capital
(Kisgen & Strahan (2009)), debt-issuance and investment (Chernenko & Sunderam (2009)). The
rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section III describes the data set employed. Section
IV conducts a principle components analysis and presents evidence on what drives correlations in
the CDS and equity markets. Section V explains the cluster methodology and then examines the
correlation structures of CDS and equity returns. Section VII concludes.
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III. The Data Set and Descriptive Statistics
The data set employed in this chapter consists of CMA’s end-of-day composite mid-market CDS
spreads and common stock closing prices obtained from Thompson Reuters Datastream, GICS
codes obtained from COMPUSTAT and issuer-level historical ratings from the Default Risk Ser-
vice (DRS) corporate database of Moody’s Investors Service.
A. The CDS and Equity Data
Like previous studies in the CDS literature, I focus on five-year quotes which are the benchmark
maturity. All premia are expressed as an annualized spread in basis points on U.S. dollar denom-
inated notional amounts and all reference obligations are senior unsecured debt. According to
CMA, contributed quotes are validated, filtered and aggregated using proprietary software. For
the publication of prices at 5pm New York time, a minimum of three consortium members seeing
quotes from three distinct sell side sources must contribute. When there are insufficient observed
values to build an entire term structure, CMA fits a proprietary term structure model to the available
data to generate the rest of the curve, which they term ‘derived prices’. I choose to retain CMA’s
derived prices rather than linearly interpolate or hold prices constant between observed quotes. In
the final sample of 145 issuers, the mean percentage of quoted to total spreads is 81% and the
median is 84%. As a further control of data quality and CDS liquidity, I impose a restriction that
limits the maximum number of consecutive trading days of zero spread change to 20.
The existing CDS literature focusses mainly on spread changes, however in using this specifica-
tion, issuers trading at higher spreads will have more volatile spreads than issuers trading at lower
spreads. To circumvent the statistical problems associated with this, I consider log-percentage
changes in CDS spreads. I will use this specification throughout this thesis, which I refer to as
‘CDS returns’. However, this definition does not correspond directly to the daily dollar return
on a CDS position given a change in spread, rather the term merely represents an analogy to the
formulation of equity returns. The CDS data set is in the form of at-market spreads for newly-
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issued contracts and the calculation of actual returns requires a pricing model. There is then the
well-known distinction between those that belong to either the reduced-form or structural-model
specifications (Merton (1974)), yet little academic consensus as to the best method for pricing
CDS. I remain agnostic to model specification because interest lies in relative price dynamics. The
raw equity data set matches that of the CDS in terms of frequency, coverage and time span and
returns are calculated in the normal manner in order to facilitate a direct comparison between the
correlation structures of the CDS and equity markets.
B. Industry Classifications
The most widely available industry classification schemes are the Standard Industry Classification
(SIC) codes, the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), the Fama & French
(1997) algorithm and the GICS. Bhojraj, Lee & Oler (2003) compare the four schemes in a variety
of applications common to capital market research, such as their ability to explain cross-sectional
variation in stock returns as well as market-based valuation multiples. They reach the conclusion
that the GICS is significantly better than the others in almost all applications, and argue that it
should be more widely adopted by academic researchers. I implemented the main analysis of this
chapter using the NAICS as well. The central results are not sensitive to the choice of industry
classification scheme but I consistently found better results using the GICS.
The GICS was developed jointly by Standard & Poors (S&P) and Morgan Stanley Capital
International (MSCI) and introduced in 1999 to ‘establish a global standard for categorizing com-
panies into sectors and industries’. It is an eight-digit, four-tiered (two digits per tier), hierarchical
classification code and currently consists of 10 sectors, 24 industry groups, 67 industries and 147
sub-industries. According to the GICS guidebook (MSCI Barra (2009)), companies are classified
on the basis of their primary business activity. The S&P and MSCI analysts are guided by in-
formation from financial statements as well as market perception as revealed through investment
research reports. Due to the hierarchical nature of the GICS, I must stipulate from which level
affiliations between firms will be drawn. I follow Daniels & Jensen (2005) in so far as my ex-ante
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belief is that the CDS market is segmented by industry type. In this chapter, firms are classified by
their six-digit (industry-level) GICS codes.
C. Rating Classifications
I use Moody’s historical issuer-level senior unsecured ratings to classify investment-grade and
high-yield rated firms as well as those that have either been upgraded or downgraded across the
boundary over the sample period. Four firms did not have ratings available in the DRS and so I
supplemented their ratings data with S&P’s domestic long term issuer credit rating obtained from
COMPUSTAT. For the subsequent analysis, usage of the term ‘rating classification’ refers only to
the distinction made between issuers separated by the boundary, not the finer categories of Moody’s
twenty-one grade alphanumeric rating scale.
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Table 2.1: The 145 firms used in this chapter are grouped into GICS industries and presented with accom-
panying equity ticker symbols and rating classifications, defined as investment-grade (IG), high-yield (HY)
or some combination of the two depending on rating actions by Moody’s.
Industry GICS Code Ticker Firm Name Rating Class.
Energy Equipment & Services 101010 BHI Baker Hughes Inc. IG
DO Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc. IG
HAL Halliburton Company IG
NBR Nabors Industries Ltd. IG
PDE Pride International Inc. HY
RIG Transocean Ltd. IG
WFT Weatherford International Ltd. IG
Oil, Gas & Consumable Fuels 101020 APC Anadarko Petroleum Corp. IG
APA Apache Corp. IG
CHK Chesapeake Energy Corp. HY
CVX Chevron Corp. IG
COP Conocophillips IG
DVN Devon Energy Corp. IG
EP El Paso Corp. HY
HSE Hess Corp. IG
KMP Kinder Morgan Energy LP IG
MRO Marathon Oil Corp. IG
OXY Occidental Petroleum Corp. IG
OKS Oneok Partners LP IG
SUN Sunoco Inc. IG
TSO Tesoro Corp. HY
VLO Valero Energy Corp. IG
WMB Williams Cos. Inc. HY/IG
XTO XTO Energy Inc. IG
Chemicals 151010 APD Air Products & Chemicals Inc. IG
ASH Ashland Inc. IG/HY
CYT Cytec Industries Inc. IG
DOW Dow Chemical IG
DD E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company IG
EMN Eastman Chemical Company IG
LZ Lubrizol Corp. IG
MON Monsanto Company IG
OLN Olin Corp. IG/HY
POL Polyone Corp. HY
PPG PPG Industries Inc. IG
PX Praxair Inc. IG
ROH Rohm & Haas Company IG
RPM RPM International Inc. IG
Road & Rail 203040 CAR Avis Budget Group Inc. HY
BNI Burlington Northern Santa Fe IG
CNW Con-Way Inc. IG
CSX CSX Corp. IG
NSC Norfolk Southern Corp. IG
R Ryder System Inc. IG
UNP Union Pacific Corp. IG
Auto Components 251010 AXL American Axle & Manufacturing Holdings Inc. IG/HY
ARM Arvinmeritor Inc. HY
BWA Borgwarner Inc. IG
CTB Cooper Tire & Rubber Company IG/HY
GT Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company HY
JCI Johnson Controls Inc. IG
LEA Lear Corp. IG/HY
VC Visteon Corp. HY
Household Durables 252010 BZH Beazer Homes USA Inc. HY
BDK Black & Decker Corp. IG
CTX Centex Corp. IG/HY
DHI D.R. Horton Inc. HY/IG/HY
KBH KB Home HY
LEN Lennar Corp. IG/HY
MDC M.D.C Holdings Inc. IG
NWL Newell Rubbermaid Inc. IG
PHM Pulte Homes Inc. IG/HY
RYL Ryland Group Inc. HY/IG/HY
SPF Standard Pacific Corp. HY
TOL Toll Brothers Inc. IG/HY
WHR Whirlpool Corp. IG
(Continued on next page)
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Industry GICS Code Ticker Company Name Rating Class.
Hotels, Restaurants & Leisure 253010 CCL Carnival Corp. IG
DRI Darden Restaurants Inc. IG
MAR Marriott International Inc. IG
MCD Mcdonald’s Corp. IG
MGM MGM Mirage HY
RCL Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. HY
HOT Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc. HY/IG
WEN Wendy’s Arby’s Group Inc. IG/HY
YUM Yum! Brands Inc. IG
Speciality Retail 255040 AZO Autozone Inc. IG
LOW Lowe’s Companies Inc. IG
LTD Limited Brands Inc. IG/HY
RSH Radioshack Corp. IG/HY
SHW Sherwin-Williams Co. IG
SPLS Staples Inc. IG
TJX TJX Companies Inc. IG
Food & Staples Retail 301010 COST Costco Wholesale Corp. IG
CVS CVS Caremark Corp. IG
KR Kroger Company IG
RAD Rite Aid Corp. HY
SWY Safeway Inc. IG
SVU Supervalu Inc. IG/HY
WMT Wal-Mart Stores Inc. IG
Food Products 302020 ADM Archer-Daniels-Midland IG
CPB Campbell Soup Company IG
CAG Conagra Foods Inc. IG
DF Dean Foods Company HY
HNZ Heinz Company IG
KFT Kraft Foods Inc. IG
SLE Sara Lee Corp. IG
SFD Smithfields Foods Inc. HY
TSN Tyson Foods Inc. IG/HY
Healthcare Providers 351020 AET Aetna Inc. IG
ABC Amerisourcebergen Corp. HY/IG
CAH Cardinal Health Inc. IG
CI Cigna Corp. IG
HMA Health Management Assoc. IG/HY
MCK Mckesson Corp. IG
MHS Medco Health Solutions HY/IG
DGX Quest Diagnostics IG
THC Tenet Healthcare Corp. HY
UNH Unitedhealth Group Inc. IG
UHS Universal Health Services IG
WLP Wellpoint Inc. IG
Pharmaceuticals 352020 ABT Abbott Laboratories IG
AGN Allergan IG
BMY Bristol-Myers Squibb IG
LLY Eli Lilly & Company IG
JNJ Johnson & Johnson IG
MRK Merck & Company IG
PFE Pfizer Inc. IG
SGP Schering-Plough IG
WYE Wyeth IG
Insurance 403010 ACE ACE Ltd. IG
ALL Allstate Corp. IG
ABK Ambac Financial Group Inc. IG/HY
AIG American International Group Inc. IG
AOC Aon Corp. IG
CB The Chubb Corp. IG
CNA CNA Financial Corp. IG
HIG Hartford International Services IG
LNC Lincoln National Corp. IG
L Loews Corp. IG
MMC Marsh & Mclennan Companies Inc. IG
MBI MBIA Inc. IG/HY
MET MetLife Inc. IG
PRU Prudential Financial Inc. IG
TRV Travelers Companies Inc. IG
UNUM Unum Group HY
XL XL Group Plc. IG
Multi-Utilities 551030 CNP Centerpoint Energy Inc. HY
CMS CMS Energy Corp. HY
ED Consolidated Edison Inc. IG
D Dominion Resources Inc. IG
DTE DTE Energy Company IG
SRE Sempra Energy IG
TE Teco Energy Inc. HY/IG
WEC Wisconsin Energy Corp. IG
XEL Xcel Energy Inc. IG
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D. Descriptive Statistics
The initial data set of issuers with matched spreads, equity prices, rating histories and GICS codes
covers the period February 2, 2004 to December 31, 2008, giving 1283 daily observations on a
total of 262 continuously active corporate issuers based in the U.S. I further impose that an industry
contains at least seven constituent firms3, such that the final sample consists of a balanced panel of
the daily CDS and equity returns of 145 firms.
Table I lists the issuers and their distribution across 14 GICS industries: Energy Equipment
& Services (7), Oil, Gas & Consumable Fuels (17), Chemicals (14), Road & Road (7), Auto
Components (8), Household Durables (13), Hotels, Restaurants & Leisure (9), Speciality Retail
(7), Food & Staples Retail (7), Food Products (9), Health Care Providers (12), Pharmaceuticals
(9), Insurance (17) and Multi-Utilities (9). As for rating classifications, in total there are 100
firms that have been classified as strictly investment-grade (IG) throughout the sample period, 21
as high-yield (HY), 17 have traversed the investment-grade boundary from above (IG/HY), five
from below (HY/IG) and two that were promoted to IG status and subsequently downgraded again
(HY/IG/HY).
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics for the equity price, CDS spread and corresponding log-
return data by year. Whilst the analysis of this chapter is conducted on the log-return data, I include
the price level data as it is easier to visual in terms of how aggregate pricing has varied through
the time dimension of the data set. The average daily spread in the full sample is 124bps with a
standard deviation of 282bps, but there is considerable variation across years reflecting changing
credit conditions. In 2004 and 2006, we observe relatively low CDS return volatility and negative
average CDS returns (Panel C), i.e. tightening spreads as we are considering returns from the
perspective of the protection buyer. The volatility of CDS returns is seen to be relatively high in
3If I lower or remove this threshold, the conclusions of this chapter do not change. Indeed, there would be more
high-yield rated firms and clusters in the data, but the presentation of the clusters in the expanded data set is unneces-
sarily bulky.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics for the CDS and equity data, over the period February 3, 2004 to December
31, 2008 on a year-by-year basis. Panels A and C present statistics for the CDS data and B and D are that of
the Equity data.
Panel A: Daily CDS Spread Levels (bp)
Period No. of Firms Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max.
2004 145 80.12 101.53 45.00 6.80 955.0
2005 145 75.49 106.61 41.80 4.00 2086.5
2006 145 75.11 113.37 35.50 3.00 1125.0
2007 145 91.64 148.01 38.50 2.90 1958.6
2008 145 290.90 547.62 114.00 13.60 9123.7
Full Sample 145 123.55 282.41 48.50 2.90 9123.7
Panel B: Daily Equity Prices ($)
Period No. of Firms Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max.
2004 145 32.60 15.84 30.42 3.35 91.31
2005 145 38.73 17.79 36.90 3.28 103.80
2006 145 41.96 19.53 41.29 3.46 119.41
2007 145 46.75 23.07 46.15 2.07 149.05
2008 145 39.47 26.37 36.11 0.28 161.40
Full Sample 145 40.02 21.43 37.84 0.28 161.40
Panel C: Log Daily CDS Returns
Period No. of Firms Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max.
2004 145 -0.0011 0.045 0 -0.92 1.27
2005 145 0.0006 0.051 0 -0.75 0.74
2006 145 -0.0013 0.047 0 -1.23 0.76
2007 145 0.0030 0.052 0 -0.51 1.25
2008 145 0.0049 0.055 0.0013 -1.05 0.83
Full Sample 145 0.0013 0.050 0 -1.23 1.27
Panel D: Log Daily Equity Returns
Period No. of Firms Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max.
2004 145 0.0007 0.016 0 -0.31 0.19
2005 145 0.0004 0.017 0 -0.18 0.28
2006 145 0.0003 0.017 0 -0.23 0.25
2007 145 -0.0002 0.020 0 -0.66 0.24
2008 145 -0.0025 0.048 -0.0002 -0.94 0.70
Full Sample 145 -0.0003 0.027 0 -0.94 0.70
2005, which is unsurprising given that credit markets were characterized by the downgrades of
Ford and GM in May of that year. More recently, credit markets have been distorted by the onset
of the subprime crisis in 2007, and the ensuing global financial crisis of late 2008, which led to an
economy-wide repricing of credit risk. This is observed in Panels A & C by the dramatic increase
in mean spread levels to 291bps, a standard deviation of 548bps and positive average CDS returns,
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even in the absence of defaulted issuers. The statistics of the equity market reflect a different story.
In Panel D, equity return volatility is seen to trend upwards and mean stock prices (Panel B) are
only observed to fall in 2008. The equity market seems, at least at an aggregate level, to have been
less disrupted than the credit markets in both 2005 and 2007.
For the analysis of this chapter, I consider the period February 3, 2004 to August 29, 2008,
yielding a total of 173,130 firm-day observations per security class. The sample is truncated to
pre-September 2008 due to the extraordinary events of that month and the disfunction of financial
markets, particularly the CDS market, during that time. For instance, Lehman Brothers filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. American International Group, Merrill Lynch,
Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac also failed or were placed under conservatorship by the U.S. gov-
ernment.
IV. Principle Components Analysis
I begin by examining the correlation structure of the CDS market by use of a Principle Compo-
nents Analysis (PCA). With little guidance in the literature as to the empirical properties on CDS
correlations, a logical starting point is to reduce the dimensionality of the data by looking for lin-
ear combinations of the firm level CDS returns that can explain the maximum variance. That is, to
examine in more depth some of the main sources of redundancy of information in the panel. These
Principal Components (PCs) are orthogonal by construction. Subsequently, I regress the principal
component weights (normalized eigenvectors) on 14 industry dummy variables as one might ex-
pect common factors relating to industries or groups of industries as a key source of informational
redundancy. If the correlation structure of the CDS market has nothing to do with industry, then
the dummies should have no cross-sectional explanatory power for the principal components. For
comparative purposes, I do the same for the equity returns of these firms. King (1966) identi-
fies that stock prices co-vary by industry beyond the effects of aggregate market behavior and Roll
(1988) shows that a significant portion of stock return variation can not be attributed to overall mar-
ket and industry movements, suggesting that firm-specific information is impounded into prices.
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Table 2.3 reports summary results from the PC decomposition of the correlation matrices as well
as the results from the cross-sectional regressions.
From the PC decomposition we observe that the risks in CDSs, like the risks inherent in equi-
ties, are not purely idiosyncratic as the first PC explains 18.5% of the variation in CDS returns and
29.2% in equity returns. Yet idiosyncratic risk would appear to be the dominant influence on both,
with the first 10 PCs explaining 40% and 60% respectively. This differential suggests the existence
of a relatively larger idiosyncratic component to individual firms’ CDS spreads, which would help
to explain why correlations in CDS returns are lower than equity returns in general; idiosyncratic
shocks on spreads and share prices will not induce cross-sectional correlation. The sample mean
CDS return correlation is 0.2 and that of equity returns is 0.27.
With reference to the cross-sectional regressions, in both markets, all 14 dummy variables
are positive and highly significant with respect to the first PC. To interpret it, I create an index by
taking a weighted average of the 145 firms’ CDS and equity returns, using the normalized principal
component weights. For future reference, I call this the Principle Component Index (PCI). I also
introduce a CDS market return index by constructing an equally-weighted average of all 262 firms’
CDS spreads in the data set and then taking log-differences to calculate returns. The correlation
between the first PCI of CDS returns and CDS index returns is is 0.82, and it therefore resembles
a pervasive component to credit risk, consistent with the findings of Das, Freed, Geng & Kapadia
(2006), Elizalde (2005) and Longstaff & Rajan (2008). In a similar fashion, the correlation of the
first PCI of equity returns with S&P500 returns is 0.9, and it is therefore related to the market in
a traditional sense. The correlation of the first PCIs of CDS and equity returns is 0.38, suggesting
that the markets factors to which these components relate are not distinct across securities.
Beyond the first PC, there is a significant relationship between all of the remaining PCs and
either individual or groups of industries. However, the CDS return PCs are linked to a narrower
subset of industries than those of the equity returns, as many load on only one or two industries.
The R2 of the cross-sectional regressions are also typically higher in the equity results suggesting
that correlation dynamics are more closely related to industry in the equity market, a finding con-
sistent with Longstaff & Rajan (2008). Of particular interest is the second PC of equity returns,
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which is best explained by the industry dummies across all principle components and has an ad-
justed R2 of 81.3%. It explains approximately 10% of the variation in equity returns. In contrast,
that of CDS returns explains 4% and the R2 of the cross-sectional regression is much lower at
54.4%. Closer inspection of Table 2.3 shows that the second PC in equity returns loads heavily
and positively on the Energy Sector, specifically the Energy Equipment & Services and Oil, Gas
& Consumable Fuels industries and to a lesser extent the Chemicals and Multi-Utilities industries.
It loads negatively, but to a lesser extent, on the Auto Components, Household Durables, Hotels,
Restaurants & Leisure and Insurance industries. Although they do not explicitly state it, Longstaff
& Rajan (2008) also find a strong positive relationship between their second PC of equity returns
and the energy and utilities sectors. I check the correlation of the second PCI of equity returns
with the return on spot West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil prices, also known as Texas Light
Sweet. This is often used as a benchmark in oil pricing and was obtained from Datastream. They
exhibit a sample correlation of 0.6 which is both highly statistically, and economically, significant.
Clearly the risk captured by the second principle component shares a strong link with the risks
posed by fluctuations in oil prices, but is not market-wide in so far as its interaction is asymmetric
across industries and exerts no influence on some, consistent with the interpretation of a sectoral
component. Interestingly, Roll (1988) suggests that higher order APT factors, created via factor
analysis, are especially important for oil and utility firms and conclude that these industries have
characteristics unlike those of a typical stock in a broad market index. Many of the results in this
chapter lead to similar conclusions. To test whether a component of this type manifests itself in the
co-movement of CDS returns, I check the correlation of the first 10 CDS PCIs with WTI returns,
but find no significance at conventional levels.
These results indicate that there are empirical similarities in the correlation structures of the
two markets. Firstly, they are both characterized by the influence of market factors that are related
across these markets. Secondly, we find evidence of factors which affect specific subsets of firms
such as industries or groups of industries in both. Yet there is also evidence of important differ-
ences; correlation dynamics of CDS returns seem less closely related to industry and oil prices
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appear to play a role in equity return correlations. I turn to the methodology of cluster analysis to
better understand how such differences materialize in the panel.
V. Correlation Cluster Analysis
The results of the PCA highlight drivers of CDS and equity correlations and provide indicative
evidence of common factors related to industry as important sources of informational redundancy
in the panel. In this section I explore the existence of common factors in CDS returns linked
specifically to issuers’ classification as either investment-grade or high-yield. If these factors do
exist and are prevalent, one might expect a segmentation effect on CDS markets. However, ex-
ante it is not clear if one can observe segmentation beyond industry, which has been established as
central to both the CDS and equity correlations. It will depend on the relative contribution of these
factors to spreads. As an alternative method for analyzing correlation dynamics, cluster analysis
identifies homogeneous groups of firms with respect to correlation in their security returns. I.e. it
gives a graphic representation of exactly which sets of firms’ security prices move together in the
time-series. It thereofre provides an ideal tool to examine the underlying structure of these markets.
Relative to PCA, which can be considered a more low-level tool for analyzing correlation, cluster
analysis facilitates a more high-level, top-down and graphic representation of the data. Given that
no prior study has implemented cluster analysis on a comprehensive CDS data set, this method
should provide novel insight into the correlation structure of the CDS market.
A. Method
When thinking about the methodological design of a cluster analysis, three key considerations are
faced that require elaboration. The first is how to define similarity between returns across firms. For
this analysis I consider the sample product moment correlation matrix, which enjoys widespread

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































second centers on the choice of clustering method. I implement an agglomerative4 hierarchical5
cluster analysis, the central procedure underpinning which is simple. The third is the number
of clusters present in a given correlation matrix, or cluster validity. I first outline the clustering
procedure and then how the resulting clusters are validated.
Complete Linkage
Whilst the general case holds for any well-defined similarity measure between firms i and j, si, j, I
highlight the methodology using the sample product moment correlation coefficient as employed
in the main analysis, ρi, j. This description follows that of Anderberg (1973), Chapter 6, p. 132.
First, the lower triangular correlation matrix is computed. The complete linkage procedure6 is then
as follows:
Step 1: Identify the firms which exhibit the highest correlation, p and q. Merge their clusters
to form a new cluster r. Delete the pth row and column of the correlation matrix. Reduce the
number of clusters by one.
Step2: Define the correlation between cluster r, and any other cluster t, as the minimum
correlation between the firms they contain:
ρrt = min(ρpt ,ρqt) (2.1)
4The distinction between the two types of hierarchical cluster method, agglomerative and divisive, lies in the
starting point of the clustering procedure. Agglomerative methods begin with a set of N clusters and finish when all
firms are in a single cluster. Divisive methods begin with a single cluster containing all firms and work backwards
towards a set of N clusters.
5The most common distinction among various types of clustering method is that of hierarchical versus partitional.
In partitional clustering, firms are grouped into non-overlapping clusters. Hierarchical clustering forms a set of nested
clusters that may be organized as a dendrogram, whereby nodes of the tree represent the merger of existing subclusters
and the root of the tree is a singleton cluster containing all firms.
6The difference between the agglomerative methods, Average Linkage, Single Linkage and Complete Linkage lies
in how to update the correlation matrix following the merger of two clusters in step 3.
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Step 3: Repeat steps 1 & 2 a total of N-1 times until all firms are in a single cluster. At
each iteration recording the clusters that were merged and the magnitude of the correlation
coefficient which lead to it.
In this framework, clusters share the property that all firms within a cluster will exhibit corre-
lations greater in magnitude than that of its two least correlated firms. Relative to the alternative
agglomerative hierarchical methods, Average Linkage (where correlations are averaged after each
merger) and Single Linkage (where the maximum is taken), complete linkage effectively puts the
maximum distance, in a correlation sense, between clusters after each merger and therefore makes
them as distinct as possible. In turn, complete Linkage also produces clusters where the distribu-
tion of firms across them is balanced; a property which facilitates studying the structure present
in a correlation matrix of financial time-series. This method shares some similarities with that of
King (1966). His study looks at monthly stock returns from firms continuously listed on the NYSE
over the period June, 1927 to December 1960 and firms are classified into six two-digit SEC in-
dustries as of the 1961 classifications. In unreported results, I have extensively experimented with
Average Linkage but the central findings of the chapter persist within this specification also. How-
ever, the clusters are not as clean using the average specification as effectively one is smoothing the
correlation structure after each merger. Single linkage is prone to a problem known as chaining,
whereby following each merger, a single cluster (hence the name) gets progressively larger and the
distribution of firms is essentially uniform across the reaming clusters. Single linkage is of little
use in financial application.
The final consideration for cluster analysis is the number of clusters present in a given correla-
tion matrix. This is termed cluster validity. As agglomerative hierarchical methods are mechanical,
i.e. they define an entire hierarchy of nested clusters and there is no global optimization of an ob-
jective function, this is nontrivial. As explained by King (1967), methodologies such as this fall
under the heading of ‘data analysis’ rather than inference. Instead, at each level in the hierarchy,
the method I evoke uses a specific criterion, Equation 2.1, to decide locally which clusters should
be merged. To get around the problem of an arbitrary number of clusters, I develop a novel cluster
validation procedure which essentially maximizes the similarity of the distribution of firms across
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clusters and the distribution of firms across the industry classification scheme. The intuition here
is that industry will be the first order influence on the clusters. The extant equity literature, the
results of the PCA, and thorough experimentation with the complete linkage algorithm on the CDS
data set confirm this. Therefore if rating structure is discernible at the level of the cluster hierarchy
at which the number of clusters best describes the industry distribution of the data, clearly rating
based common factors play an important role in the segmentation of this market.
Cluster Validity
I introduce some statistical measures known as the classification orientated measures of cluster
validity from the field of information retrieval. I denote: N as the total number of issuers. l as the
iteration of the algorithm, where l = 1, ..,N−1. Y as the number of industries in the data. ny as the
number of issuers in industry y, for y = 1, ..,Y . nx,l as the number of issuers in cluster x at iteration





Known as precision, this the probability that a member of cluster x, at iteration l, belongs to





Recall is the probability that an issuer industry y is in cluster x, at iteration l. It gives the fraction







Known as the F-measure, is the extent to which a cluster contains only and all issuers from an
industry. As the harmonic mean of precision and recall, this statistic is 1 when there is a per-
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fect correspondence between the constituents of a cluster and an industry and 0 when there is no










At iteration l, it scores the cluster which best represents an industry and then takes a weighted-
average of these scores across industries. The weights are calculated as industry size divided by
total issuers. The idea behind this metric is that for the set of clusters provided at each level of
the cluster hierarchy, l, the distribution of firms across clusters is mapped onto the distribution of
firms across industry-level GICS codes and scored on a zero to one basis. More concretely, it tends
to zero with increasing sample size. This is a consequence of using an exclusive and complete
agglomerative clustering method, whereby there will always be at least one firm per cluster and all
firms belong to a cluster. The term ‘complete’ in this sense shares no relationship to the name for
this agglomerative method, complete linkage, which stems from connections to graph theory. It can
be easily shown that in a finite sample, the minimum exists when l = 1. This validation technique
simultaneously gives the number of clusters, across which the distribution of firms best fits the
industry distribution provided by the GICS and a quantitative score of goodness-of-fit. In the main
analysis below, I consider the set of clusters in the return correlation matrices that maximize this
statistic.
B. Correlation Clusters in CDS and Equity Returns
Table 2.4 presents the correlation clusters found in the CDS return correlation matrix and Table 2.5
presents that of equity returns. These clusters have been ordered by number of constituents. Table
2.6 reports the F-measures and Phi-measures (goodness-of-fit statistic) used to define them.
Focusing on the overall picture, we first note that there is close correspondence between in-
dustries and clusters in the correlation matrices of returns, for both markets. By comparing Phi-
measures, 67% for the CDS and 75% for the equity clusters (see Table 2.6), the correspondence
to industries is notably higher in the equity market. In unreported results, I also considered rolling
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correlation matrices of 3, 6 and 12 months and by plotting the time-evolving Phi-measure, I deter-
mined that this result always holds in the data. This is supportive of the PCA; correlation dynamics
are more closely related to industry in equity returns.
By focusing on the relationships between individual clusters and industries, we gain further
insight into the empirical similarities and differences in the correlation structures of these markets.
Notable similarities, with reference to Table 2.6, are that many industries form well-defined clus-
ters in both markets, as observed from their high F-measures. In particular the Chemicals (GICS:
151010), Road & Rail (203040), Auto Components (252010), Household Durables (253010), In-
surance (403010) and Multi-Utilities (551030) industries. Also, the clustering of firms in much of
the Consumer Discretionary and Staples sectors (two-digit GICS prefixes 25 & 30) are typically
misaligned with the GICS industry definitions in both markets. I.e. the Hotels, Restaurants &
Leisure, Speciality Retail and Food & Staples Retailing industries. Cluster 1 in Table 2.4 resem-
bles a broad consumer sector consisting of firms from various related industries and many of the
smaller clusters in Table 2.5 share some consumer sector affiliations. I further investigated the
breakdown of industry links between constituents of clusters 3 and 6 in Table 2.4. Cluster 3 is
largely Health Care Equipment & Service with two exceptions: Polyone Corp. (Chemicals) and
Rite Aid Corp (Food & Staples Retail). However both companies have very strong business links
with the health care industry. Equally, cluster 6 is largely Chemicals and again Sherwin-Williams




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Conversely, there are striking differences between the two markets. Firstly, the Energy Sector,
forms the most prevalent cluster in the equity correlation matrix (cluster 1, Table 2.5). Although
table 2.6 suggests that the constituent industries, Energy Equipment & Services and Oil & Gas
Producers are not highly clustered with F-measures of 48% and 77% respectively, here the clus-
tering of returns occurs at the sector level in the GICS classifications, not at the industry level
which is what these statistics score. By comparison, the related firms are less clustered in the CDS
correlation matrix. This finding is also consistent with the PCA, which identified a strong sectoral
component related to the Energy Sector in the equity market but no comparable component in the
CDS market. Secondly, we observe segmentation of the Energy Sector across the investment-grade
boundary as demonstrated by cluster 13 in Table 2.4. This result helps explain why these firms are
less clustered in the CDS market, but more importantly, it demonstrates that common factors re-
lated to rating classification exist and make a significant contribution to spreads relative to, and
in the presence of, industry factors. This segmentation across the boundary is common to many
industries in the CDS correlation clusters in Table 2.4. For example, the HY firm in the Road &
Rail industry separates from the IG firms of the same industry (clusters 19 and 9 respectively), the
HY firm separates from the IG firms in the Health Care industry (clusters 19 and 4) and the same
applies to the Utility industry (clusters 7 and 10).
With reference to cluster 7 in Table 2.4, we also observe the clustering of high-yield firms with
no industry affiliation in CDS returns. What is particularly striking is that its six constituent firms
belong to four different GICS industries, each from a different GICS sector, i.e. Multi-utilities
& Unregulated power, Oil, Gas & Consumable fuels, Hotels, Restaurants & Leisure and Food
Products. The firms are CMS Energy Corp, El Paso Corp, MGM Mirage, Royal Caribbean Cruises
Ltd, Smithfields Foods Inc and The Williams Companies Inc. Clearly no industry argument can
explain why these firms form a correlation cluster in the CDS market. Surprising too are the
relatively high minimum and average correlation between them. This cluster in particular provides
strong empirical support for the predictions of the friction-based co-movement theories of Barberis
& Shleifer (2003) and Barberis et al. (2005); i.e. common factors related to the high-yield labeling
of these firms. As well as further helping to explain why correlation dynamics are in general more
53
closely related to industry in equity returns, this particular result highlights that in some instances
the common factors in CDS returns relating to rating classification make a larger contribution to
spreads than those pertaining to industry.
Table 2.6: The output of the cluster validation algorithm. The 14 GICS industries and number of constituents
are presented in columns 1-3. Columns 4 & 6 show the cluster in Table 2.4 or 2.5 which is determined by
the algorithm as the best representation of that industry, according to their F-measures in Columns 5 & 7.
The F-measure is the extent to which the cluster contains only and all firms of that industry. The weighted
average F-measure determines the Phi-measure (goodness-of-fit) seen in the final row.
CDS Return Correlation Matrix Equity Return Correlation Matrix
GICS Code Industry No. Firms Cluster F-Measure Cluster F-Measure
101010 Energy Equipment & Services 7 14 0.60 1 0.48
101020 Oil & Gas Producers 17 5 0.67 1 0.77
151010 Chemicals 14 6 0.70 3 0.88
203040 Road & Rail 7 9 0.92 7 0.92
251010 Auto Components 8 8 0.86 8 0.86
252010 Household Durables 13 4 0.87 4 0.87
253010 Hotels Restaurants & Leisure 9 17 0.36 12 0.62
255040 Specialty Retail 7 1 0.42 10 0.50
301010 Food & Staples Retailing 7 1 0.32 16 0.60
302020 Food Products 9 11 0.57 13 0.50
351020 Health Care Providers & Services 12 3 0.73 11 0.50
352020 Pharmaceuticals 9 12 0.50 9 0.80
403010 Insurance 17 2 0.83 2 0.87
551030 Multi-Utilities & Unregulated Power 9 10 0.71 5 1.00
Phi-Measure: 0.67 0.75
It is worth noting the validation algorithm maximizes the industry structure of the data and nat-
urally biases clusters in the CDS market away from rating affiliation. The sample is also dominated
by investment-grade issuers. Even so, these results confirm that there is correlation segmentation in
the CDS market across the ratings boundary with two results in particular highlighting this. Firstly,
we observe that issuers in a given industry divided by rating classification do not move as homoge-
nous groups. Secondly, issuers from unrelated industries that share the high-yield label cluster
together. The investment-grade boundary seemingly generates common factors in CDS returns
and such factors play a particularly important role for high-yield rated issuers. In contrast, in the
equity market I have found no direct evidence of common factors relating to rating classification.
Industry effects dominate the segmentation of this market.
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C. The Effect of Market, Industry and Rating Factors on Correlations
The PCA demonstrated the importance of market factors on the correlation structures of both
CDS and equity markets. The cluster analysis demonstrated the impact of the rating boundary on
correlations in five-year CDS spreads. In this section, in order to understand better the relative
contributions of market, industry and rating factors, I attempt to isolate their influences along two
dimensions. Firstly, I remove from the data set all firms that have traversed the investment-grade
boundary, as they confound the influence of rating factors. I retain that an industry must contain
at least seven firms. As shown by Barberis et al. (2005), and explicitly shown in Chapter 3, the
sensitivity of an asset to factors pertaining to its classification alter with a change in classification.
Of the 105 firms in this sub-sample, 88 are classified as investment-grade, 17 high-yield and the
Speciality Retail, Food & Staples Retail and Auto Components industries are excluded via the
minimum industry size restriction. With the exception of Auto Components, these consumer sector
industries cluster relatively poorly in my framework. Secondly, I control for the market factors
and so need viable proxies for them in both CDS and equity returns. In the equity literature,
two methods have been employed. In line with these studies, the first possibility is to use the
‘market’ index generated by the PCA on our sample data. The second is to create a market index
by averaging a large population of security returns. Livingston (1977) compares these alternatives
applied to equity data and concludes that whilst both methods give a market factor and residuals,
using a broad market index is preferable for a number of reasons. PCA is sample sensitive and
hence the results are not easily generalizable. Also, tests reported on simulated data show that
factor analysis does not in general uncover the ‘true’ market and residual industry effects that
generated the data. Following this advice, I construct an investment-grade credit market return
index (IGRI) from the 180 firms that have been classified as strictly IG in the full sample. I
experimented with various other specifications of the credit market index, including: varying the
scope of firms to include high-yield issuers, considering the median instead of the mean spread
level and various PCA constructed market indexes. However, the one I consider here results in
the most significant decrease in correlations across and within clusters suggesting it captures more
commonality across issuers. For the equity market factor I utilize S&P500 returns in the traditional
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manner. I then regress, for each firm separately, the CDS returns on the IGRI and equity returns
on S&P500 returns, plus a constant. Across the 105 firms, the mean loading on S&P500 returns is
0.99 and that of the IGRI is 0.90. The mean t-stats are 20.4 and 17.1 and the mean R2 is 25.7% and
20.1% respectively. Finally, I repeat the cluster analysis on the correlation matrix of the residuals
from these regressions. The resulting clusters can been seen in Tables 2.7 and 2.8.
Having controlled for the market factors, beginning with the clustering of equity return resid-
uals in Table 2.8, we observe they exhibit a near one-to-one mapping onto the GICS, with a Phi-
measure of 85.6%. Again the Energy Sector (cluster 1) forms the most prevalent cluster and the
disagreement between equity return correlations and the Consumer industry definitions remains
(cluster 4). It is interesting that King (1966) finds very similar results in his sample over the period
1927-1960, noting the prevalence of the clustering of the ‘petroleum’, rail and to a lesser extent
utilities industries. Taken in conjunction with his, these results suggest that the correlation struc-
ture of the equity market today is similar to that of the second quarter of the 20th century. There are
again no clusters with rating association. In the equity data, for every industry with firms of both
ratings classifications, high-yield and investment-grade firms cluster together and industry expla-
nations account for the correlation structure of these residuals. Mean correlations of the residuals
within the clusters are high; the Energy Sector (cluster 1) has a mean residual correlation of 0.52
across all 23 firms with a minimum linkage of 0.15, those of the seven utility firms (cluster 6) have
a mean correlation of 0.44 and are all linked by a minimum of 0.33. Similar effects are seen for all
of the other clusters.
With regards to the CDS return residual clustering in Table 2.7, the Phi-measure rises only
slightly to 69%, from 67%, in the clustering of CDS returns, and whilst there are industry inter-
pretations to the majority of clusters, the results are less clear cut. The most prevalent clusters are
the investment-grade Insurance firms (cluster 1), the investment-grade Energy firms (cluster 2) and
the investment-grade Health Care providers (cluster 3) and for all of these industries, we note the
decoupling of their high-yield firms from these clusters. There are now at least four high-yield
clusters (9, 10,11 & 13) whereby two exhibit industry affiliation, namely the high-yield Energy
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firms (cluster 13) and the high-yield Household Durables firms (cluster 9), and two which have no
clear industry links (clusters 10 & 11).
To gauge the relative contribution of industry factors in these respective markets, I look to
industries that cluster well (high F-measure) in both and whose constituents have barely altered
before and after controlling for the market factor. For CDS returns, I identify that the mean cor-
relation between constituents in the Road & Rail industry (cluster 9 , Table 2.4) is 0.45 before the
market factors’ removal and 0.28 afterwards (cluster 5, Table 2.7). Similarly, for the Insurance in-
dustry it is 0.40 before (cluster 2, Table 2.4)) and 0.19 afterwards (cluster 1, Table 2.7 ). For equity
returns, we observe that the mean correlation between constituents in the Road & Rail industry
is 0.59 before (cluster 7, Table 2.5) and 0.37 afterwards (cluster 8, Table 2.8). Similarly, for the
Insurance industry it is 0.56 before (cluster 2, Table 2.5) and 0.25 afterwards (cluster 2, Table 2.8).
Notable here is the similarity in the relative importance of the market and industry factors in these
CDS and equity return correlations.
To assess the relative contribution of industry and high-yield factors in CDS correlations I look
to Table 2.7. For clusters relating to the Energy Sector, the IG clusters 2, 12, 15 & 21 exhibit
mean residual correlations of 0.17, 0.12, 0.14 and 0.14 respectively. In comparison the Energy
Sector HY cluster 13 exhibits a correlation of 0.24. For the HY Household Durables (cluster 9)
the mean correlation is 0.25. As for the HY clusters with no industry affiliation, 10 and 11, their
mean residual correlations are 0.14 in both cases. What is apparent from these numbers, is that
the correlation linking HY issuers with no industry affiliation is similar to that linking IG industry
affiliates. Also, when firms are industry affiliates in addition to being rated as high-yield, mean
residual correlations are markedly higher. It seems that high-yield factors have an effect on CDS


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































D. Industry Factors Across Markets
From an aggregate perspective, there are major differences in the correlation structures of CDS
and equity markets. However, the central role of industry factors in both has been an important
finding in this study. In this section I turn to an individual industry in order to better understand
whether there are similarities in industry factors across these markets. I choose the Energy Sector
for several reasons. Firstly, the cluster analysis showed the prevalence of the Energy Sector in the
equity return correlation matrix and hence the important role of industry factors for these firms;
even after removing the market factor, the mean residual correlation is 0.52. Secondly, given the
results of the PCA analysis, oil prices are an important factor in the equity returns of these firms
and given their primary business operations, provide an observable common factor7. Thirdly, the
relatively poor clustering of the CDS returns of these firms by industry would suggest that no
equally dominant industry factor is contained within them. In the following analysis, I investigate
separately the impact of this observable factor on the CDS and equity returns of this sector. I show
that the nature of the common industry factors in security returns across these markets is different.
This result strengthens our understanding of why the correlation structures of these two markets
are strikingly different.
Equity Returns
I first perform a PCA on the equity return residuals from the 23 constituents of the Energy Sector
(cluster 1) in Table 2.8. The PCs are now orthogonal to the market factor. Using the index con-
struction procedure, I test the correlation of their first PCI with the returns on WTI crude oil; they
exhibit a sample correlation of 0.63. Furthermore, the first PC explains 57.1% of the variation in
this sector’s equity return residuals. Although not reported, inspection of the normalized eigen-
vectors also shows that the first component in these residuals acts as a parallel shift factor, with
all the weights being strictly positive and remarkably uniform. Their mean and standard deviation
7I also experimented with other industries. Whilst economically sensible proxies for industry factors can be thought
of, in this framework I require them to be available at a daily frequency and therefore market-traded assets are the
limiting choice.
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Table 2.9: Balanced Panel regressions for the equity and CDS returns of the 23 firms in the GICS Energy
Sector on a market variable and WTI crude oil returns. Panel robust standard errors (s.e.) are reported.
Panel A presents the results for equity returns and Panel B is that of CDS returns. Regression 1 considers
only the market variables, defined as S&P500 returns (RS&P) and the Investment-Grade Return Index (RIGI).
Regression 2 adds WTI returns (RWT I) as an explanatory variable.
Panel A: GICS Energy Sector Equity Return Regressions
Regression
1 2
Coeff. s.e. t-stat Coeff. s.e. t-stat
RS&P 0.95 0.05 18.6 1.02 0.05 19.0
RWT I 0.95 0.06 17.1
Const. 0.00 0.00 11.0 0.00 0.00 6.3
R2 0.163 0.340
No. Observations 27462 27462
Panel B: GICS Energy Sector CDS Return Regressions
Regression
1 2
Coeff. s.e. t-stat Coeff. s.e. t-stat
RIGI 0.79 0.03 26.7 0.79 0.03 26.7
RWT I -0.10 0.02 -4.45
Const. -0.00 0.00 -1.04 -0.00 0.00 -0.67
R2 0.18 0.18
No. Observations 27462 27462
are 0.04 and 0.01 respectively. To quantify the relative importance of S&P500 returns and WTI
returns, two key factors in the equity returns of this sector, I make use of pooled OLS regressions.
The results can be seen in Regressions 1 & 2 in Panel A of Table 2.9. Both variables are positive
and highly statistically significant, with panel robust t-stats of 19 and 17.1 respectively. The eco-
nomic impact of WTI returns on the equity returns of this sample is essentially of the same order
of magnitude as that of S&P500 returns, with coefficients of 1.02 and 0.95 respectively. By com-
parison to Regression 1, which excludes oil returns, also note that the R2 of the regression doubles
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with its inclusion from 16% to 34%. These results confirm that oil prices play a central role in the
clustering of the Energy Sector in the equity return correlation matrix.
CDS Returns
I repeat the same analysis on the CDS returns of the most highly-clustered constituents of this
sector, the nine investment grade firms in cluster 2 of Table 2.7. This subset of Energy Sector
firms allows stronger conclusions to be drawn about common industry factors than the smaller
clusters. Inspection of the PC weights for the first PCI in these residuals again shows a remarkably
uniform weighting on each of the nine firms, resembling a parallel shift factor, with a mean of
0.11 and a standard deviation of 0.02. The first PC explains 26.16% of their variation. Yet the
correlation of the first PCI with WTI returns is a mere -0.06; not significantly different from zero.
The industry factors driving correlation in the CDS return residuals of this subset are therefore
unlikely related to oil prices. At best I can conclude that this PCI resembles latent factors related
to their industry affiliation and conditional on their investment-grade status. For completeness, I
also look to see whether WTI returns exert any meaningful statistical impact on the CDS returns
of these firms. The pooled regressions in Panel B of Table 2.9 using the full 23 firms show that it
does. The negative coefficient, -0.10, on WTI returns shows that increasing oil prices correspond to
a tightening of spreads, consistent with the equity regressions, however the economic significance
is an order of magnitude smaller than that of the market factor. The coefficient on the return of
the investment-grade credit market index (as defined in Section C) is 0.79. Including WTI returns
does not increase the R2 of the regression.
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VI. Conclusion
In this chapter I have analyzed the correlation structures of the U.S. CDS and equity markets. I
have shown that equity and CDS correlations are driven by market factors common to all firms as
well as factors common to subsets of firms, such as industries or groups of industries. These factors
appear to play similar roles in the correlation structures of these markets although correlations in
CDS returns are typically lower given that they contain a relatively larger idiosyncratic component.
CDS correlations provide direct evidence of common factors in spreads related to rating classi-
fication as high-yield whereas equity correlations do not. In CDS prices, the boundary seemingly
drives a wedge, intra-industry, between CDS correlations of firms on opposite sides of it, and also
leads to substantial correlation in the spreads of high-yield rated issuers from unrelated economic
sectors. These results have direct implications for pricing and are outside of the constructs of
existing CDS pricing models. The mechanisms of how rating classification factors are generated
and to what extent this phenomena is consistent with traditional views of asset pricing and market
efficiency are the focus of the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Excess Co-Movement in Credit Default
Swap Markets: Evidence from the CDX
Indices
I. Summary
As stated more formally at the beginning of the previous chapter, the traditional framework of
financial economics premises that a security’s price equals its fundamental value. It then follows
that co-movement in prices is due to co-movement in fundamental values. The questions I ex-
plicitly address in the chapter are (i) what drives high-yield correlation clustering and (ii) is the
evidence of rating structure in CDS correlations consistent with the notion of fundamental-based
co-movement.
I show that the high-yield labeling of clustered issuers captures another important property they
share. Namely, that they are all constituents of the Markit’s high-yield CDX index. By exploiting
Markit’s index eligibility rules I show that this correlation clustering is consistent with excess co-
movement in CDS prices. That is, co-movement in prices greater than should be expected from
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co-movement in fundamental values. Building on the results of the equity literature that has docu-
mented excess co-movement in equity returns, I determine that the generating mechanism relates to
the trading behaviour of market participants around the index. That is, by taking aggregate macro
views based on the somewhat arbitrary high-yield label, and by making capital allocation decisions
at the index level, trading of the entire basket without full consideration of the fundamental values
of individual constituents generates excess co-movement in CDS prices. In this way, the empirical
evidence I present suggests a significant departure from fundamentals-based price co-movement
and is contrary to traditional views of market efficiency.
II. Introduction
A Credit Default Swap functions like insurance against default by a debt issuer. As a bilateral
contract, the protection buyer pays a quarterly premium to the protection seller1, and receives a
settlement equal to the difference between the par and market value of an underlying bond should
a default event occur during its life-time. Since its inception in the early 1990’s, the CDS market
has grown to become one of the largest derivative markets today. As of December 2010, the Bank
of International Settlements estimated that the total notional amount of outstanding CDS to be
approximately $30 trillion2. This growth was facilitated by the introduction of benchmark credit
indices in late 2003. The CDX indices in North America3, administered by Markit, represent
baskets of the most liquid single name CDS across various sectors and maturities (Markit (2010)).
The investment-grade index (CDX.IG) and high-yield index (CDX.HY) are characterized by the
CDS spreads of 125 North American investment-grade issuers and 100 North American high-
1Bongaerts, Cremers & Goetzmann (2011) report that hedge funds are the the biggest net sellers of protection in
the CDS market. Their motivation is of taking on aggregate credit risks in order to earn credit risk premia.
2By comparison, they estimated the total notional amount of outstanding equity derivatives to be $5.6 trillion.
3Synthetic credit indices originated in 2001. In 2003, JPMorgan’s JECI and Hydi indices merged with Morgan
Stanley’s TRACERS under the name Trac-x. In 2004, Trac-x merged with iBoxx to form the CDX in North American
and iTraxx in Europe and Asia.
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yield issuers respectively. They are designed to allow investors to take aggregate exposure to a
representative portfolio of CDSs from each of these market sectors4.
It has been shown in the equity literature that indexation, and the trading behaviour of market-
participants at the index level, can result in excess co-movement in stock returns. That is, co-
movement in prices greater than should be expected from co-movement in fundamental values.
For instance, Barberis et al. (2005) demonstrate that changes in fundamental characteristics cannot
explain why stocks added to the S&P 500 increase in co-movement with it. Boyer (2011) docu-
ments excess co-movement in stocks by exploiting the mechanical rules that govern membership
changes to the S&P/Barra Value and Growth indices. To the best of my knowledge, no prior study
has conclusively demonstrated excess co-movement in credit markets. Eligibility in the CDX in-
dices is mainly governed by the investment-grade or high-yield rating classification of an issuer.
By controlling for changes in this characteristic, I am able to demonstrate that the indexation pro-
cess in CDS markets not only generates excess co-movement in spreads, but does so to the extent
we observe high-yield correlation clustering of issuers from unrelated economic sectors. The data
set I employ in this chapter spans the CDS spreads and credit ratings of the 506 corporate issuers
contained in the full CDS sample. I extend the time-series dimension to lie between February 2,
2004 and June 1, 2010. As explained below, I also introduce a data set of assignment changes to
the CDX indices during this period.
I first repeat the cluster analysis on a different, updated sample of issuers taken from this ex-
tended data set. Here, I focus more on the industries in the data that contain a good cross-section of
issuers that are in, or have been in, the CDX.IG and CDX.HY indices. In doing so, I determine that
again, there is a well-defined high-yield correlation cluster, but that these issuers also share a sec-
ond key characteristic; they are essentially all permanent members of the CDX.HY. The question of
whether it is the high-yield classification of issuers, or their indexation based on this classification,
that drives correlation clustering is central to separating out a fundamental vs. non-fundamental
4The North American component of the CDX family contains two other indices. These are the ‘High-Vol’ index
(CDX.IG.HVOL), the 30 most volatile issuers from CDX.IG, and the ‘Cross-Over‘ index (CDX.NA.XO), the 35
issuers with split ratings across the investment-grade boundary. The Cross-Over index was discontinued as of March
2011.
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hypothesis of co-movement. The first hypothesis suggests that their high-yield labeling is proxying
for some unobserved common fundamental characteristic. The second suggests that their indexa-
tion, based on it, is generating excess co-movement in spreads. Insightfully, high-yield issuers not
in the CDX.HY do not appear to correlation cluster with their indexed counterparts.
I then use an event study to explore co-movement dynamics around exclusions and inclusions
to the CDX indices. In unconditional results, I identify that exclusion from either the CDX.IG or
CDX.HY index does not result in changes in co-movement with it. By contrast, index inclusions
result in highly significant increases in co-movement. For instance, upon inclusion the average
issuer experiences an increase in beta of 0.14 with the CDX.IG and 0.18 with the CDX.HY. Both
results are significant at the 1% level. Using bivariate regressions, I condition my results on as-
signment changes that followed rating reclassifications between investment-grade and high-yield
under Markit’s eligibility rules. My identification strategy assumes that on average only fundamen-
tal characteristics correlated with the investment-grade and high-yield classifications alter around
index assignment changes. I document three key results that suggest a departure from the funda-
mental co-movement. Firstly, issuers included in the high-yield index experience an increase in
co-movement with the CDX.HY irrespective of rating changes. Secondly, issuers excluded from
the investment-grade index because of a rating reclassification to high-yield do not decrease in
co-movement with the CDX.IG. Thirdly, these high-yield issuers only increase in co-movement
with the CDX.HY if they are subsequently included in it. Therefore, co-movement dynamics
around index assignment changes cannot be explained by the rating changes which govern them.
For robustness, I examine whether thin-trading plays a role in beta increases upon index inclu-
sions. I identify that 77% of issuers included in the CDX.IG experience decreases in their bid-ask
spreads and that thin-trading may influence their betas. However, the average issuer included in
the CDX.HY does not experience a change in their bid-ask spread and thin trading cannot explain
the increases in co-movement they experience.
The evidence I present supports the excess co-movement hypothesis, particularly in the case of
indexed high-yield issuers. In the terminology of Barberis & Shleifer (2003), high-yield represents
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a well-defined asset ‘style5’. The CDX.HY allows ‘style investors’ to take aggregate exposure
to a representative portfolio of CDSs from this style. The trading behavior of such investors at
the index level generates excess co-movement in the CDS spreads of constituent issuers, even
though their fundamental values are only partially related. This study adds to the growing body of
literature that documents excess co-movement and style-related effects in capital markets. Froot &
Dabora (1999) find that the prices of identical stocks traded on different exchanges do not move in
tandem but rather co-move with their respective exchanges. Chen & De Bondt (2004) document
style related trends in equity returns. Kumar & Lee (2006) show that patterns of co-movement in
stock returns can be related to correlated trades of retail investors. Greenwood (2008) studies the
Nikkei index and provides evidence that co-movement in stock returns can be a consequence of
commonality in trading behavior. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section III
describes the CDX indexation process and Markit’s eligibility rules. Section IV describes the data
set I employ and presents summary statistics. Section V presents a correlation cluster analysis of
the CDS market. Section VI examines CDS co-movement in relation to CDX assignment changes.
Section VII concludes.
III. The CDX Indices and Eligibility Rules
Since late 2003, a fixed-maturity series of the CDX.IG and CDX.HY has been issued on March
21st and September 21st of every year. The CDX.IG is issued in 1,2,3,5,7&10-year maturities and
the CDX.HY is issued in 3,5,7&10-year maturities. Series one of the indices was introduced in
October 2003 and series 16 is concurrent as of the time of August 2011. Markit initiates a process
to determine the constituents issuers of a new index series in the weeks leading up to the ‘roll-
date’. Until March 2011, index series were governed by Markit’s 20076 CDX eligibility rules (See
Markit (2007)).
5For instance, credit hedge funds as well as bond mutual funds typically specialize in either investment-grade or
high-yield debt or reference the investment-grade boundary with respect to permissible asset concentrations.
6The 2011 guidelines were introduced for series 16 in March 2011. Eligibility will be strictly rules-based rather
than determined by the dealer community as outlined above. The main alteration refers to determining spread liquidity
via information from the DTCC Trade Information Warehouse. Rating eligibility remains the same.
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In the lead-up to the announcement of a new series, Markit polled the 14 major index dealers
to determine index constituents7. Ten days before the roll date, they submitted lists of issuers
they wished excluded from the current series. To be nominated, an issuer had to fulfill one of three
criteria: (i) ineligibility due to rating classification changes (ii) ineligibility due to corporate actions
(iii) a material decrease in the issuer’s CDS liquidity. Issuers nominated by three or more dealers
were then voted on as to which would be excluded. Nine days before the roll date, the dealers
nominated and voted on issuers to replace those excluded. To be eligible, an issuer requires an
eligible rating and sufficient CDS liquidity. For inclusions in the CDX.IG, an issuer needs two
investment-grade ratings from Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch, or one if rated by two or less agencies.
For the CDX.HY, an issuer needs two high-yield ratings, or one if rated by two or less agencies.
Three days before the roll date, the dealers submitted the fixed rate spread payable for each index
at each maturity. The median of the submitted annualized spreads, rounded to the nearest five
basis points is used. Payments from an index protection buyer to the protection seller are made on
a quarterly basis8. Markit publishes the constituents of the new series the day before the roll date
and it begins trading the next day.
As a separate consideration, index constituents can be deleted from the indices due to quali-
fying credit events, defined as bankruptcy and failure to pay. The triggering of contractual agree-
ments in the underlying single name CDS results in a payment from the index protection seller to
the protection buyer9 and the issuer being deleted from any series in which it is a constituent. By
contrast, issuers excluded from a new series due to ineligibility, remain constituents of previous
series in which they were included. As such, they remain indexed but in ‘off-the-run’ series.
7The major dealers are not eligible for inclusion in the CDX indices.
8March 20th, June 20th, September 20th and December 20th.
9Cash settlement is the default mechanism for all CDS trades following the implementation of the Big Bang and
Small Bang in April and July 2009. An auction is conducted to determine the recovery rate to be used in settlement.
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IV. The Data Set and Descriptive Statistics
The data set in this study consists of CMA’s composite CDS spreads, CDX.IG and CDX.HY
index assignments from Markit’s website10, issuer-level credit ratings from Moodys Default and
Recovery Database and Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes from COMPUSTAT.
A. CDS Data
I begin with the raw CMA11 DataVisionT M CDS data set, but update its time-dimension to cover
the period February 2, 2004 to June 1, 2010. Again, it contains daily five-year bid-ask spread
quotes for 506 North America corporate issuers and all reference obligations are senior unsecured
debt. The available data covers 94% of the panel for a total of 785,787 firm-day observations. I
take mid-market spreads (average of bid and ask), where all premia are expressed as an annualized
spread, in basis points, on U.S. dollar denominated notional amounts. I choose to retain all prices
in this study, including their model generated prices. Approximately 60% of the raw entries carry
CMA’s ‘Veracity Score’ and of these, 76% are actual quotes. For the main analysis of this chapter, I
continue to define CDS ‘returns’ as log-differences in daily mid-market CDS spreads. To reiterate,
the CDS data is in the form of newly-issued at-market spreads and the calculation of actual returns
requires a pricing model. I prefer to abstain from introducing model dependency as my analysis
remains statistical in nature.
I append each issuer’s CDS data with their credit ratings from Moody’s. An issuer’s estimated
senior rating is set equal to its senior unsecured debt rating, or if there is none by implying it on
the basis of rated subordinated or secured debt. For this analysis, a ‘rating change’ is defined as
a reclassification between investment-grade and high-yield. I then place the issuers into industries
10Availble at:
www.markit.com/en/products/data/indices/credit-and-loan-indices/index-annexes/annexes-archive.page?.
11Recent research by Mayordomo, Pena & Schwartz (2010) compares the six major sources of corporate CDS
prices: GFI, Fenics, Reuters EOD, CMA, Markit and JP Morgan. They suggest that CMA’s data leads the price
discovery process in five-year CDS spreads.
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using the GICS but make use of the four-digit industry-group level, rather than the six-digit industry
level, in this chapter.
B. Index Assignments
I match the CDS data with Markit’s CDX.IG and CDX.HY index series constituent lists. The
CDS data covers series 1-14 of the CDX.IG and series 2-14 of the CDX.HY12. Table 3.1 presents
the coverage of the CDS data across these series and the matched inclusion and exclusion event
issuers.
Table 3.1: Coverage of the CDS data across series 1-14 of the CDX.IG and CDX.HY indices. Date is the
month and year (mm/yy) of the index series. # is the total number of issuers included in that series. Samp. is
the number of these issuers in the CDS data set. Excs. and Incs. gives the distribution of matched inclusion
and exclusion events across these issuers.
Series 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Date 10/03 3/04 9/04 3/05 9/05 3/06 9/06 3/07 9/07 3/08 9/08 3/09 9/09 3/10
CDX.IG
#. 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
Samp. 112 113 114 117 117 117 118 119 119 120 123 122 122 122
Excs. 3 3 0 7 5 4 6 8 7 6 9 6 2 -
Incs. - 4 4 3 7 5 5 7 8 8 9 8 6 2
CDX.HY
#. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Samp. - 66 67 67 71 78 80 83 86 87 85 87 87 90
Excs. - 2 4 2 2 2 5 4 3 6 6 7 1 -
Incs. - 0 3 4 6 9 4 8 7 4 4 8 7 4
In total there were 83 exclusion/inclusion pairs in series 1-14 of the CDX.IG and 84 ex-
clusion/inclusion pairs in the CDX.HY. I.e., on average, there were approximately six exclu-
sion/inclusion pairs per series for both indices13. The number of CDX.IG issuers in the data
increases from 90% in series 1 up to 98% in series 14. The number of CDX.HY issuers varies
from 66% in series 2 up to 90% in series 14. The issuers cover 80% of CDX.IG exclusions, 91%
of CDX.IG inclusions, 52% of CDX.HY exclusions and 80% of CDX.HY inclusions.
12The constituent list for series 1 of the CDX.HY is not available on Markit’s website.
13Which in turn suggests that more than 90% of issuers are the same between consecutive series of the same index.
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A subset of excluded issuers were deleted due credit events, as reported in Table 3.2 along with
the nature of the credit event, the date of occurrence and the index series in which the issuer was
included. These issuers all defaulted in late 2008 to mid-to-late 2009 at the height of the financial
crisis. Also worth noting is that prior to their default and deletion from the indices, CIT Group
Inc., Lear Corp. and Visteon Corp. resided in both the CDX.IG and CDX.HY. This peculiarity
results from the series structure of the CDX indices. Issuers who are excluded from a series due to
rating changes become eligible for the other index and may be included in it, either immediately
or at a future date. An issuer can thus be a constituent of different series of both the CDX.IG and
CDX.HY, but with different times-to-maturity. As such, an issuer can be rated as high-yield, but
still be in a prior investment-grade index series and traded with other investment-grade issuers.
I make use of this feature in our empirical tests of CDS co-movement around CDX assignment
changes in Section VI.
Table 3.2: The issuers deleted from the CDX indices due to credit events. I use Markit’s Auction Settlement
Summaries to determine the nature of the credit event experienced.
Issuer Name Credit Event Date Series at Event CDX Consistent
CIT Group Inc. Bankruptcy 02/11/2009 13 IG 1-12 & HY 13
Charter Communications Inc. Bankruptcy 27/03/2009 12 HY 2-11
Chemtura Corp. Bankruptcy 18/03/2009 11 HY 10-11
General Motors Corp. Bankruptcy 01/06/2009 12 HY 5-12
Lear Corp. Failure to Pay1 01/07/2009 12 IG 4 & HY 5-12
Lyondell Chemical Inc. Bankruptcy 07/01/2009 11 HY 2-9
R.H. Donnelly Corp. Failure to Pay2 18/05/2009 12 HY 7-12
Six Flags Inc. Bankruptcy 13/06/2009 12 HY 2-12
Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. Bankruptcy 26/01/2009 11 HY 2-11
Station Casinos Failure to Pay3 03/03/2009 12 HY 10-11
Tribune Company Bankruptcy 08/12/2008 11 HY 9-11
Visteon Corp. Bankruptcy 28/05/2009 12 IG 1 & HY 4-12
1 Entered Bankruptcy on 02/07/2009.
2 Entered Bankruptcy on 11/06/2009.
3 Entered Bankruptcy on 28/07/2009.
C. Investment-Grade and High-Yield Index Factors
I create factors to mimic the CDX.IG and CDX.HY indices. The CDX.IG factor is defined as the
daily cross-sectional median spread of the 74 issuers included in each of the series of the CDX.IG
for which I have CDS data. The CDX.HY factor is defined as the daily cross-sectional median
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spread of the 36 issuers included in every series of the CDX.HY for which I have CDS data. The
issuers which constitute these index factors are detailed in Table 3.3 below.
Table 3.3: The index factor constituents. These issuers were in series 1-14 of the CDX.IG and series 2-14
of the CDX.HY, between February 2, 2004 and June 1, 2010.
CDX.IG CDX.HY
ACE Ltd. Halliburton Co. AES Corp.
Aetna Inc. Hartford Finl. Svs. Gp. AK Steel Corp.
Alcoa Inc. Hewlett-Packard Co. Amkor Technology Inc.
Allstate Corp. Honeywell Intl. Inc. Chesapeake Energy Corp.
Altria Group Inc. International Paper Co. CMS Energy Corp.
American Elec. Pwr. Co. Inc . Intl. Bus. Mchs. Corp. CSC Holdings Inc.
American Express Co. Kraft Foods Inc. Dillards Inc.
Amgen Inc. Kroger Co. Dole Food Co.
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. Lockheed Martin Corp. Dynegy Inc.
Arrow Electronics Inc. Loews Corp. Echostar DBS Corp.
Baxter International Inc. Marriott Intl. Inc. El Paso Corp.
Boeing Capital Corp. Mcdonalds Corp. Forest Oil Corp.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. Metlife Inc. Georgia-Pacific Gp.
Burlington Nthn. Snt. Fe. Motorola Inc. Goodyear Tire & Rub. Co.
Campbell Soup Co. Nat. Rur. Util. Coop. Fin. HCA Inc.
Capital One Bank Newell Rubbermaid Inc. Host Hotels & Resorts LP
Carnival Corp. News America Inc. KB Home
Caterpillar Inc. Nordstrom Inc. Level 3 Comms. Inc.
Chubb Corp. Norfolk Southern Corp. Levi Strauss & Co.
Cigna Corp. Northrop Grumman Corp. Mediacom LLC
Computer Sciences Corp. Omnicom Group. MGM Mirage Inc.
Conagra Foods Inc. Progress Energy Inc. Owens-Illinois Inc.
Conocophillips Raytheon Co. Polyone Corp.
Constellation En. Gp. Inc. Safeway Inc. Pride International Inc.
Cox Communications Inc. Sempra Energy. Qwest Capital Fdg. Inc.
CSX Corp. Simon Property Group Inc. Rite Aid Corp.
Deere & Co. Southwest Airlines Royal Crbn. Cruises Ltd.
Devon Energy Corp. Target Corp. Saks Inc.
Dominion Resources Inc. Time Warner Inc. Smithfield Foods Inc.
Dow Chemical Co. Transocean Inc. Standard Pacific Corp.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. Union Pacific Corp. Tenet Healthcare Corp.
Duke Energy Carolinas Inc. Valero Energy Corp. Tesoro Corp.
Eastman Chemical Co. Verizon Comms Inc. Toys R Us Inc.
Firstenergy Corp. Wal-Mart Stores Inc. TRW Automotive Inc.
General Elec. Capital Corp. The Walt Disney Co. Unisys Corp.
General Mills Inc. Whirlpool Corp. United Rentals Inc.
Goodrich Corp. XL Capital Ltd.
Total 74 36
I utilize the median rather than the mean spread because it provides a better measure of central
tendency given the dramatic spread behavior of some indexed issuers during the financial crisis
of 2008-914. These factors aim to capture the behavior of the ‘on-the-run’ CDX series through
time. Figure 3.1 plots the time-series evolution of the indices. As a relative consideration, the
14I remove American International Group Inc. from the CDX.IG factor and AMR Corp. from the CDX.HY factor
due to extreme spread behavior.
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CDX.HY is unconditionally more expensive to insure. On average it has 8.5 times the spread
level of the CDX.IG, ranging from 4-6 times in 2004 up to 16 times in late 2008, shortly after the
Lehman bankruptcy. The CDX.IG has a mean spread of 50bps, ranging from a minimum of 13bps
in February 2007 to a maximum of 190bps in November 2008. The CDX.HY factor has a mean
spread of 407bps, ranging from 160bps in March 2005 to approximately 1300bps in December
2008.
Figure 3.1: The CDX.IG and CDX.HY index factors between February 2, 2004 and June 1, 2010. Each
is expressed as a daily (annualized) spread in bps, taken from the cross-section of issuers denoted in the
legend.
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V. Correlation Cluster Analysis
To reiterate, cluster analysis identifies homogeneous groups of issuers with respect to correlation
in their CDS spreads. It allows us to better understand what influences aggregate co-movement in
the CDS market and what common factors exist in CDS spreads.
A. Methodology
In this section, I analyze the correlation structure of the CDS returns of the eight largest indus-
tries in the data set15. The resulting 167 issuers are detailed in Table IV. They are grouped by
four-digit GICS industry and I report each issuers’ Datastream Identifier (DI) and historical index
assignments.
Their distribution across industries is: Energy (22), Materials (30), Capital Goods (22), Retail-
ing (16), Health Care Equipment & Services (19), Diversified Financials (13), Insurance (18) and
Utilities (27). I again implement the complete linkage algorithm and validation algorithm detailed
in Section V of Chapter 2. The CDS return correlation matrix over the full period of the data. To
reiterate, this algorithm was choose based on two defining characteristics. Firstly, issuers within
a cluster are all more correlated than the least two correlated issuers. This suggests that clustered
issuers co-move predominantly with each other. Secondly, it makes clusters distinctive because it
minimizes local correlations following each merger.
15The Food, Beverage & Tobacco (GICS: 3020) and Consumer Durables & Apparel (2520) industry-groups are
larger than the smallest two industry-groups I consider. However I exclude them because, as shown in Chapter 2, these
particular Consumer Sector industry-groups cluster poorly.
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Table 3.4: The 167 correlation cluster analysis issuers, distributed across eight GICS industry-groups. (DI)
is Datastream Identifier. (Index) denotes historical index assignments as either IG, HY, IG/HY of NI if they
have been in a series of either the CDX.IG, the CDX.HY, both, or not-indexed in either, respectively.
Industry Group GICS Code DI Issuer Name Index
Energy (22) 1010 APC Anadarko Petroleum Corp. IG
APA Apache Corp. NI
BHI Baker Hughes Inc. NI
CHK Chesapeake Energy Corp. HY
CVX Chevrontexaco Cap. Co. NI
COP Conocophillips IG
DVN Devon Energy Corp. IG
DO Diamond Offshore Drilling. NI
EP El Paso Corp. HY
XOM Exxon Mobil Corp. NI
HAL Halliburton Co. IG
MRO Marathon Oil Corp. NI
NBR Nabors Industries Inc. NI
OXY Occidental Petroleum Corp. NI
PDE Pride International Inc. HY
SUN Sunoco Inc. NI
TSO Tesoro Corp. HY
RIG Transocean Inc. IG
VLO Valero Energy Corp. IG
WFT Weatherford Intl. Inc. NI
WMB Williams Cos Inc. HY
XTO XTO Energy Inc. IG
Materials (30) 1510 APD Air Products & Chems Inc. NI
AKS AK Steel Corp. HY
AA Alcoa Inc. IG
ASH Ashland Inc. NI
CCC Comcast Cable Comms LLC. IG
CMC Commercial Metals Co. NI
CYT Cytec Industries Inc. NI
DTC Domtar Inc. HY
DD Du Pont E.I. De Nemours IG
EMN Eastman Chemical Co. IG
GP Georgia-Pacific Gp. HY
IP International Paper Co. IG
LPX Louisiana-Pacific Corp. HY
LZ Lubrizol Corp. NI
MLM Martin Marietta Mats Inc. NI
MWV Meadwestvaco Corp. IG
MTC Monsanto Co. NI
NEM Newmont Mining Corp. NI
NUE Nucor Corp. NI
OLN Olin Corp. IG
OI Owens-Illinois Inc. HY
PD Phelps Dodge Corp. NI
PPG PPG Industries Inc. NI
PX Praxair Inc. NI
ROH Rohm & Haas Co. IG
RPM RPM International Inc. NI
SEE Sealed Air Corp. NI
SHW Sherwin-Williams Co. IG
TIN Temple-Inland Inc. IG/HY
VMC Vulcan Materials NI
(Continued on next page)
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Industry Group GICS Code DI Issuer Name Index
Capital Goods (22) 2010 MMM 3M Company NI
ARN Arvinmeritor Inc. HY
BNG Boeing Co. NI
CAT Caterpillar Inc. IG
CMI Cummins Inc. HY
DHR Danaher Corp. NI
DE Deere & Co. IG
DOV Dover Corp. NI
ETN Eaton Corp. NI
EMR Emerson Electric Co. NI
GMT GATX Financial Corp. IG
GD General Dynamics Corp. NI
GR Goodrich Corp. IG
HON Honeywell Intl. Inc. IG
ITW Illinois Tool Works Inc. NI
LMT Lockheed Martin Corp. IG
NAV Navistar Intl. Corp. HY
NOC Northrop Grumman Corp. IG
RTN Raytheon Co. IG
TXT Textron Inc. NI
URI United Rentals Inc. HY
UTX United Technologies Corp. NI
Retailing (16) 2550 AZO Autozone Inc. IG
GPS Gap Inc. IG
HD Home Depot Inc. IG
JCP JC Penney Co. IG/HY
KSS Kohls Corp. IG
LWE Lowes Companies Inc. IG
LTD LTD Brands IG/HY
FD Macys Inc. IG/HY
NMGA Neiman-Marcus Group Inc. HY
JWN Nordstrom Inc. IG
ODP Office Depot Inc. NI
RSH Radioshack Corp. IG/HY
SKS Saks Inc. HY
SPLS Staples Inc. IG
TGT Target Corp. IG
TJX TJX Companies Inc. IG
Health Care (19) 3510 AET Aetna Inc. IG
ABC Amerisourcebergen Corp. HY
BOL Bausch & Lomb Inc. NI
BAX Baxter International Inc. IG
BSX Boston Scien. Corp. IG
CAH Cardinal Health Inc. IG
CI Cigna Corp. IG
HCA HCA Inc. HY
HMA Health Man.Assocs. Inc. NI
HUM Humana Inc. NI
HCR Manor Care Inc. NI
MCK Mckesson Corp. IG
MHS Medco Health Sltn. Inc. NI
MDT Medtronic Inc. NI
QST Quest Diagnostics IG
THC Tenet Healthcare Corp. HY
UNH Unitedhealth Group Inc. IG
UHS Universal Health Svs Inc. IG
WLP Wellpoint Inc. NI
(Continued on next page)
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Industry Group GICS Code DI Issuer Name Index
Diversified Fins. (13) 4020 AXP American Express Co. IG
BAC Bank Of America Corp. NI
COFC Capital One Finl. Corp. NI
C Citigroup Inc. NI
GEC General Elec. Capital Corp. IG
GMAC GMAC LLC IG/HY
GS Goldman Sachs Gp Inc. NI
HHFC HSBC Finance Corp. NI
INTL Intl. Lease Fin.Corp. IG/HY
JPM JP Morgan Chase & Co. NI
MER Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. NI
MWD Morgan Stanley Gp. Inc. NI
SLM SLM Corp. IG
Insurance (18) 4030 ACE ACE Ltd. IG
ALL Allstate Corp. IG
ABK Ambac Financial Gp. Inc. NI
AIG American Intl. Group. IG
AOC AON Corp. NI
BRKA Berkshire Hath. Inc. NI
CB Chubb Corp. IG
CNA CNA Financial Corp. NI
HIG Hartford Finl. Svs. Gp. IG
LBMI Liberty Mutual Ins. NI
LNC Lincoln National Corp. NI
LTR Loews Corp. IG
MMC Marsh & Mclennan Cos. Inc. IG
MBI MBIA Inc. HY
MET Metlife Inc. IG
SPC Travellers Cos. Inc. NI
UNM Unum Group. HY
XL XL Capital Ltd. IG
Utilities (27) 5510 AES AES Corp. HY
AYE Allegheny En. Supp. Co. LLC. HY
AEP American Elec. Pwr. Co. Inc. IG
CNPRC Centerpoint En. Res. Corp. NI
CNP Centerpoint Energy Inc. NI
CMS CMS Energy Corp. HY
ED Consolidated Edison Inc. NI
CEG Constellation En. Gp. Inc IG
D Dominion Resources Inc. IG
DPL DPL Inc. NI
DTE DTE Energy Company NI
DUK Duke Enrgy Carolinas IG
DYN Dynegy Inc. HY
ETR Entergy Corp. NI
EXC Exelon Corp. NI
EXG Exelon Generation Co. LLC. NI
FE Firstenergy Corp. IG
OKE Oneok Inc. NI
POM Pepco Holdings Inc. NI
PGN Progress Energy Inc. IG
PSEP Pseg Power LLC NI
SRE Sempra Energy IG
SOCE Southern Cali. Edison Co. NI
TE Teco Energy Inc. NI
TXUE TXU Energy Co. LLC NI
WEC Wisconsin Energy Corp. NI
XEL XCEL Energy Inc. NI
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B. Correlation Clusters in the CDS Market
Table 3.5 presents the nine largest clusters in the correlation matrix, ordered by size. Each issuer is
denoted by their GICS code, CDX assignments and abbreviated Datastream identifier (DI). Again,
we observe a well-defined industry structure to CDS co-movement, with each industry represented
by a correlation cluster. Cluster 1 corresponds to Materials and contains 53% of the sample issuers
in that industry. Cluster 2 corresponds to Capital Goods (68%), Cluster 3 is Insurance (78%),
Cluster 4 is Diversified Financials (77%), Cluster 5 is Utilities (48%), Cluster 6 is Energy (59%),
Cluster 8 is Retail (56%) and Cluster 9 is Health Care Equipment & Services (47%). The minimum
and average correlation between the industry clustered issuers are similar; ρmin ranges from 0.19
to 0.27 and ρav ranges from 0.35 to 0.45.
Cluster 7 is the HY cluster in this data set. But here, having supplemented the issuers with
their historical index assignments, we also observe that in addition to being HY rated, they are
also CDX.HY constituents. With reference to Table 3.3, the majority of these issuers are also con-
stituents of the CDX.HY index factor I defined in Section IV, i.e. they were in every series of the
index that I consider16. Again these clustered issuers are distributed across several of the industries
in the data set: Energy, Materials, Retail, Health Care and Utilities. The minimum and average
correlation of this cluster are 0.20 and 0.38 respectively, implying co-movement properties simi-
lar to those of issuers within the industry clusters and consistent with the findings of the previous
Chapter.
Not all indexed high-yield issuers are in Cluster 7, as some co-move predominantly with their
industry affiliates. However they are typically the more transient members of the index. For
instance Lousiana-Pacific Corp. (1510-HY-LPX) in the Materials cluster was in series 11-14 of the
CDX.HY, Cummins Inc. (2010-HY-CMI) in the Capital Goods cluster was in series 2-4 and MBIA
Inc and (4030-HY-MBI) in the Diversified Financials cluster was only in series 14. There are a few
non-indexed high-yield issuers in the sample but they do not cluster with their indexed counterparts.
These issuers are mainly from the Health Care industry and form a minor industry-based cluster not
16The two issuers not in the index factor, Neiman-Marcus Group Inc. (2550-HY-NMGA) and The Williams Com-












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































presented. If the HY labeling of firms does capture some key fundamental characteristic of these
issuers’ credit risk, we would expect to see un-ambiguous clustering of HY rated firms irrespective
of whether the firms have been indexed.
Using the DRD data set, I am able to identify that all of the non-indexed (NI) issuers in the
presented clusters are rated investment-grade. A minor point of note is that cluster 4, Diversified
Financials, contains a subset of the major index dealers (JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Morgan
Stanley etc.). They are not eligible for inclusion in the CDX indices under Markit’s eligibility
rules and hence carry the NI label. The fact that indexed high-yield issuers co-move predominantly
with each other once again suggests there are strong common factors in their CDS spreads that
are more prevalent than industry related common factors. The central question I address in this
chapter is whether such factors relate to their high-yield classification, which simply proxies for
some common fundamental characteristics. If so, this empirical artifact may be consistent with the
fundamentals-based view of co-movement. Alternatively, these common factors may be related
to their indexation based on the high-yield classification and provide direct evidence of excess co-
movement. In the following section, I construct tests capable of determining whether co-movement
in the CDS market simply reflects co-movement in fundamental values.
VI. CDS Co-movement and CDX Assignments
A. Unconditional Results
Using an ‘event study’, I now test the hypothesis of changes in co-movement around CDX.IG and
CDX.HY exclusions and inclusions. The daily CDS spread of event issuer i is mapped to event
time τ, where τ = 0 are the roll dates of the index series. On average they are 130 trading-days
apart so I define the pre- and post-event windows as 120-day periods. The pre-event window ends
at τ−5 and the post-event window begins at τ+5 to accommodate event-day uncertainty. Market
participants learn of changes in index membership before a new series becomes active as the index
‘annex’ is published the day before the roll date and the major index dealers learn of membership
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changes a calendar week before this. It is therefore possible that spreads anticipate indexation
events17. The windows lie within the time-frames of successive index series, 6 calendar months. I
then regress the issuer’s CDS returns on CDX.IG returns for CDX.IG exclusions and inclusions, in











t + εit (3.2)




t are daily log-
differences in the CDX.IG and CDX.HY factors described in Section IV and βIGi and β
HY
i are the
respective factor loadings. I determine average changes in co-movement around indexation events














(βHYi2 −βHYi1 )/n (3.4)
Where the parameters are estimated in either the pre-event (1) or post-event (2) window. n is the
sample size conditional on having the required CDS data. Table 3.6 below lists the issuers by
indexation event as well as the reasoning for each. I was informed by Markit that they did not keep
records of this information although their documentation says all such reasons must be provided in
writing by the dealers. Therefore, I investigated each index assignment change, case by case, using
Moody’s ratings, Markit’s website and press releases around the time of the indexation event. I
separate out of this sample the index deletions that resulted from credit events as reported in Table
3.2. I was also forced to remove CDX.HY exclusions from series 3 & 4, and CDX.HY inclusions
into series 4, due to some erroneous CDS data in CMA’s database during this period.
17Spreads are well-known to anticipate rating events, particularly in the case of review for downgrade, downgrade
and outlook negative. See Hull et al. (2004), Norden & Weber (2004) and Cathcart, El-Jahel & Evans (2010b) (Chapter
4).
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Table 3.6: The indexation event issuers. Ser. is the series of the event. Res. denotes the reason for
each event. For exclusions: RC=Rating Change, CA=Corporate Action, U=Undetermined. For inclusions:
E=Eligible for at least six months, ECr=Rating Eligibility Change - A rating change occurred during the
prior six months that rendered the issuer eligible, ECc=Corporate Action Eligibility Change - A corporate
action occurred during the prior six months that rendered the issuer eligible.
CDX.IG CDX.HY
Exclusions Inclusions Exclusions Inclusions
Issuer Ser. Res. Issuer Ser. Res. Issuer Ser. Res. Issuer Ser. Res.
AT&T Corp. 2 RC Autozone Inc. 3 E Amrisrcbrgn Corp. 5 RC Eastman Kodak Co. 5 ECr
Citizens Comms. Co. 2 RC Cardinal Health Inc. 3 E D.R. Horton Inc. 5 RC Ford Motor Credit Co. 5 ECr
Elctrnc Data Sys. Corp. 2 RC Lennar Corp. 3 E Starwood Htls.&Rsts. 6 RC General Motors Corp. 5 ECr
Eastman Kodak Co. 4 RC Mckesson Corp. 3 E Unum Group. 6 RC Lear Corp. 5 ECr
Ford Motor Credit Co. 4 RC Amrcn. Axl&Mnfg Inc. 4 E Bowater Inc. 7 CA Liberty Media LLC 5 ECr
GMAC LLC 4 RC Hilton Hotels Corp. 4 ECr Felcor Lodging LP 7 U Amrcn. Axl&Mnfg Inc. 6 ECr
Lear Corp. 4 RC Lear Corp. 4 E Navistar Intl. Corp. 7 CA Beazer Homes Usa Inc. 6 E
Liberty Media LLC 4 RC Gap Inc. 5 ECr United States Steel 7 RC Domtar Inc. 6 E
Maytag Corp. 4 RC LTD Brands. 5 E Xerox Corp. 7 RC Hertz Corp. 6 ECc
Sears Roe. Acc. Corp. 4 RC M.&Mclennan Cos. Inc. 5 E Delhaize America Inc. 8 RC K. Hovnanian Ents. Inc. 6 E
Albertsons Inc. 5 CA Radioshack Corp. 5 E Lucent Technologies Inc. 8 CA Massey Energy Co. 6 E
Amrcn. Axl&Mnfg Inc. 5 RC Sabre Holdings Corp. 5 E Parker Drilling Co. 8 CA Neiman-Marcus Gp. Inc. 6 ECc
Bellsouth Corp. 5 CA Sara Lee Corp. 5 E Reynolds American Inc. 8 RC NRG Energy Inc. 6 E
Hilton Hotels Corp. 5 RC Toll Brothers Inc. 5 ECr TXU Corp. 9 CA Cooper Tire & Rubber 7 E
Viacom Inc. 5 U Sherwin-Williams Co. 6 E The Williams Cos. Inc. 9 RC R.H. Donnelley Corp. 7 E
Supervalu Inc. 6 RC Temple-Inland Inc. 6 E Allegheny En. Supp. Co. 10 RC Aramark Corporation. 8 E
Tribune Co. 6 RC Tribune Co. 6 E Alltel Corp. 10 CA Clear Channel Coms. Inc. 8 ECr
Wendys Intl. Inc. 6 RC Wendys Intl. Inc. 6 E Citizens Comms. Co. 10 CA Freescale Semicons. Inc. 8 ECc
Clear Chnl Coms. Inc. 7 RC Olin Corp. 7 E Frprt-Mcmr. Cpr.&Gd. 10 RC Harrahs Opg. Co. Inc. 8 ECr
Equity Office Props. Tst. 7 CA Resd Capital LLC 7 E Ikon Office Sltns. Inc. 10 RC Radioshack Corp. 8 ECr
Gap Inc. 7 RC R.R. Donnelley&Sons 7 E The Mosaic Company 10 RC Sabre Holdings Corp. 8 ECr
Harrahs Opg. Co. Inc. 7 RC Boston Scientific Corp. 8 E Allied Waste NA Inc. 11 RC TXU Corp. 8 E
Radioshack Corp. 7 RC First Data Corp. 8 E Directv Holdings LLC 12 RC Univision Comm Inc. 8 ECr
Sabre Holdings Corp. 7 RC JC Penney Co. 8 E Reliant Energy 12 CA Alltel Corp. 9 ECr
Alltel Corp. 8 RC Radian Group Inc. 8 E First Data Corp. 9 ECr
Boston Scientific Corp. 8 RC Starwood Htls.&Rsts. 8 ECr Frprt-Mcmr. Cpr.&Gd. 9 E
Expedia Inc. 8 RC Universal Hlth Svs. Inc. 8 E Realogy Corp. 9 ECc
First Data Corp. 8 RC Belo Corp. 9 E Resd. Capital LLC 9 ECr
Olin Corp. 8 RC Darden Restaurants Inc. 9 E Tribune Co. 9 E
Resd. Capital LLC 8 RC Fortune Brands Inc. 9 E Chemtura Corp. 10 ECr
Temple-Inland Inc. 8 RC Gannett Company Inc. 9 E Constellation Brands 10 E
Belo Corp. 9 RC Home Depot Inc. 9 E Directv Holdings LLC 10 E
Centex Corp. 9 RC IStar Financial Inc. 9 E Station Casinos 10 ECc
Comcast Cable Comms. 9 CA Liz Claiborne Inc. 9 E Louisiana-Pacific Corp. 11 E
Ctrywide Hmloan Inc. 9 CA Quest Diagnostics 9 E Radian Group Inc. 11 ECr
Jones Apparel Gp. Inc. 9 RC Black & Decker Corp. 10 E Sprint Nextel Corp. 11 ECr
Lennar Corp. 9 RC Brunswick Corp. 10 E Belo Corp. 12 E
Pulte Homes Inc. 9 RC Comcast Corp. 10 E Dean Foods Co. 12 E
Brunswick Corp. 10 RC Kohls Corp. 10 E Gannett Co Inc. 12 ECr
Liz Claiborne Inc. 10 RC Masco Corp. 10 E Lennar Corp. 12 E
Meadwestvaco Corp. 10 RC Mdc Holdings Inc. 10 E LTD Brands 12 ECr
Radian Group Inc. 10 RC New York Times Co. 10 E Starwood Htls.&Rsts. 12 ECr
Rohm & Haas Co. 10 CA Viacom Inc. 10 E Temple-Inland Inc. 12 E
Sprint Nextel Corp. 10 RC ERP Operating LP. 11 E The New York Times Co. 12 ECr
Embarq Corp. 11 CA Mohawk Industries Inc. 11 E Brunswick Corp. 13 E
Gannett Co Inc. 11 RC Ryder System Inc. 11 E GMAC LLC 13 E
IStar Financial Inc. 11 RC Staples Inc. 11 E Liz Claiborne Inc. 13 E
LTD Brands 11 RC Time Warner Cable Inc. 11 E Macys Inc. 13 ECr
MBIA Insurance Corp. 11 RC United Parcel Ser. Inc. 11 E McClatchy Co. 13 E
Mohawk Industries Inc. 11 RC Xerox Corp. 11 E Textron Financial Corp. 13 ECr
Starwood Htls.&Rsts. 11 RC XTO Energy Inc. 11 E
New York Times Co. 11 RC YumBrands Inc. 11 E
Wyeth 11 CA Avnet Inc. 12 E
JC Penney Co. 12 RC Boston Properties Inc. 12 E
Macys Incorporated. 12 RC Cisco Systems Inc. 12 E
Masco Corp. 12 RC Dell Inc. 12 E
Textron Financial Corp. 12 RC Lowes Companies Inc. 12 E
Weyerhaeuser Co. 12 RC Pfizer Inc. 12 E
The TJX Companies Inc. 12 E
Vornado Realty LP 12 E
Directv Holdings LLC 13 ECr
GATX Financial Corp. 13 E
Johnson Controls Inc. 13 E
K. Morgan Energy Prns. 13 E
Reynolds American Inc. 13 E
Unitedhealth Gp. Inc. 13 E
58 66 24 50
83
We observe from Table 3.6 that for the 58 issuers excluded from the CDX.IG, 84% were due
to rating downgrades during the prior six months and 14% were due to corporate actions, all
mergers, during the same period. For the 24 issuers excluded from the CDX.HY, 63% were due to
rating upgrades and 33% related to corporate actions, including mergers, buy-outs and accounting
irregularities. The reasons for individual index inclusions are less transparent than for exclusions.
Once in the index, rating changes or corporate actions that render an issuer ineligible lead to an
exclusion event. Conversely, rating changes and corporate actions that render an issuer eligible do
not necessarily result in an index inclusion, rather they join the pool of issuers eligible by rating
that may be nominated for inclusion in future series. For the 66 issuers included in the CDX.IG in
the sample, 8% were rendered eligible due to rating changes during the prior six months. 92% were
rated investment-grade for a least six months before their inclusion. For the 50 issuers included in
the CDX.HY, 46% were rendered eligible due to rating changes, 10% were rendered eligible due
to a corporate actions and 44% were rated high-yield for at least six months before the inclusion.
I was unable to determine the reason for one CDX.IG exclusion and one CDX.HY exclusion;
they were possibly a result of a material decrease in CDS liquidity, as set out by Markit’s rules.
We also observe from Table 3.6 that the distribution of events across index series is reasonably
balanced, although index turnover was higher during the later series. In addition to analyzing
CDX exclusions and inclusions over the full period of the data, I split the samples in half to
consider separately 02/2004-04/2007 and 04/2007-06/2010. These sub-periods roughly correspond
to before and after the onset of the subprime debacle and ensuing credit crisis. I present the results
in Table 3.7.
In the full sample, the average issuer excluded from either the CDX.IG or CDX.HY does not
experience significant changes in co-movement with the index. In the case of CDX.IG exclusions,
mean changes in beta between the six-month event windows are zero and approximately 50% of
the cross-sectional changes in beta are positive. Similarly, no change in beta is observed in either
sub-period. For CDX.HY exclusions, in the full sample, mean betas decrease by 0.07 and approx-
imately 50% of the cross-sectional changes are positive. Although there is no change in beta in the
pre crisis period, a decrease of 0.21 is observed in the post-crisis period and approximately 70% of
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Table 3.7: Univariate regressions of issuers’ daily CDS returns on CDX.IG and CDX.HY index returns
around index assignments. The Full Sample results cover the period 02/2004-06/2010, assignments from
series 2-13 of the CDX.IG and series 5-13 of the CDX.HY. The Pre Crisis results cover the period 02/2004-
04/2007, assignments from series 2-8 of the CDX.IG and series 5-8 of the CDX.HY. The Post Crisis results
cover the period 04/2007-06/2010 and assignments from series 9-13 of the CDX.IG and CDX.HY. Excs.
denotes exclusions and Incs. denotes inclusions. ∆β is the cross-sectional mean change in loading on the
relevant index factor between the pre- and post-event windows as defined in Equations 3.3 and 3.4. β1 is
the cross-sectional mean beta in the pre-event window. ∆βi > 0 (%) is the percentage of changes in beta in
the cross-section that are positive. t-stat gives the results of a cross-sectional t-test and p-value is ascribed
by the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Significance at 1% is denoted by (∗∗∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗). n is the
sample size.
Full Sample Pre Crisis Post Crisis
CDX.IG CDX.HY CDX.IG CDX.HY CDX.IG CDX.HY
Excs. Incs. Excs. Incs. Excs. Incs. Excs. Incs. Excs. Incs. Excs. Incs.
∆β 0.00 0.14 -0.07 0.18 -0.01 0.20 0.03 0.19 0.01 0.09 -0.21 0.16
β1 0.55 0.49 0.67 0.47 0.45 0.35 0.31 0.25 0.62 0.58 0.88 0.67
∆βi > 0 (%) 46.6 69.7 45.8 74.0 50.0 66.7 55.6 73.9 44.1 71.8 33.3 74.1
t-stat 0.08 3.10∗∗∗ -0.88 3.70∗∗∗ -0.12 2.10∗∗ 0.37 3.00∗∗∗ 0.25 2.80∗∗∗ -2.20∗∗ 2.30∗∗
p-value 0.97 0.00∗∗∗ 0.65 0.00∗∗∗ 0.93 0.08∗ 0.76 0.00∗∗∗ 0.91 0.01∗∗∗ 0.11 0.02∗∗
n 58 66 24 50 24 27 9 23 34 39 15 27
the cross-sectional beta changes are negative. However, the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank
test does not assign significance at the 10% level and sample size hinders strong conclusions with
respect to the cross-sectional test, which assigns 5% significance.
By contrast, the average issuer included in either the CDX.IG or CDX.HY experiences highly
significant increases in co-movement with the index. When an issuer is included in the CDX.IG,
on average its beta increases by 0.14 from 0.49 to 0.63. Similarly, when an issuer is added to the
CDX.HY, its beta increases by 0.18 from 0.47 to 0.65. Approximately 70% and 74% of the cross-
sectional beta changes are positive respectively. All of these results are significant at the 1% level.
With reference to the sub-periods, mean betas are higher in the post crisis period, consistent with
market-wide increases in spread correlations, but beta increases are observed in both. CDX.IG
inclusions resulted in larger increases in mean betas in the pre-crisis period; increasing by 0.20,
from 0.35 to 0.55, before the crisis and by 0.09, from 0.58 to 0.67, after the crisis. CDX.HY
inclusions demonstrate similar increases in beta in both sub-periods, increasing by 0.19, from
0.25 to 0.44, before the crisis and by 0.16, from 0.67 to 0.83, after it. In the full samples, post-
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inclusion betas are consistent with pre-exclusion betas. For example, the average issuer included
in the CDX.IG experiences a beta increase from 0.49 to 0.63, which is similar in magnitude to the
average issuer’s beta of 0.65 during the six months before it is excluded from the CDX.IG.
As a point of note, the beta coefficients seem quite low overall; in the full samples they are
of the order of 0.5. To address this concern, we first examine whether the relatively short event
window sizes (of 120-days) play a role in biasing them downwards. It seems they do. By extending
the pre and post-event windows to 250 days (which reduces the sample size slightly as index
assignment changes into and out of series 2 and 3 of the indices drop out), mean betas in Table 3.7
increase towards 0.7. In the equity literature (Barberis et al. (2005)), mean betas in the pre-event
window are in the region of 0.8, which is slightly higher than for CDS ‘returns’, although they use
longer event windows. On the whole, smaller betas in CDS returns seem consistent with the results
of Chapter 2, i.e. that spreads appear to contain a relatively larger idiosyncratic component than
equity returns.
Whilst changes in co-movement in CDS spreads around index assignments, as captured by
mean beta coefficients, are a necessary condition to test the hypothesis of excess co-movement,
it is also possible that index assignments are associated with changes in average CDS return. I.e.
it is worth identifying the behaviour of mean alpha coefficients, and changes to them, having
condition on index returns. I therefore repeat the set of tests described in Table 3.7 on the cross-
section of alphas, using cross-sectional t-tests and the Wilcoxon signed rank test to ascribe p-
values, for each index and for both inclusions and deletions. Having condition on index returns,
mean alphas in the pre-event window are not significantly different for zero. Similarly, changes
to them following index assignments changes are not statistically different from zero either, with
the possible exception of a weakly significant decrease in mean return following exclusion for the
CDX.HY in the post crisis period using a cross-sectional t-test. However, given the small sample
size of the test (15 observations), and given the volatility of this particular subset of issues at this
time, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions from this result. Overall, these results suggest that
index membership changes are not associated with changes in average return.
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B. Conditioning on Rating Changes
CDX membership is governed by the investment-grade and high-yield classification of issuers.
According to Moody’s (2003), “...ratings should change only when relative fundamental credit-
worthiness changes”. Under the fundamentals hypothesis, changes in co-movement around index
assignments relating to rating changes must be due to changes in co-movement of issuers’ fun-
damentals that are correlated with these classifications. I now test whether rating changes are
sufficient to explain co-movement dynamics around index assignment changes.
Issuers excluded from the CDX.IG as a result of rating downgrades join the pool of issuers
with an eligible rating for future inclusion in the CDX.HY. In the sample, there are 49 rating-driven
CDX.IG exclusions. Whilst the investment-grade and high-yield classification of an issuer under
Markit’s rules is determined by a consensus of ratings ascribed by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, in the
data, Moody’s rating are sufficient18 to infer exclusions and inclusions related to rating changes19.
I label as Case I the 20 issuers that join the CDX.HY immediately. The remaining 29 issuers either
do not join the CDX.HY or do so after more than six months. I label this sample as Case II. The
fundamentals hypothesis predicts a decrease in co-movement with the CDX.IG and an increase in
co-movement with CDX.HY in both cases20. As a control sample, I label the 22 issuers that were
classified as high-yield for at least six months before their inclusion in the CDX.HY as Case III.
Ceteris paribus, the fundamentals hypothesis predicts no change in co-movement with the index for
this sample. Due to data limitations, I am unable to provide complimentary samples for the separa-
tion of issuers excluded from the CDX.HY due to rating upgrades which either (i) are included the
CDX.IG immediately or (ii) are not included within six months as only two issuers were promoted
18Whilst split ratings suggest that agencies disagree on the IG vs HY labelling of issuers, Markit’s definition of
IG vs. HY, on which indexation rules are based, is well-defined and specifically accommodates this possibility. As
my analysis shows, it is indexation that drives excess-co-movement, not ratings, or the information on which they
are based. I.e. regardless of a change in rating, or disagreement on it at the agency level, if an issuer is indexed, its
co-movement with the index increases. As such, split ratings cannot bias the findings of this study.
19Whilst their rating systems are comparable in terms of the alphanumeric category assignments each agency makes,
the meaning of their rating categories differ. Bongaerts, Jong & Driessen (2009) among others note that S&P and Fitch
ratings reflect cross-sectional variation in default probabilities whereas Moody’s also incorporate loss given default and
hence aim to capture expected losses.
20More concretely, it predicts changes in spread co-movement with the wider investment-grade and high-yield
markets. However by construction, the indices are constituted by their most representative issuers.
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from the CDX.HY to the CDX.IG between consecutive series. Also, 92% of CDX.IG inclusions
were rated as investment-grade for at least six months and so the corresponding control sample
is very similar to the one reported in the unconditional univariate analysis of CDX.IG inclusions
reported above.










t + εit (3.5)
The univariate regressions are analogous to Equations 3.1 & 3.2. Average changes in co-movement
with the indices are calculated as in Equations 3.3 & 3.4. The full-sample correlation between
rIGt and r
HY





> 0, and for Case III, ∆β
IG
= 0 and ∆β
HY
= 0. The results are presented in Table 3.8.
Columns 1-3 demonstrate that issuers demoted from the CDX.IG to the CDX.HY due to rat-
ing downgrades increase in co-movement with the high-yield index but do not decrease in co-
movement with the investment-grade index. In the bi-variate specification in column 1, mean
CDX.IG betas decrease by 0.01, from 0.32 to 0.31, and 60% of the cross-sectional beta changes
are negative. This result is insignificant in both tests. Mean CDX.HY betas increase by 0.17, from
0.34 to 0.51, and 70% of the beta changes are positive. This result is significant at the 5% and 10%
level in the respective tests. In the univariate specification in column 2, no significant changes in
mean CDX.IG beta is observed. In column 3, the mean CDX.HY beta increases by 0.24, from 0.49
to 0.73, and 75% of the cross-sectional beta changes are positive. This result is significant at the
1% level in both tests.
Columns 4-6 demonstrate that issuers excluded from the CDX.IG due to downgrades, which do
not join the CDX.HY within six months, experience no changes in co-movement with either index.
Columns 7-9 demonstrate that issuers which were rated as high-yield for at least six months expe-
rience increases in co-movement with the CDX.HY upon inclusion. In the bivariate specification
in column 7, mean CDX.HY betas increase by 0.15, from 0.26 to 0.41, and approximately 65% of
the beta changes are positive. This result is significant at the 5% and 10% levels in the respective
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Table 3.8: Bivariate and univariate regressions of issuers’ daily CDS returns on CDX.IG and CDX.HY index
returns around CDX assignment changes resulting from rating changes. Case I in columns 1-3 corresponds
to the sample of issuers demoted between successive series of CDX.IG and CDX.HY due to rating down-
grades. Case II in columns 4-6 corresponds to issuers excluded from CDX.IG due to rating downgrades
but which were not included in the CDX.HY for at least six months. Case III in Columns 7-9 corresponds
to issuers included in the CDX.HY who were rated as high-yield for at least six months. ∆β is the cross-
sectional mean change in loading on the relevant index factor between the pre- and post-event windows. β1
is the cross-sectional mean beta in the pre-event window. ∆βi > 0 (%) is the percentage of changes in beta
in the cross-section that are positive. t-stat results from a cross-sectional t-test and p-value is ascribed by the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Significance at 1% is denoted by (∗∗∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗). n is the sample
size.
Case I Case II Case III
CDX.IG/HY Demotions CDX.IG Exclusions CDX.HY Inclusions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆β
IG
-0.01 0.11 - 0.04 0.01 - -0.02 0.08 -
β
IG
1 0.32 0.46 - 0.39 0.55 - 0.27 0.38 -
∆βIGi > 0 (%) 40.0 60.0 - 58.6 44.8 - 54.5 63.6 -
t-stat -0.14 1.20 - 0.94 0.18 - -0.33 1.6 -
p-value 0.60 0.28 - 0.26 0.91 - 0.91 0.10∗ -
∆β
HY
0.17 - 0.24 -0.06 - -0.01 0.15 - 0.13
β
HY
1 0.34 - 0.49 0.32 - 0.58 0.26 - 0.45
∆βHYi > 0 (%) 70.0 - 75.0 41.4 - 51.7 63.6 - 68.2
t-stat 2.00∗∗ - 2.90∗∗∗ -1.10 - -0.16 2.10∗∗ - 2.20∗∗
p-value 0.06∗ - 0.01∗∗∗ 0.13 - 0.85 0.09∗ - 0.05∗∗
n 20 29 22
tests. In the univariate specification in column 9, mean CDX.HY betas increase by 0.13, from
0.45 to 0.58, and approximately 70% of the beta changes are positive. This result is significant in
both tests at the 5% level. Neither the bivariate nor univariate specification suggest a change in
co-movement with the CDX.IG for these issuers.
Differences in the co-movement dynamics of the three samples, and the observed deviations
in mean beta changes from the predictions of the fundamental hypothesis, suggest a departure
from the fundamentals-based view of co-movement. Cases I and II demonstrate that CDX.IG
exclusions, following downgrades, do not result in decreases in co-movement with the investment-
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grade index. Although both sets of issuers are rated as high-yield, only those issuers who get
re-indexed in the CDX.HY immediately experience increases in CDX.HY betas. Also, 12 of the
29 CDX.IG exclusions in Case II correspond to 12 of the 22 CDX.HY inclusions in Case III. That
is, a subset of these issuers get re-indexed in the CDX.HY, but after more than six months. Yet
they only experience increases in CDX.HY beta at the time of the re-indexation, not at the time of
the rating change. The remaining 10 CDX.HY inclusions in Case III were unambiguously rated as
high-yield during the duration of our sample. However, on average they also experience increases
in beta following their indexation. Finally, we observe from Cases I and III that issuers included in
the CDX.HY experience an increase in co-movement, irrespective of rating changes. From these
results, I am able to conclude that indexation drives beta increases upon inclusion in the CDX.HY,
not rating changes.
C. Alternative explanations
My analysis assumes that rating changes across the investment-grade boundary relate to changes
in the co-movement of fundamental characteristics of investment-grade and high-yield issuers. If
this is not the case, it is unsurprising that we do not observe changes in co-movement following
index exclusions that result from rating changes. We then require an alternative explanation as to
why, irrespective of rating changes, we observe increases in betas following CDX.HY inclusions.
It is possible thin-trading may play a role. The CDX indices represent issuers who have an eligible
credit rating and the most liquid CDS spreads. If, upon inclusion, an issuer’s CDS spread is
more frequently traded and incorporates market-wide news more rapidly, this may suggest some
downward bias in our pre- inclusion betas. To test this alternative explanation, I adopt a test similar
to the one suggested by Vijh (1994) and Barberis et al. (2005). I first calculate daily percentage bid-
ask spreads during the same 120-day pre- and post-event windows for all issuers included in the
CDX.IG or CDX.HY. I then split the samples by issuers who became more or less liquid following
their inclusion according to decreases or increases in six month average daily percentage bid-ask
spread. If my results are driven by thin-trading, we should expect to see issuers whose bid-ask
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spreads decreased upon inclusion to exhibit increases in beta and issuers whose bid-ask spread
increases to exhibit decreases in beta. The results are presented in Table 3.9.
Table 3.9: Univariate regressions of issuers’ daily CDS returns on CDX.IG and CDX.HY returns condi-
tioned on liquidity changes. ∆BA is the cross-sectional mean change in average daily percentage bid-ask
spreads between the pre- and post-event windows. BA1 is the cross-sectional mean of average daily percent-
age bid-ask spreads in the pre-event window. ∆BAi < 0 (%) is the percentage of average bid-ask spread
changes in the cross-section that are negative. ∆β is the cross-sectional mean change in loading on the
relevant index factor between the pre- and post-event windows. β1 is the cross-sectional mean beta in the
pre-event window. ∆βi > 0 (%) is the percentage of beta changes in the cross-section that are positive.
t-stat gives the results of the cross-sectional t-test and p-value is ascribed by the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
Significance at 1% is denoted by (∗∗∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗). n is the sample size.
CDX.IG Inclusions CDX.HY Inclusions
Full Sample Full Sample
∆BA -0.02 0.00
BA1 0.09 0.05
∆BAi < 0 (%) 77.3 58.5
n 66 53
More Liquid Less Liquid More Liquid Less Liquid
∆β 0.15 0.08 0.03 0.34
β1 0.47 0.55 0.48 0.44
t-stat 2.82∗∗∗ 1.32 0.55 4.60∗∗∗
p-value 0.01∗∗∗ 0.21 0.62 0.00∗∗∗
n 51 15 31 22
We observe that the CDS spread of the average issuer included in the CDX.IG becomes more
liquid; 77% of issuers experience decreases in their six month average daily percentage bid-ask
spreads. The observed decrease is on average approximately 2%, from 8% to 6%. Pre-inclusion
betas are lower for issuers that became more liquid but mean beta changes are positive in both
sub-samples. However, the beta changes are only statistically significant for the issuers which
became more liquid and both tests assign significance at the 1% level for this sub-sample. Thin-
trading does appear to play a role in beta increases following CDX.IG inclusions. By contrast, the
average issuer included in the CDX.HY does not experience a change in liquidity. 58% experienced
decreases in their bid-ask spreads but the average bid-ask spread is unchanged at 5.5% before and
after inclusion. Whilst beta changes are positive in both sub-samples, they are only statistically
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significant for issuers which became less liquid. Both tests assign significance at the 1% level for
this sub-sample. Hence thin-trading does not explain beta increases following CDX.HY inclusions.
In sum, CDX.HY inclusions result in increases in co-movement that cannot be explained be
either rating or liquidity changes. Under the fundamentals hypothesis, if indexed high-yield issuers
exhibit some unobserved fundamental characteristic, unrelated to credit ratings, this could poten-
tially explain the inclusion results. However, given the findings of this chapter as well Chapter 2,
this source of commonality would have to outweigh commonality in fundamental characteristics
already captured by industry affiliation and/or rating classification. This seems highly implausi-
ble. Index exclusions do not result in decreases in co-movement, even though they are governed
by observable characteristic changes, credit rating and corporate actions, which should relate to
a change in the issuer’s fundamental characteristics. Yet Markit’s CDX indices allow style in-
vestors to trade excluded issuers, which remain indexed with the majority of issuers included in
the on-the-run index series, via previous off-the-run series. In this way, I interpret both results as
being consistent with the excess co-movement hypothesis; issuers included in or excluded from
the CDX.HY co-move by more than implied by changes in co-movement in their fundamentals.
Due to data limitations, I are unable to draw strong conclusions with respect to the CDX.IG index.
However, my results are generally supportive of excess co-movement amongst these issuers, just
not to the same extent as that of CDX.HY issuers. It is of course possible and to some extent
plausible that industry itself, as a classification, generates excess co-movement in spreads. This
however, is beyond the scope of this thesis and is left as an interesting avenue for future research.
VII. Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined the effects of indexation on co-movement dynamics in the CDS
market. The CDX.IG and CDX.HY indices, administered by Markit, were introduced in 2003
and represent the CDS spreads of the most liquid North American corporate issuers. They allow
market participants to take aggregate exposure to diversified portfolios of credit risk and index
membership is governed mainly by an issuer’s rating classification as either investment-grade or
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high-yield. By exploiting the CDX eligibility rules, I have provided empirical evidence of excess
co-movement in the CDS spreads of CDX indexed issuers. I have shown that issuers excluded
from either the investment-grade or high-yield index do not change in co-movement with the index
even though index exclusions result from observable characteristic changes that relate to changes
in the issuer’s fundamental characteristics. Issuers included in these indices experience increases in
co-movement. In the case of CDX.HY inclusions, I am able to identify increases in co-movement
irrespective of the observable characteristic changes that govern them. Thus, increases in co-
movement around index inclusions cannot simply be explained by changes in rating and therefore
changes in fundamentals correlated with ratings.
Through Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis I have documented several key empirical results that
should be considered in conjunction with one another. Firstly, there exists strong common factors
in high-yield rated issuers spreads’. These factors form a central feature of the correlation struc-
ture of the CDS market. Building on this, I have shown that the CDX indexation process seems
to, at least partially, explain why the high-yield factor arises. That is, an important driving force
of the correlation dynamics of high-yield rated issuers, in particular, is their index assignment and
the trading behaviour of market participants at the index level. In fact, these factors plays a more
important role in the spreads of high-yield indexed issuers than industry common factors, where
fundamentals-based explanations are more readily available; industry affiliates share common fun-
damental characteristics. The sensitivity of issuers to factors pertaining to the high-yield index
increase upon indexation regardless of the rating changes that govern the assignment. I conclude
there is excess co-movement in CDS spreads, whereby they diverge from their fundamental value.
They diverge to the extent that indexed high-yield issuers, from unrelated economic sectors, form
a prevalent correlation cluster in the CDS market. Such evidence raises concerns about the overall
efficiency of the CDS market. My body of evidence is the first to question this assertion.
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Chapter 4
The Credit Rating Crisis and the
Informational Content of Corporate Credit
Ratings
I. Summary
This chapter looks more closely at the dynamic interaction of CDS spreads and credit rating
announcements. In the previous chapters I focused on the discrete labeling of issuers as either
investment-grade or high-yield and the implications this distinction has for co-movement in prices,
market structure and market efficiency. However ratings have more depth than these dichotomous
classifications and there are a total of 21 ratings an issuer can be assigned with. Also, the full
rating process includes two other important signals of credit quality, outlooks and reviews. I now
examine the full time-series and cross-sectional interaction between CDS spreads and credit rat-
ings. The empirical framework I employ builds mainly on the studies of Norden & Weber (2004)
and Hull et al. (2004), who have shown that the entire rating process, including these additional
signals of credit quality, are important to the CDS price formation process.
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Rather than present an analysis similar to these extant studies on a newer and broader data set,
I focus on whether the events of 2007-9 have altered the nature of the interaction between rating
announcements and CDS spreads. It is well-established that the CRA’s flawed AAA ratings of
structured products such as ABS CDOs and other complex mortgage-related securities played a
central role in the crisis that began in the U.S mortgage markets in mid-to-late 2007. I therefore
examine whether the so-called ‘credit rating crisis’ altered the information effects (price effects) of
their traditional product, corporate credit ratings. I use an event study to analyze the CDS market’s
response to rating announcements by Moody’s between September 2004 and December 2009 and
demonstrate that CDS price effects were considerably greater in the pre-crisis era. I view this result
as consistent with a loss of information caused by a spill-over effect of reputational damage onto
the bond rating services of the CRAs.
II. Introduction
‘They have no brand, they have no credibility whatsoever, I can’t imagine any
investor trusting them.’ - U.S. Representative Christopher Shay - House Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform: Credit rating agencies and the financial crisis.
October 22, 2008.
On July 10, 2007, Moody’s downgraded 399 Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS)
with an original value of $5.2bn and Standard & Poor’s placed 612 RMBSs with an original value
of $7.3bn on review for downgrade. The next day, Moody’s placed a further $5bn of Collateralized
Debt Obligations (CDOs) on review for downgrade. These events marked the beginning of a
series of mass downgrades of structured products throughout 2007, 2008 and 2009. According to
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, by June 2010 $2.5tr worth of RMBSs and $564bn of
CDOs had been downgraded. The scale of the resulting write-downs by financial institutions and
the ensuing events led to a succession of public enquires in the U.S. that investigated the role of
the CRAs in the financial crisis. The Senate Banking Committee, the House of Representatives’
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and various other committees heard evidence.
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Given their findings, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which was
signed into law on July 21, 2010, has provisioned for new oversight of, and requirements for, the
CRAs in order to enhance transparency and accountability within the rating industry. The media
has not been sympathetic of the CRAs either. Articles like ‘AAA Oligopoly’, ‘The Ratings Racket’
(Wall Street Journal 26 Feb. and 25 Jun., 2008 resp.) and ‘Triple-A Failure’ (New York Times 27
Apr., 2008) highlight a wider sense of frustration at their failings.
Collectively these events, dubbed the ‘credit rating crisis’, have highlighted many shortcomings
of the rating practises and business models of the CRAs, the structure of the credit rating industry
and the regulatory framework around ratings. A rapidly growing literature has documented various
aspects of these issues. Among others, Benmelech & Dlugosz (2009) explain the structured finance
collapse of 2007-2008; they cite inflated ratings due to ratings shopping and model error on behalf
of the agencies as contributing factors. Coval, Jurek & Stafford (2009) investigate the rise and fall
of structured finance and the challenges faced by CRAs, in terms of the required parameter and
modeling assumptions, to arrive at accurate ratings. Brunnermeier (2009) also looks at the role of
the CRAs and structured products in the financial crisis. White (2010) explains how the financial
regulatory structure facilitated the systemic consequences of the failings of rating agencies. He
cites that as of June 30, 2009, 80% of CDO tranches and 52% of RMBSs that were originally
AAA-rated and issued between 2005-7 were downgraded to high-yield.
Whilst the focus of the literature on the rating crisis has been on flawed structured product
ratings, in this chapter, I investigate its implications for corporate credit ratings. My hypothesis
is that this episode has negatively impacted on how market participants perceive bond ratings and
their informational content. There are at least two motivating arguments as to why I believe this
might be the case. Firstly, the unprecedented failings of structured product ratings may have had a
spill-over effect and impaired the integrity of bond ratings. It must be noted that structured product
rating symbols are the same as those on corporate and government bonds1; the credibility and
1Mason & Rosner (2007) explain the misapplication of such symbols in terms of why traditional bond ratings do
not properly account for the risks in RMBS and CDOs.
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widespread usage2 of bond ratings, in conjunction with the existence of ratings-based regulation,
allowed structured products to be widely marketed and sold. It has been argued by Adelino (2009)
that many investors in AAA-rated mortgage backed securities simply purchased the rating, relying
on the symbols’ connotation as implied by corporate and government bonds. As noted by Pagano
& Volpin (2010), the CRAs were even explicit in reassuring investors that structured products
ratings were directly comparable to those of traditional bonds:
‘Our ratings represent a uniform measure of credit quality globally and across all
types of debt instruments. In other words, ‘AAA’ rated corporate bonds should exhibit
the same degree of credit quality as an ‘AAA’ rated securitized issue’ - Standard &
Poor’s (2007), Ratings Direct Research.
Secondly, it is conceivable that the rating crisis could have impacted on how market participants
perceive the incentives and or the ability of agency analysts to reliably produce timely, value-
relevant information about risk. For instance, Bongaerts et al. (2009) suggests that people have
questioned whether the structure of the credit rating industry provides the proper incentives for
the production of reliable information about risk. Griffin & Tang (2010) show that CRAs deviated
from their structured product rating models by including an element of subjectivity in ratings, the
degree of which was positively related to future downgrades. Also, CRAs have enjoyed a con-
siderable informational advantage over other participants; as studied by Jorion, Liu & Shi (2005)
they have been exempt from the SEC’s Regulation Fair Disclosure, which prohibits U.S. public
companies from making selective, non-public disclosures to favored investment professionals3.
As such, credit ratings include both public and private information. This may include an issuer’s
expansion plans, budget, future products and board meeting minutes as well as advanced notifica-
tion of corporate events such as debt issuance and mergers. It might also include factors that are
entirely subjective, such as management quality (See Moody’s (2002)). Yet ultimately, a corpo-
2CRAs have been rating corporate bonds for over a century. Also bond ratings have a long history of empirical
testing, through various stages of the economic cycle. See Perraudin & Taylor (2004) and references therein.
3Section 939B of The Dodd-Frank Act revises Regulation FD, deleting Rule 100(b)(2)(iii) which exempts credit
rating agencies.
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rate credit rating is a team of analysts’ subjective assessment4 about the overall financial capacity
of a particular issuer to pay its financial obligations. Regardless of the contributing mechanisms,
my hypothesis has the empirically testable implication that the price effects of corporate rating
announcements will have decreased.
Using an event study, I investigate the information effects of Moody’s corporate rating an-
nouncements by analyzing their influence on the CDS market prior to, and subsequent to the onset
of the rating crisis. A CDS is a bilateral contract that represents the market price of the risks that
Moody’s ratings aim to capture, probability of default and loss-given-default (abstracting from
time-varying risk premia and temporal supply-demand imbalances). I consider all six types of
rating actions by Moody’s: Review for downgrade, rating downgrade, outlook negative (negative
events), review for upgrade, rating upgrade and outlook positive (positive events). The full-sample
consists of 542 announcements and daily spread data pertaining to 205 eminent U.S. issuers be-
tween September 14, 2004 and December 14, 2009.
I first examine the price effects of rating announcements during the pre-rating crisis period,
September 14, 2004 to July 10, 2007. I find that downgrade reviews and upgrade reviews have the
largest impact on spreads; mean announcement day CDS responses are estimated to be 10.1% and
-6.1% respectively. Followed by downgrades (3.3%) and upgrades (-1.5%). In line with the large
body of literature that has examined different security price responses to ratings announcements5,
I find that some of the CDS price adjustment occurs before downgrade reviews in ‘anticipation’;
statistically significant increases in spreads of 4.7% can be identified a week in advance. Also,
CDS prices fully adjust to the information in rating announcements within a day of the announce-
ment; indicative evidence in support of the hypothesis that the CDS market is efficient with respect
4CRAs have preferred to use the word ‘opinion’ in light of the first amendment protection of credit raters as
publishers and credit ratings as opinions, which has effectively safeguarded them from litigation historically. However,
the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 repeals Rule 436(g) of the Securities Act of 1933. The CRAs may now be liable as
‘experts’.
5Holthausen & Leftwich (1986) find that downgrades are associated with negative abnormal stock returns but
that upgrades are not. Goh & Ederington (1993) find significant negative abnormal stock returns for downgrades
due to earnings deterioration and positive abnormal returns for those due to increases in leverage. Hand, Holhausen
& Leftwich (1992) find significant negative stock and bond returns for downgrades and downgrade reviews but no
abnormal returns around upgrades. Steiner & Heinke (2001) find significant negative abnormal bond returns around
downgrades and downgrade reviews.
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to rating announcements. I can relate these results to the extant literature that has studied the ef-
fects of announcements on CDS spreads. For instance, Hull et al. (2004) conclude that whilst the
CDS market anticipates all three types of negative announcement, there are only announcement
day effects for downgrade review. Norden & Weber (2004) find anticipation and announcement
day effects for downgrade reviews and rating downgrades, yet insignificant reactions to positive
announcements. Both of these studies admit to a sample deficiency of positive announcements;
a shortcoming my sample rectifies. In line with the results of this study, they find no significant
post-announcement spread movement. Micu, Remolona & Wooldridge (2006) suggest that all six
types of announcement have a price impact, with review for downgrade and downgrade having the
largest. Daniels & Jensen (2005) find a significant market reaction to rating downgrades.
I then study the price effects of announcements subsequent to the onset of the ratings crisis,
from July 11, 2007 to December 14, 2009. Whilst there are very few positive announcements in this
period, generally my prior conclusions hold well. Firstly, I find that downgrade reviews continue to
invoke the largest announcement day price response. Secondly, there are increases in CDS prices
a week in advance of downgrade reviews, the magnitude of which are consistent with the pre-
crisis sample. Thirdly, there is no post-announcement day price movement across announcement
types. However, the striking result of my analysis is that of a large decrease in market reaction
to reviews and rating changes. For downgrade reviews, mean announcement day CDS responses
have approximately halved, decreasing from 10.1% to 5.1%. Similarly, for downgrades they have
decreased from 3.3% to 1.2%. These findings are supportive of the idea that the informational
effects of rating announcements were much greater before the rating crisis.
I then endeavor to ensure that the reduced price impact of ratings announcements is not driven
by inhomogeneity in the samples. I demonstrate that the distributions of rating level at the time of
announcements, the magnitude of rating changes, and issuer coverage, compare well between the
pre- and post-crisis periods, particularly for negative rating announcements. Through the usage of
multivariate cross-sectional regressions, I also ensure that decreases in announcement day effects
are robust to rating characteristics that can alter their informational effects or relate to the effects
of costs that firms can incur due to rating changes on their CDS prices. In fact, having conditioned
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on such variables, I find that the decrease in market response to downgrade reviews and actual
downgrades is larger than the univariate results imply. I find that, since the crisis, for the average
issuer, downgrades reviews invoke an announcement day price response that is 6.7% lower and
actual downgrades invoke a price response that is 2.6% lower. Therefore, the easiest criticism
of my results is that they could simply be coincidental; my rating crisis sample covers the most
severe economic downturn in more than half a century which may confound these findings. Yet
the cross-sectional evidence I provide, helps attribute the decrease in market reaction to the rating
crisis rather than, say, the economic recession.
This results of this chapter contribute to the existing literature in two ways. Firstly, it reveals
an important consequence of the credit rating crisis; it has had a marked effect on Moody’s role
in the price formation process of corporate credit risk. Secondly, I add to the empirical literature
on the relationships between credit rating announcements and the CDS market. The remainder of
this chapter is organized as follows. Section III describes the CDS and rating announcement data
set. Section IV explains the event study methodology and statistical framework I employ. Section
V presents an analysis of the impact of rating announcements on the CDS market prior to, and
subsequent to, the onset of the rating crisis. Section VI conducts a multivariate cross-sectional
analysis. Section VII concludes.
III. The Data Set and Descriptive Statistics
The data set consists of CMA’s composite mid-market CDS spreads collected from Thomson
Reuters Datastream, issuer-level estimated senior unsecured rating actions by Moody’s from their
Default and Recovery Database (DRD) and Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes
from COMPUSTAT.
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A. The CDS Data
CDS spreads offer both conceptual and empirical advantages over bond spreads in the analysis
of the informational content of issuer-level rating announcements. For instance, CDSs are traded
on standardized terms and less affected by differences in covenants and contractual arrangements
across obligors than bonds. Also, yield spreads on corporate bonds are affected by the choice of
risk-free benchmark yield (Houweling & Vorst (2005)), differential tax treatments (Elton et al.
(2001)) and liquidity (Longstaff et al. (2005)) between corporate and treasury bonds. Finally, CDS
are generally perceived as a timelier measure of credit risk, as suggested by Blanco et al. (2005)
among others.
The raw CDS data set employed in this chapter covers the period February 2, 2004 to January 5,
2010 and 1547 daily observations on 298 U.S. based, continually active, corporate issuers. Again I
retain CMA’s ‘derived’ prices in the data set for this analysis. As controls of data quality, I impose
restrictions that, for a given issuer, limit the maximum number of consecutive trading days of zero
spread change to 20 and the ratio of derived to total prices to 50%. The final sample consists
of 205 issuers, the mean percentage of derived to total CDS prices is 16% and the median is
13%. To reiterate, all premia are expressed as an annualized spread in basis points on U.S. dollar-
denominated notional amounts and all reference obligations are senior unsecured debt. Firms are
classified using the GICS and I make use of the two-digit sector level in this study.
B. Rating Announcements and Selection Criteria
For each issuer, I create time-series information of Moody’s estimated senior unsecured ratings,
outlooks and reviews. In short, an issuers’s estimated senior rating is set equal to its actual senior
unsecured debt rating, or if there is none by implying it on the basis of rated subordinated or secured
debt. It must be noted that these ratings are not deliberated by a ratings committee and as such are
not official published ratings histories. However, extant studies tend to use priority rules to select
a rating that reflects the issuer’s credit rating, from their obligation’s credit ratings, as accurately
as possible. Here, I rely on Moody’s methodology to do so. I concentrate on announcements by
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Moody’s because the existing literature has shown that the various agencies’ ratings are related and
effective substitutes for one another. For instance Steiner & Heinke (2001) demonstrate that excess
bond returns associated with rating actions by Moody’s and S&P are mean difference insignificant.
Using announcements by Standard and Poor’s, in addition, could potentially capture more rating
events but would also lead to the double counting of many events. With regards to Fitch, Norden &
Weber (2004) have shown that their announcements did not affect the CDS market in their sample
and Norden (2008) has sought to clarify this in terms of Fitch releasing rating actions relatively
late compared to other rating agencies.
In addition to announcements pertaining to rating changes, which represent a fundamental
change in an issuer’s long-term creditworthiness, Moody’s make two other types of announce-
ment; reviews and outlook reports. Reviews represent a statement that agency analysts are actively
reviewing the rating of a firm, either for an upgrade or downgrade in rating. Outlook reports rep-
resent agency analysts’ forecasts of the medium-term direction of a firm’s rating, usually over an
18-month period. They fall into three categories; predicted to improve, predicted to decline and
no change expected. Reviews represent a stronger indication of future rating actions than outlooks
and agencies typically conclude the review within 90 days. An issuer does not need to be on review
to undergo a rating change; sometimes agencies change ratings without forewarning. Similarly a
review does not necessarily guarantee a rating change; issuers can mitigate ratings changes whilst
on review by either taking appropriate actions or providing sufficient new information that address
the agencies’ concerns.
When analyzing the informational content of rating announcements, contamination must be
controlled for so as not to bias inference regarding specific announcement types. I impose fairly
stringent filters to the data compared to previous studies, largely facilitated by its increased span
and coverage, but have carefully considered and adjusted the selection rules so as not to impede
the representativeness of the final sample. I impose two initial filters. Firstly, I exclude firms
whose rating has been withdrawn. Secondly I exclude an announcement if it occurred on a day
where the CDS spread is ‘derived’ by CMA. Announcement contamination can arise in the form
of closely preceding same-type announcements and or different-type announcements as well as
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contemporaneous different-type announcements6. Given a particular announcement, I control for
same-type contamination by removing any subsequent, similar announcement that occurred within
21 trading days7. The most problematic source of different-type contamination results from the
fact that rating changes are typically preceded by a review. Therefore, I require that matched
reviews and ratings changes not be less than 21 days apart. If they are, I eliminate both. I remove
any remaining instances of different-type event contamination by removing any announcement
that is preceded by another within 21 days. Contemporaneous contamination is typically when, in
addition to a rating change, Moody’s change the issuer’s outlook or place the issuer on review for
a further rating change. I exclude all such instances.
C. Descriptive Statistics
The sample summaries presented in this section aim to demonstrate that the filtering methodolo-
gies I employ should not unduly affect the representativeness of the final sample or bias that of
either the pre- or post-crisis period. I also aim to alleviate concerns that differential CDS price
responses to ratings announcements before and after the rating crisis are driven by inhomogeneity
in announcement samples.
Table I lists the issuers I consider in this chapter and their distribution across GICS economic
sectors. These are Energy (17), Materials (23), Industrials (22), Consumer Discretionary (48),
Consumer Staples (19), Health Care (19), Financials (28), IT (12), Telecommunication Services
(3) and Utilities (14).
6I do not consider cross-agency contamination in this study.
7I set the event window in the main analysis to 56 trading days, so the maximum overlap of same-type announce-
ments in event time is 35 days. Less than 10% of announcements are subject to any overlap. Such contamination
is confined to the first two sub-divisions of the event window and therefore has no impact on the conclusions of the
chapter.
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Table 4.1: The 205 issuers whose CDS prices and Moody’s corporate rating announcement data are consid-
ered in the study. They are grouped into 10 economic sectors as defined by the GICS. Av. Rat. corresponds
the the average rating of the issuer on the period September 14, 2004 to December 14, 2009.
Sector Issuer Av. Rat. Sector Issuer Av. Rat.
Financials Allstate Corp. A1 Consumer American Axle&Mnfg Inc. B1
Ambac Financial Gp. Inc. A2 Discretionary Arvinmeritor Inc. B1
American Express Co. A1 Beazer Homes USA Inc. Ba3
American Intl. Gp. Aa3 Black&Decker Corp. Baa2
Aon Corp. Baa2 Block Financial Corp. A3
Avalonbay Commns. Inc. Baa1 Borgwarner Inc. Baa2
Bank Of America Corp. Aa2 Brunswick Corp. Baa3
Capital One Bank A3 Cablevision Systems Corp. B3
Citigroup Inc. Aa2 Carnival Corp. A3
Goldman Sachs Gp. Inc. Aa3 Cooper Tire&Rubber B1
Hartford Finl.Svs.Gp. A3 D.R.Horton Inc. Ba1
JPMorgan Chase&Co. Aa3 Eastman Kodak Co. B1
Kimco Realty Corp. Baa1 Gannett Co. Inc. A3
Lincoln National Corp. A3 Goodyear Tire&Rub. Co. B2
Loews Corp. A3 Hasbro Inc. Baa3
MBIA Inc. A1 Interpublic Gp.Cos. Inc. Ba2
MetLife Inc. A2 J.C. Penney Co. Inc. Ba1
MGIC Investment Corp. A3 Johnson Controls Inc. Baa1
Morgan Stanley Gp. Inc. Aa3 Jones Apparel Gp. Inc. Baa3
PMI Group Inc. A3 KB Home Ba2
Prologis Trust Baa1 Lennar Corp. Ba1
Prudential Financial Inc. A3 Liz Claiborne Inc. Baa3
Radian Group Inc. Baa1 Lowe’s Companies Inc. A1
SLM Corp. A3 Limited Brands Inc. Baa3
The Travelers Cos. Inc. A3 Macy’s Inc. Ba3
Unum Group Ba1 Marriott Intl. Inc. Baa2
Wells Fargo&Co. Aa1 Mattel Inc. Baa2
XL Capital Ltd. A3 M.D.C Holdings Inc. Baa3
Materials Ak Steel Corp. B1 MGM Mirage Inc. Ba3
Alcoa Inc. A3 Newell Rubbermaid Inc. Baa2
Ashland Inc. Ba1 Nordstrom Inc. Baa1
Commercial Metals Co. Baa2 Omnicom Group Baa1
Cytec Industries Inc. Baa3 Pulte Homes Inc. Ba1
Dow Chemical Co. A3 Radioshack Corp. Baa3
E.I. du Pont de Nemours A2 Royal Crbn. Cruises Ltd. Ba1
International Paper Co. Baa3 Ryland Group Inc. Ba1
Louisiana-Pacific Corp. Ba1 Sherwin-Williams Co. A3
Lubrizol Corp. Baa3 Standard Pacific Corp. Ba3
Martin Marietta Materials Inc. Baa1 Staples Inc. Baa1
Meadwestvaco Corp. Baa3 Starwood Htls.&Rsts. Wwd. Ba1
Monsanto Company A3 Target Corp. A2
Newmont Mining Corp. Baa1 Time Warner Inc. Baa2
Nucor Corp. A1 The TJX Companies Inc. A3
Olin Corp. Baa3 Toll Brothers Inc. Ba1
Owens-Illinois Inc. B3 The Walt Disney Co. A3
Polyone Corp. B2 Wendys Intl. Inc. Ba2
PPG Industries Inc. A2 Whirlpool Corp. Baa2
Praxair Inc. A2 Yum! Brands Inc. Baa3
Sealed Air Corp. Baa3 Telcom. Services AT&T Corp. Baa1
Temple-Inland Inc. Baa3 CenturyTel Inc. Baa2
Weyerhaeuser Company Baa2 Sprint Nextel Corp. Baa3
(Continued on next page)
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Sector Issuer Av. Rat. Sector Issuer Av. Rat.
Energy Anadarko Petroleum Corp. Baa2 Consumer Altria Group Inc. Baa1
Chesapeake Energy Corp. Ba3 Staples Anheuser-Busch Cos. Inc. A2
ConocoPhillips A1 Avon Products A2
Devon Energy Corp. Baa2 Campbell Soup Co. A3
Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc. Baa2 The Coca-Cola Company Aa3
El Paso Corp. B2 ConAgra Foods Inc. Baa2
Halliburton Company A3 CVS Caremark Corp. Baa1
Hess Corp. Baa3 Dean Foods Company B1
Kinder Morgan Energy Prns. LP Baa1 H.J. Heinz Company Baa1
Nabors Industries Inc. A3 Kimberly-Clark Corp. A1
Occidental Petroleum Corp. A3 Kraft Foods Inc. Baa1
Sunoco Inc. Baa2 Pepsico Inc. Aa3
Tesoro Corp. Ba1 Procter&Gamble Company Aa3
Transocean Inc. Baa2 Reynolds American Inc. Ba2
Valero Energy Corp. Baa3 Rite Aid Corp. Caa1
Williams Companies Inc. Ba2 Sara Lee Corp. Baa1
XTO Energy Inc. Baa2 Smithfield Foods Inc. Ba3
Industrials 3M Company Aa1 Supervalu Inc. Ba3
Avis Budget Group Inc. B1 Tyson Foods Inc. Ba2
The Boeing Company A2 Health Care Abbott Laboratories A1
Burlington Nthn. Snt. Fe Corp. Baa1 Aetna Inc. A3
Caterpillar Inc. A2 AmerisourceBergen Corp. Ba1
Con-Way Inc. Baa3 Amgen Inc. A2
Cummins Inc. Ba1 Boston Scientific Corp. Baa3
Danaher Corp. A2 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. A2
Deere&Company A2 Cardinal Health Inc. Baa2
Eaton Corp. A2 Cigna Corp. Baa2
Goodrich Corp. Baa3 Eli Lilly&Co. Aa3
Lockheed Martin Corp. Baa1 McKesson Corp. Baa3
Masco Corp. Baa2 Medco Health Solutions Inc. Baa3
Norfolk Southern Corp. Baa1 Merck&Co. Inc. Baa1
Northrop Grumman Corp. Baa2 Pfizer Inc. Aa1
Pitney Bowes Inc. Aa3 Quest Diagnostics. Baa2
Raytheon Company Baa2 Tenet Healthcare Corp. Caa1
Republic Services Inc. Baa2 UnitedHealth Group Inc. A3
Southwest Airlines Baa1 Universal Health Svs. Inc. Baa3
Textron Inc. A3 WellPoint Inc. Baa1
United Parcel Services Inc. Aa1 Wyeth Limited A3
Waste Management Inc. Baa3 Utilities The AES Corp. B1
IT Advanced Micro Devices Inc. B2 Allegheny Engy. Supp. Co. LLC. Ba2
Amkor Technology Inc. B2 American Elec. Pwr. Co. Inc. Baa2
Arrow Electronics Inc. Baa3 CenterPoint Energy Inc. Ba1
Avnet Inc. Ba1 CMS Energy Corp. Ba3
CA Inc. Ba1 Constellation En. Gp. Inc. Baa1
Computer Sciences Corp. A3 Dominion Resources Inc. Aa2
Corning Inc. Baa2 DPL Inc. Baa3
Hewlett-Packard Company A2 Duke Energy Carolinas LLC. A3
Motorola Inc. Baa2 Dynegy Inc. B1
Sun Microsystems Inc. Ba1 ONEOK Inc. Baa2
Unisys Corp. B1 Pepco Holdings Inc. Baa3
Xerox Corp. Baa3 Progress Energy Inc. Baa2
Teco Energy Inc. Ba1
Panel A of Table 4.2 provides a summary of the announcement sample by issuer coverage,
type, before and after the selection criteria are imposed, and split by period of interest; before and
after the rating crisis. The initial sample consists of 1110 rating announcements on 216 issuers over
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the period September 14, 2004 to December 14, 2009. This period is defined by the requirement
of our methodology that ratings announcements need complete time-series information for the
estimation and event windows of the event study. The final sample, after imposing the selection
criteria, retains 542 announcements (49%) relating to 205 issuers (95%). Across announcement
types, these selection rules give the largest reduction to the number of ratings downgrades, where
approximately 30% of the initial sample is retained, mostly due to contemporaneous contamination
by negative outlooks and downgrade reviews. In line with previous studies, there are roughly
twice as many negative announcements (355) as positive announcements (187) in the final sample.
However there are very few positive announcements in the post-crisis period (48), whereas positive
and negative announcements are more evenly distributed in the pre-crisis period. Panel B of Table
4.2 gives the mean resolution time and percentage success rates for downgrade and upgrade reviews
in the initial sample. I find the mean resolution time for downgrade reviews is 57.3 days and that of
upgrade reviews is 67.9 days, consistent with other authors. I calculate the success rate of reviews
that end in a rating change in the implied direction to be 69.1% for downgrade reviews and 78%
for upgrade reviews, consistent with Moody’s own calculations (See Moody’s (2002)).
Panel A of Table 4.3 presents the distribution of issuers’ ratings at the time of rating review in
the final sample, again split by period of interest. It reveals that the distributions of issuer rating
at downgrade review are very similar pre- and post- crisis, although there are more instances in
the post-crisis period; 61 before and 89 after. There are very few upgrade reviews in the post-
crisis period and they are concentrated in the investment-grade category, with only three such
announcements on high-yield rated issuers. By mapping Moody’s ratings onto a numerical 21
grade scale (Aaa = 1 to C = 21), Panel B of Table 4.3 demonstrates that the sample mean rating
at the time of either type of review is Baa3 before July 10, 2007 and Baa2 afterwards, i.e. not
statistically different in both cases.
Finally, Panel A of Table 4.4 describes the distribution of rating changes across the periods.
There are more upgrades than downgrades in the pre-crisis period, more downgrades and very
few upgrades in the post-crisis period. Approximately 80% of rating changes are by one grade

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































compares well for both upgrades and downgrades. Panel B of Table 4.4 demonstrates that the
magnitude of mean rating change is not statistically different between the pre- and post-crisis
periods. Jorion, Liu & Shi (2005) also find the magnitude of rating changes to be stable across
time and our estimates of mean rating changes are consistent with Benmelech & Dlugosz (2009)
who utilize a larger sample of Moody’s bond ratings from the same database.
Table 4.3: Panel A provides the distribution of issuers’ ratings at the announcement of downgrade review
or upgrade review by Moody’s. These reviews pertain to the final sample. The Pre-crisis period is Sept.
14, 2004 to Jul. 10, 2007 and the Post-crisis period is Jul. 11, 2007 to Dec. 14, 2009. Issuers’ ratings are
split by whole letter rating category, except near the boundary where we consider Baa3 and Ba1 as distinct
given their importance as the investment-grade boundary. Panel B uses a paired difference test to determine
whether the mean issuer rating at the time of reviews varies across the periods.
Panel A: Rating Review Sample Comparison
Downgrade Reviews Upgrade Reviews
Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis
Initial Rating # % # % # % # %
Aaa - - 1 1.1 - - - -
Aa 2 3.3 7 7.9 1 2.4 - -
A 12 19.7 18 20.2 8 19.0 5 26.3
Baa1/2 23 37.7 28 31.5 13 31.0 6 31.6
Baa3 7 11.5 10 11.2 5 11.9 5 26.3
Ba1 2 3.3 5 5.6 6 14.3 1 5.3
Ba2/3 6 9.8 9 10.1 4 9.5 1 5.3
B 8 13.1 9 10.1 4 9.5 1 5.3
Caa 1 1.6 2 2.2 1 2.4 - -
Ca/C - - - - - - - -
Total 61 89 42 19
Panel B: Paired Difference Tests
Downgrade Reviews Upgrade Reviews
Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis




Table 4.4: Panel A provides the distribution of rating changes in the final sample as absolute differences in
Moody’s 21 grade numeric scale. The Pre-crisis period is Sept. 14, 2004 to Jul. 10, 2007 and the Post-crisis
period is Jul. 11, 2007 to Dec. 14, 2009. Panel B uses a paired difference test to determine whether the
magnitude of mean rating change differs between the periods.
Panel A: Rating Change Sample Comparison
Rating Downgrades Rating Upgrades
Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis
Change # % # % # % # %
1 19 79.1 36 72.0 37 78.7 15 83.3
2 4 16.7 10 20.0 8 17.0 2 11.1
3 1 4.2 2 4.0 2 4.3 - -
4 - - - - - - 1 5.6
5 - - 1 2.0 - - - -
6 - - - - - - - -
7 - - 1 2.0 - - - -
Total 24 50 47 18 -
Panel B: Paired Difference Tests
Rating Downgrades Rating Upgrades
Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis




IV. Event Study Methodology
The purpose of this event study is to determine abnormal CDS performance attributable to rating
announcements; that is the ex post performance of spreads around an announcement relative to the
expected performance had no announcement occurred. The three key considerations of the analysis
are (i) the metric of abnormal performance (ii) the length of the period around the announcement
in which to study it (ii) and the statistical testing procedure. I elaborate on each below.
A. Estimation and Event Windows
Using the notation of Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay (1997), CDS spreads are indexed in event time,
τ, where τ = 0 is the rating announcement date, τ = T0 + 1 to τ = T1 represents the estimation
window and τ = T1+1 to τ = T2 represents the event window. I set the estimation window, L1 =
T1− T0, equal to 120 trading days (six calendar months) and the event window, L2 = T2− T1,
equal to 56 trading days (approx. three calendar months). The event window begins 40 trading
days before the announcement, ends 15 days after it, and is divided into k = 6 subintervals: [-
40,-21], [-20,-6], [-5,-1], [0], [1,5], [6,15]. These correspond to a period of one calendar month
ending one month before the announcement, a period of three weeks ending a week before the
announcement, the week preceding the announcement, the announcement day, the week following
the announcement and a two-week period beginning one week after the announcement.
B. Market Model Abnormal Returns
The studies of Hull et al. (2004) and Norden & Weber (2004) consider CDS spread changes in
their analysis because spread changes are more readily related to bond returns. However, when ex-
amining spread changes, issuers trading at higher spreads (lower ratings) will exhibit more volatile
spreads than issuers trading at lower spreads. In order to deal with the statistical issues that arise
from differences in spread levels across issuers, they adjust spread changes by an index spread
calculated as the mean of firms with an equivalent whole letter rating to that of the issuer at the
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time of the event. Jorion & Zhang (2007) take a similar approach. In this study I examine log-
differences in CDS spreads to alleviate problems associated with changes in spread levels. I then
use a market model in conjunction with a market-wide median spread index return, which I believe
forms a better benchmark for the conditioning information set of normal performance across all
issuers. I utilize the median instead of the mean given that the post-crisis sample period contains
some extreme outliers as thus provides a more robust measure of central tendency.
This is in line with the recent empirical findings of Cathcart, El-Jahel & Evans (2010a) (Chapter
2) and Berndt & Obreja (2010), who demonstrate that a single pervasive component to credit is
common to all issuers, regardless of rating category and industry, and statistically analogous to
a market factor in equity returns. This framework has the added benefit of allowing the usage
of a wider range of robust statistical tests, as highlighted in the event study literature (See Binder
(1998)). I will refer to log-differences in CDS spreads as CDS returns for this analysis. To reiterate,
this definition does not correspond to the dollar return on a CDS position given a change in spread,




) = αi+βiRm,τ+ εi,τ (4.1)
where Si,τ is the spread level for security i, in event time τ. Rm,τ = log(
Sm,τ
Sm,τ−1 ) is the market index
return based on the median spread index Sm,τ of the 249 firms for which I have both CDS and
ratings data. αi and βi are the parameters to be estimated over the six-month estimation window.
εi,τ is the disturbance term with E[εi,τ] = 0 and Var[εi,τ] = σ2εi . I express this as the regression
system:
Ri = Xiθi+ εi (4.2)
where Ri = [Ri,T0+1 . . .Ri,T1]
′ is a vector of estimation window CDS returns, Xi = [1 Rm] is a
matrix with a vector of ones in the first column and the vector of market index return observations
Rm = [Rm,T0+1 . . .Rm,T1]′ in the second column, and θi = [αiβi]′ is the parameter vector. Given the
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market model parameter estimates, I analyze the sample vector of abnormal CDS returns, ÂR
∗
i , for





i −X∗i θˆi (4.3)
where R∗i = [Ri,T1+1 . . .Ri,T2]
′ is the vector of event window CDS returns, X∗i = [1 R
∗
m] is matrix
with a vector of ones in the first column and the vector of event window market index return
observations in the second column and θˆi is the parameter vector estimate.
C. Test Statistics
To test the hypothesis that the price impact of rating announcements has decreased, interest focuses
on mean CDS price effects. The two sample periods exhibit different volatility characteristics
as the second covers the global financial crisis. I therefore pay particular attention to variance
considerations in this statistical framework. I utilize the J1 statistic of Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay
(1997), the standardized cross-sectional test statistic of Boehmer, Musumeci & Poulsen (1991)
(BMP) and a non-parametric bootstrapped cross-sectional test statistic (BST). I test that, for a given
type of rating announcement, cumulative mean abnormal returns or mean standardized cumulative
abnormal returns in any event window subinterval are significantly non-zero as follows.
It can be shown8 that conditional on the market return over the event window, abnormal CDS
returns in Equation 4.3 will be jointly normally distributed with zero conditional mean and condi-
tional covariance matrix Vi. Under the null hypothesis that rating announcements have no impact
on the mean or variance of CDS returns:
ÂR
∗
i ∼ N(0,Vi) (4.4)
Where:








8See Campbell et al. (1997).
112
In order to draw overall inference for a particular type of rating announcement, individual securi-
ties’ abnormal return vectors ÂR
∗











Then, by assuming that the event windows of the N announcements do not overlap in calendar
time, I can set the covariance terms equal to zero to give9:







I then temporally aggregate average abnormal returns by defining CARk(τ1,τ2) as the cumulative
average abnormal return from τ1 to τ2 where T1 < τ1 < τ2 6 T2 are the cut-off points of the k =
1,2, ..,6 event window intervals given in Section . By defining γk as an (L2×1) vector with ones
in positions τ1−T1 to τ2−T1 and zeros everywhere else:
CARk(τ1,τ2)≡ γ′kAR∗ ∼ N(0, σ¯2k(τ1,τ2)) (4.8)
Where:
σ¯2k(τ1,τ2) = Var[CARk(τ1,τ2)] = γ
′
kVγk (4.9)







This statistic relies on the residual variance estimate from the market model to estimate the variance
of the abnormal return estimator. Since σ¯2k(τ1,τ2) is unknown, I use the OLS estimator of the




iεˆi to calculate the variance of abnormal returns
in Equation (4.5), with the specified adjustment for forecast error explained in Patell (1976). As
9Assuming cross-sectional independence of the residuals ignores industry and rating classification effects, noted in
chapters 1 & 2 of this thesis, for firms with the same event windows in calendar time. However, this sample consists
of a broad cross-section of issuers with a balanced distribution across industries and ratings. Also these events are not
highly clustered in calendar time.
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highlighted by Binder (1998) this will likely underestimate the true variance due to event-induced
heteroskedasticity; the event day return is a function of both the random announcement shock as
well as other firm-specific shocks. Harrington & Shrider (2007) argue that tests robust to cross-
sectional variation in true abnormal returns should always be used in event studies and that a good
candidate for a robust parametric test is the standardized cross-sectional test statistic of Boehmer




σ2i,k(τ1,τ2) = Var[ĈARi,k(τ1,τ2)] = γ
′
kViγk (4.12)
The cumulative abnormal return estimates are first standardized by their estimated standard devia-





This stops securities with large variances from dominating the test. By defining SCARk(τ1,τ2) as



















Finally, for robustness, I also utilize of a non-parametric bootstrapped cross-sectional test statistic
on cumulative average abnormal CDS returns, as explained in Efron & Tibshirani (1993). Here, I











I define C˜ARi,k(τ1,τ2)= ĈARi,k(τ1,τ2)−CARk(τ1,τ2) for i= 1,2, ..,N and, for a given k, the values
of which correspond to the distribution defined by the null hypothesis of the test, or null distribu-
tion. I sample with replacement N times from the null distribution, calculate the sample mean (s¯B),
standard deviation (σˆB) and t-statistic tB =
√
n(s¯B/σˆB) for a total of B= 99,999 bootstrap samples.
This provides the empirical distribution for t under the null hypothesis.
V. The Impact of Rating Announcements on the CDS Market
A. Pre-Rating Crisis
Figure 4.1 plots cumulative mean abnormal CDS returns, across the entire event window, for all
six types of rating announcement in the pre-crisis period, September 14, 2004 to July 10, 2007.
Table 4.5 presents the corresponding data and results of the three tests on the six sub-divisions of
the event window. Table 4.5 suggests that the test statistics generally agree on non-zero returns.
For the analysis, I refer mainly to Panel A, which presents cumulative mean abnormal returns, as
their economic interpretation is clearer.
I find no evidence of announcement anticipation in the form of significant movements in abnor-
mal CDS returns until within one calendar week of the announcement. No abnormal performance
is detected in the [-40,-21] or [-20,-6] windows for any announcement type. In the [-5,-1] inter-
val, downgrade reviews exhibit a 4.7% abnormal spread increase, significant at the 5% level in
the BMP test and the 1% level in the J1 and BST tests. I find no abnormal performance before
downgrade, outlook negative, upgrade review, upgrade and outlook positive in this period.
In terms of announcement day effects in the [0] interval, all announcements apart from positive
outlook have a statistically significant impact on spreads. The largest is the average increase of
10.1% in abnormal CDS spreads at downgrade review; a well-documented relative result and in
consensus with previous studies. For upgrades reviews, the mean announcement day decrease is
6.1%, and for downgrades there is an average increase of 3.3%. These results are 1% significant
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Figure 4.1: A plot of cumulative mean abnormal CDS returns around the six types of rating announcement
by Moody’s in the pre-rating crisis period Sep. 14, 2004 to Jul. 10, 2007. Event time 0 represents the calen-
dar date of announcements. The vertical dotted lines are the lower bounds of the event window subdivisions.
Numbers in brackets in the legend denote the sample size.
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Table 4.5: Panel A presents cumulative mean abnormal CDS returns during the pre-crisis period. The
results of the J1 test statistic are denoted by: ∗ (10%), ∗∗ (5%) and ∗ ∗ ∗ (1%). The results of the cross-
sectional bootstrap test are denoted by † using the same convention. Panel B presents the corresponding
mean standardized cumulative abnormal CDS returns, during the pre-crisis period. The results of the BMP
test are denoted by ′.
Panel A: Cumulative Mean Abnormal CDS Returns (%)
Event Window Subdivision
Announcement [ -40 , -21 ] [ -20 , -6 ] [ -5 , -1 ] [ 0 ] [ 1 , 5 ] [ 6 , 15 ]
Downgrade Review 1.03 1.45 4.65∗∗∗††† 10.1
∗∗∗
††† 2.53† -2.22
Rating Downgrade -2.91 1.28 -0.72 3.34∗∗∗††† 0.22 1.42
Outlook Negative 0.08 3.92 0.97 1.48∗∗ 1.84 -1.43
Upgrade Review -0.17 0.27 -1.95 -6.06∗∗∗††† -2.44 1.93
Rating Upgrade 1.04 -1.92 -1.13 -1.51∗† -0.80 2.90
Outlook Positive -1.52 1.41 -1.87 -0.19 -1.46 1.66
Panel B: Mean Standardized Cumulative Abnormal CDS Returns
Event Window Subdivision
Announcement [ -40 , -21 ] [ -20 , -6 ] [ -5 , -1 ] [ 0 ] [ 1 , 5 ] [ 6 , 15 ]
Downgrade Review 0.006 0.023 0.279′′ 3.170′′′ 0.166′ -0.077
Rating Downgrade -0.033 0.053 0.015 1.000′′′ 0.028 0.070
Outlook Negative 0.026 0.090′ 0.081 0.457 0.121′ -0.020
Upgrade Review -0.009 -0.011 -0.152 -1.760′′′ -0.158 0.042
Rating Upgrade 0.029 -0.025 -0.069 -0.343′′ 0.060 0.070
Outlook Positive -0.007 0.037 -0.100 -0.061 -0.060 0.070
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in all tests. For the remaining announcement types, the results are less conclusive but the signs are
consistent. The 1.5% increase for negative outlooks is 5% significant in the J1 test alone. The 1.5%
decrease at rating upgrade is at least 10% significant in all tests. The 0.19% decrease at positive
outlook is not found to be significant.
With regards to the post-announcement intervals, [1,5] and [6,15], I find weak evidence of sig-
nificant changes in spreads after downgrade review and outlook negative. The BMP and BST tests
find the increase in spreads of 2.5% the week after downgrade reviews 10% significant. Similarly,
the BMP test finds the mean increase in spreads of 1.8% the week after negative outlooks 10%
significant. I investigated this result further as it would suggest an informational inefficiency in the
CDS market. By looking at the cross-section of [0,1] abnormal CDS returns, I find that a small
number of significant returns occur on day +1. This is result of data synchronicity; our Moody’s
rating actions are not time-stamped and so may have occurred after the 5pm publication of the
CDS data. Extending the announcement day interval to [0,1] removes this result. In unreported
results, I also repeated the entire analysis of this chapter by extending the announcement day in-
terval to [0,1]. Outlook positive becomes significant using this specification of announcement day.
This extension comes at a cost; most of the large spread responses to announcements do occur
at day zero and by smoothing announcement day effects across a two-day period there is a slight
decrease in significance in our cross-sectional analysis. However, our main findings remain un-
changed. I conclude that CDS spreads fully adjust to the information in rating announcements
by day +1. This is indicative evidence in favor of the CDS market being informationally efficient
with respect to rating announcements and in agreement with previous studies. Finally, the well es-
tablished asymmetry of the impact of positive and negative announcements can be seen in Figure
4.1. However it must be noted that our results relate the asymmetry to differences in the degree of
anticipation and absolute magnitude of announcement day effect, not that positive announcements
have no influence on spreads.
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B. Post-Rating Crisis
Figure 4.2 plots cumulative mean abnormal CDS returns between July 11, 2007 and December
14, 2009. Table 4.6 presents the corresponding data and test results. In line with the results of
the pre-crisis data, I find no evidence of statistically significant anticipation of announcements
before the [-5,-1] interval. Downgrade reviews and negative outlooks exhibit significant abnormal
performance in the preceding week; the increase in mean abnormal CDS returns are 5.5% and
3.1% respectively. These results are significant at the 1% level in all tests for downgrade reviews.
The J1 test assigns 5% significance to the result for negative outlooks and the BST test assigns 10%
significance. Also consistent with the pre-crisis sample, there is no anticipation of downgrades or
positive events. However, the signs on cumulative mean abnormal returns are typically in the
expected direction.
As for announcement day effects, downgrade reviews continue to invoke the largest spread
response with a mean abnormal return of 5.1% in this period, 1% significant in all tests. For
downgrades, it is 1.2% and 10% significant in all tests. For negative outlooks 1.4%, which is 5%
significant in the J1 and BMP tests. With regards to positive announcements, sample deficiency
hampers the analysis and interpretation of the test results so I refrain from drawing strong conclu-
sions. Nonetheless, I observe that the spread response to upgrade reviews and upgrades are -1.2%
and 0.1% respectively and statistically insignificant. Finally, consistent with the pre-crisis period,
I find no evidence of abnormal performance in the post-announcement intervals across all events
once I adjust for the day +1 effect.
In sum, these findings suggest that negative announcements by Moody’s significantly influ-
enced CDS spreads prior to, and subsequent to, the onset of the rating crisis. By comparing
the pre- and post-crisis results, we observe a large decrease in announcement day price effects.
For downgrade reviews it has decreased from 10.1% to 5.1%, for downgrades it has decreased
from 3.3% to 1.2% and for upgrade reviews it has decreased in absolute terms from −6.1% to
−1.2%. Whilst I have found no evidence of anticipation effects for rating downgrades or positive
announcements, the pre-announcement anticipation of downgrade reviews in the [-5,-1] interval
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Figure 4.2: A plot of cumulative mean abnormal CDS returns around the six types of rating announcement
by Moody’s in the post-rating crisis period, Jul. 11, 2007 to Dec. 14, 2007. Event time 0 represents
the calendar date of announcements. The vertical dotted lines are the lower bounds of the event window
subdivisions. Numbers in brackets in the legend denote the sample size.
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Table 4.6: Panel A presents cumulative mean abnormal CDS returns during the post-crisis period. The
results of the J1 test statistic are denoted by: ∗ (10%), ∗∗ (5%) and ∗ ∗ ∗ (1%). The results of the cross-
sectional bootstrap test are denoted by † using the same convention. Panel B presents the corresponding
mean standardized cumulative abnormal CDS returns. The equivalent results of the BMP test are denoted
by ′.
Panel A: Cumulative Mean Abnormal CDS Returns (%)
Event Window Subdivision
Announcement [ -40 , -21 ] [ -20 , -6 ] [ -5 , -1 ] [ 0 ] [ 1 , 5 ] [ 6 , 15 ]
Downgrade Review 1.09 -0.73 5.50∗∗∗††† 5.08
∗∗∗
††† 0.68 -1.15
Rating Downgrade 1.19 0.39 0.85 1.18∗† 2.52
∗
†† -2.71
Outlook Negative -0.01 2.42 3.12∗∗† 1.36
∗∗ 2.28∗ -1.41
Upgrade Review 1.02 0.30 -1.9 -1.18 -3.00 -0.26
Rating Upgrade 3.99 -5.84 -0.82 0.08 -0.88 -2.65
Outlook Positive 2.81 01.50 0.41 1.51 -2.90 -0.22
Panel B: Mean Standardized Cumulative Abnormal CDS Returns
Event Window Subdivision
Announcement [ -40 , -21 ] [ -20 , -6 ] [ -5 , -1 ] [ 0 ] [ 1 , 5 ] [ 6 , 15 ]
Downgrade Review 0.016 0.005 0.240′′′ 1.310′′′ 0.056 0.011
Rating Downgrade 0.042 0.017 0.027 0.341′ 0.131′′ -0.075
Outlook Negative 0.020 0.034 0.130 0.370′′ 0.071 -0.014
Upgrade Review 0.019 0.005 -0.069 -0.068 -0.212 0.001
Rating Upgrade 0.053 -0.116 -0.056 -0.086 -0.070 -0.063
Outlook Positive 0.030 -0.012 -0.040 0.414 -0.086 -0.019
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has remained consistent, increasing slightly from 4.7% to 5.5%. That of outlook negative has
increased from 1.0% to 3.1%. I therefore test the hypotheses of differences in cumulative mean
abnormal returns and mean standardized cumulative abnormal returns before and after the crisis, in
both the [-5,-1] and [0] intervals, across all announcement types. The results are reported in Table
4.7. Panel A demonstrates that I find no evidence of statistically significant differences in mean
anticipation effects for any announcement type. Panel B shows that the drop in announcement day
return at downgrade reviews, downgrades and upgrade reviews is statistically significant in both
specifications of abnormal performance.
C. Interpretation of Results
The decrease in market reaction to Moody’s announcements since the onset of the rating crisis
is unlikely related to a change in the informational advantage of Moody’s or a change in bond
rating methodology that could have reduced the informational content of ratings. I are unaware
of any changes to either during the sample period, although Moody’s structured product rating
methodologies have been subject to various changes (See Griffin & Tang (2010)). Therefore,
this empirical evidence might support the hypothesis that market participants perceive that the
incremental information conveyed by such announcements, over and above that already known
and priced in spreads, has decreased. However, alternative explanations must also be considered.
Firstly, one must take into account announcement characteristics that can influence information
effects. Although I demonstrated that the distribution of rating levels and changes, as well as
issuer coverage, are well matched between the sample periods, I can explicitly control for such
characteristics in a multivariate setting.
Secondly, it is important to identify that my results are robust to choice of model specification.
I have made use of a ‘market model’ to generate ex ante expected returns and defined cumulative
abnormal returns relative to this benchmark. Perhaps the simplest and most intuitive robustness
check on this framework is to repeat the results using index adjusted abnormal CDS returns, where
the betas are artificially constrained to be equal to one. In this way, I ensure that the decrease
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Table 4.7: Panel A presents the results of paired difference tests on cumulative mean abnormal returns and
their standardized counterparts in the week preceding rating announcements, before and after the rating
crisis. Panel B does the same for the announcement days. Significance is denoted by: ∗ (10%), ∗∗ (5%) and
∗∗∗ (1%).
Panel A: Paired Difference tests in the [-5, -1] interval
Pre-crisis Post-crisis Difference
Downgrade Review
CAR3 4.65 5.50 0.85
SCAR3 0.279 0.240 -0.039
Rating Downgrade
CAR3 -0.72 0.853 1.57
SCAR3 0.015 0.027 0.012
Outlook Negative
CAR3 0.97 3.12 2.15
SCAR3 0.081 0.13 0.050
Upgrade Review
CAR3 -1.95 -1.90 0.05
SCAR3 -0.152 -0.070 0.082
Rating Upgrade
CAR3 -1.13 -0.81 0.32
SCAR3 -0.070 -0.060 0.010
Outlook Positive
CAR3 -1.87 0.41 -2.28
SCAR3 -0.100 0.040 0.140
Panel B: Paired Difference tests in the [0] interval
Pre-crisis Post-crisis Difference
Downgrade Review
CAR4 10.1 5.08 −5.03∗
SCAR4 3.170 1.310 −1.860∗∗
Rating Downgrade
CAR4 3.34 1.18 −2.16∗
SCAR4 1.000 0.340 −0.660∗∗
Outlook Negative
CAR4 1.48 1.36 -0.12
SCAR4 0.460 0.440 0.020
Upgrade Review
CAR4 -6.06 -1.18 4.88∗
SCAR4 -1.760 -0.070 1.690∗∗
Rating Upgrade
CAR4 -1.51 0.08 -1.59
SCAR4 -0.343 -0.086 -0.257
Outlook Positive
CAR4 -0.19 1.51 1.7∗
SCAR4 -0.061 0.414 0.474∗
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in market reaction is not simply driven by differences in the behavior of the betas between sub-
periods. The results of this test are reported in Table 4.8. With reference to Table 4.7, I note that
the decrease in market reaction to rating announcements is robust to model choice and fixing the
betas gives results that are quantitatively and qualitatively very similar to those where betas are
not fixed. In particular, Panel B demonstrates significant decreases in the announcement day reac-
tion to rating announcements, particularly downgrade reviews, downgrades and upgrade reviews
in the post-crisis period. Again, the results are stronger using the standardized specification of ab-
normal performance, which normalizes differences in volatility between the sub-periods. Panel A
continues to demonstrate that the anticipation effects of rating announcements are not statistically
different between the two sub-periods.
Thirdly, although ratings are intended as a channel by which to improve the flow of information
in debt markets, in the limit that they contain no new information about a firm’s credit risk, rating
changes can still impact prices because downgrades and upgrades impose real costs on firms. Many
regulations reference ratings (for instance, The Joint Forum (2009) details member authorities’
usage of credit ratings in legislation, regulations and supervisory policies) and some institutional
investors are restricted from holding high-yield debt. As explained by Kisgen (2006), access to the
commercial paper market is rating dependent and ratings are further referenced in many financial
contracts, both public and private. For instance, bond covenants and loan agreements can contain
ratings triggers that result in rate changes or even forced repurchases (See Bhanot & Mello (2006)).
Kisgen & Strahan (2009) show that ratings-based regulations affect a firm’s cost of debt capital. If
costs play an important role in CDS responses to rating actions, then the decrease in market reaction
we observe would imply that rating actions are less costly to firms in the post-crisis era. Again, I am
unaware of any change in the regulatory framework that relies on ratings during the sample period,
hence this line of reasoning is difficult to justify. Also, given the homogeneity of the samples, the
effects of discrete costs associated with different rating levels should be comparable. Nonetheless,
I will provide some further tests of the influence of rating related costs on the magnitude of CDS
responses to rating actions.
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Table 4.8: Panel A presents the results of paired difference tests on cumulative mean abnormal returns and
their standardized counterparts in the week preceding rating announcements, before and after the rating
crisis, using an index adjusted abnormal CDS return specification where betas are constrained to be equal to
unity. Panel B does the same for the announcement days. Significance is denoted by: ∗ (10%), ∗∗ (5%) and
∗∗∗ (1%).
Panel A: Paired Difference tests in the [-5, -1] interval
Pre-crisis Post-crisis Difference
Downgrade Review
CAR3 5.10 5.52 0.42
SCAR3 0.312 0.251 -0.061
Rating Downgrade
CAR3 -0.36 -0.66 -0.30
SCAR3 0.035 -0.060 -0.095
Outlook Negative
CAR3 0.43 3.40 2.97
SCAR3 0.036 0.146 0.110
Upgrade Review
CAR3 -1.99 -2.74 -0.75
SCAR3 -0.148 -0.116 0.032
Rating Upgrade
CAR3 -1.49 -1.93 -0.44
SCAR3 -0.102 -0.101 0.001
Outlook Positive
CAR3 -1.35 1.64 2.99
SCAR3 -0.056 0.179 0.235
Panel B: Paired Difference tests in the [0] interval
Pre-crisis Post-crisis Difference
Downgrade Review
CAR4 10.05 5.15 −4.90∗
SCAR4 3.110 1.340 −1.770∗∗
Rating Downgrade
CAR4 3.37 1.37 -2.00
SCAR4 1.070 0.402 −0.668∗
Outlook Negative
CAR4 1.37 1.42 0.05
SCAR4 0.393 0.462 0.069
Upgrade Review
CAR4 -5.68 -1.24 4.44∗
SCAR4 -1.640 -0.095 1.550∗∗
Rating Upgrade
CAR4 -1.44 0.13 -1.57
SCAR4 -0.349 -0.053 -0.296
Outlook Positive
CAR4 -0.29 1.29 1.68∗
SCAR4 -0.119 0.268 0.387
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Finally, the rating crisis period includes the most severe economic downturn in more than half a
century. In trying to establish a link between a decrease in market reaction to rating announcements
and the rating crisis, these results could simply be coincidental. One could argue that the onset of
the global recession may have contributed to the reduction in the price effects of announcements.
For instance, in a period were there is far more negative news from Moody’s, combined with
pessimism amongst market participants, such announcements may be expected and therefore have
less of an impact. Using the data in Table 4.2, I calculate that in the pre-crisis period, on average
a negative announcement was made every 441 firm-days. In the post-crisis period, on average
a negative announcement was made every 214 firm-days; a doubling in frequency. If so, the
question would be why do we observe a decrease in the price effects of upgrade reviews, when the
frequency of positive announcements is much lower. I calculate from that on average a positive
announcement was made every 523 firm-days in the pre-crisis period and 1276 firm-days in the
post-crisis period; more than a halving in frequency. Alternatively, one could argue that during
an economic downturn, investors overreact to downgrades whereas upgrades are perceived more
favorably. If this alternative reasoning is literally true, then I may be underestimating the impact
of the rating crisis on CDS price responses to rating announcements. Because the influence of the
economic cycle is ambiguous, I also endeavor to ensure that it does not bias these results in the
following section.
VI. Multivariate Cross-sectional Analysis of Announcement Day
Performance
My aim in this final section is to ensure that the observed decrease in CDS responses to rating an-
nouncements supports the hypothesis that the rating crisis has altered the information effects of cor-
porate credit ratings. In order to do so, I first perform a cross-sectional analysis of announcement-
day abnormal returns, from both the pre- and post-crisis periods simultaneously, on variables that
potentially influence information effects or relate to the costs associated with rating changes. I then
perform a cross-sectional analysis of announcement-day abnormal returns from the post-crisis pe-
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riod to ensure that the economic recession does not unduely influence my findings. I only consider
downgrade reviews and actual downgrades in this analysis due to the sample limitations of posi-
tive events. I concentrate on standardized cumulative abnormal returns as our cross-section covers
the global financial crisis; the data exhibits substantial cross-sectional variation in the volatility of
abnormal CDS returns and some of these variables are correlated with volatility.
A. Information and Cost Considerations
Regression Specification
For downgrade reviews I estimate the regression:
ŜCAR
RRD
i,4 = γ0+ γ1RCDi+ γ2IGDi+ γ3PNEDi+ γ4BDi+ηi (4.17)
Where ŜCAR
RRD
i,4 is the announcement day standardized cumulative abnormal return for downgrade
review announcement i as defined in Equation (4.13), Section C. The Rating Crisis Dummy (RCD)
is zero if the observation is from the pre-crisis period, September 14, 2004 to July 10, 2007, and
one if it is from the post-crisis period, July 11, 2007 to December 14, 2009. The Investment Grade
Dummy (IGD) is one if the firm is rated above Baa3 and zero otherwise. The Previous Negative
Events Dummy (PNED) is one if the period spanning the estimation and pre-announcement event
window (160 days, eight calendar months) contains any other negative announcements. I use
the initial rating (unfiltered) sample to determine preceding announcements on the issuer. The
Boundary Dummy (BD) is one if the firm is rated Baa3 at downgrade review and zero otherwise.
For downgrades I estimate the regression:
ŜCAR
RD
i,4 = γ0+ γ1RCDi+ γ2IGDi+ γ3PNEDi+ γ4NCDi+ γ5CBDi+ηi (4.18)
Where ŜCAR
RD
i,4 is the announcement day standardized cumulative abnormal return for rating
downgrade announcement i as defined in Equation (4.13), Section C. In addition to the variables
defined previously, the Notches Changed Dummy (NCD) equals one if the firm’s rating was re-
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vised more than one notch and zero if it was equal to one notch and Crosses Boundary Dummy
(CBD) equals one if the rating revision reclassifies the firm as high-yield.
In both regressions, interest centers on the coefficients of RCD, which measures the impact
of the rating crisis on the intercept. If bond rating announcements have become less informative,
then its coefficients should be negative in both specifications. I condition on three other variables
that may potentially influence information effects. Firstly, I include IGD to examine whether price
responses to negative announcements for investment-grade issuers differ from those of high-yield
issuers, on average. Ceteris paribus, we might expect a negative coefficient if the quantity of pro-
cessed credit information is positively correlated with rating, i.e. rating announcements have a
higher information effect for lower credit quality firms. Secondly, I include PNED because longer
periods between consecutive negative announcements might suggest that each announcement gen-
erates additional information to the CDS market. Conversely, longer periods between announce-
ments might suggest that the announcements are less timely. Therefore ex ante, the sign on this
coefficient is ambiguous. Previous evidence on this interaction is mixed. Jorion et al. (2005) find
a significantly positive relationship between announcement frequency and abnormal stock perfor-
mance, Steiner & Heinke (2001) find no relationship for bonds and Norden & Weber (2004) find
a significantly positive relationship for CDS but the opposite for stocks. Thirdly, the magnitude
of the rating revision is captured by NCD. I expect a positive coefficient on this variable if larger
rating changes reveal more information to the market.
I also condition on rating characteristics that control for the influence of rating-related costs on
spreads. At the investment-grade boundary, regulations based on credit ratings are most binding
and ratings changes from investment-grade to high-yield are the most costly (Kisgen (2006) and
Kisgen & Strahan (2009)). I include BD and CBD as no prior study has examined this issue in
a cross-sectional analysis of CDS performance. Previous evidence for other asset classes is also
mixed. Hand, Holhausen & Leftwich (1992) find no contribution to abnormal bond performance
for bonds moving out of investment grade, Steiner & Heinke (2001) find the opposite and Jorion
et al. (2005) find a contribution to abnormal stock performance. If the costs associated with ratings
changes play an important role in the magnitude of CDS responses to rating announcements, I
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expect to observe positively significant coefficients on these variables. Whilst reviews are not
known to be used for regulatory or contractual purposes, given that the success rate of downgrade
reviews is approximately 70% (Table 4.2), if participants expect a subsequent downgrade, then all
the relevant information is conveyed by the review. In this case, investors would trade at the review
date to avoid further losses from selling coercion at the downgrade date.
For robustness, I also conduct these regressions using Standardized Gross Spread Changes
(SGSC) as the dependent variable. This is defined as a securities’ announcement-day spread change





The main result of this chapter, that is a decrease in market reaction to Moody’s reviews and
rating changes, is derived using log-differences in spreads in conjunction with a market model.
The idea here is to remove the model dependency from our performance metric, whilst allowing
comparability, pre- and post-rating crisis, via the standardization.
Results
The results of the cross-sectional regressions are presented in Table 4.9. In order to interpret these,
I note that the average estimated standard error of cumulative abnormal announcement day returns
(Equation (4.12)), across all instances of downgrade review is 4.43% and that of rating downgrade
is 3.97%.
For downgrade reviews, focussing first on the standardized cumulative abnormal return speci-
fication in Panel A of Table 4.9, the coefficient on the rating crisis dummy (RCD) is significantly
negative as expected. This suggests that the mean CDS reaction to downgrade reviews is consid-
erably weaker in the post-crisis period, conditioning on the other variables. Its coefficient implies
that the abnormal CDS return for a downgrade review on the average firm drops by -1.53×4.43%,
or -6.7%, which is significant at the 5% level. This is higher than the decrease in mean abnormal
CDS return of -5.0% that we observed in the univariate event-study setting. For downgrades, in
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Table 4.9: The results of the multivariate cross-sectional regressions of announcement day CDS perfor-
mance. Panel A relates to downgrade reviews (RRD) and Panel B rating downgrades (RD). These regres-
sions span both the pre- and post-rating crisis samples. Columns 2-4 correspond to mean standardized
cumulative abnormal returns and Columns 5-7 correspond to standardized gross spread changes in Equation
(4.19). HAC standard errors (S.e) are reported. Significance is denoted by: ∗ (10%), ∗∗ (5%) and ∗∗∗ (1%).






Coeff. S.e. t-stat Coeff. S.e. t-stat
Const. 4.13 0.98 4.21∗∗∗ 6.16 1.88 3.28∗∗∗
RCD -1.53 0.78 -1.96∗∗ -3.97 2.03 -1.96∗∗
IGD -0.55 0.89 -0.62 1.05 1.76 0.60
PNED -1.81 0.57 -3.18∗∗∗ -2.17 1.41 -1.54
BD -0.36 1.02 -0.35 0.56 1.67 0.34
R2 (%) 7.4 4.6
No. Observations 150 150






Coeff. S.e. t-stat Coeff. S.e. t-stat
Const. 1.08 0.29 3.72∗∗∗ 0.85 0.28 3.04∗∗∗
RCD -0.65 0.29 -2.23∗∗ -0.76 0.33 -2.30∗∗
IGD -0.29 0.28 -1.04 -0.40 0.37 -1.08
PNED 0.11 0.31 0.36 0.34 0.27 1.26
NCD -0.38 0.21 -1.81∗ -0.08 0.29 -0.28
CBD 0.46 0.48 0.96 0.36 0.80 0.45
R2 (%) 9.2 8.8
No. Observations 74 74
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Panel B, the rating crisis dummy’s coefficient implies that the average abnormal CDS price re-
sponse decreases by -0.65×3.97%, or -2.6%, again significant at the 5% level. This is also higher
than in the univariate setting, where the decrease was observed to be -2.2%. The regressions using
standardized gross spread changes confirm these findings; RCD is 5% significant in both. All of
these results are strongly supportive of the hypothesis of a reduction in the information effects of
rating announcements.
The investment grade dummy (IGD), although not statistically significant, has the expected
negative signs in three of the four regressions. The differential in average abnormal CDS reaction
of investment-grade issuers to that of high-yield issuers is -0.55×4.43%, or -2.4%, at downgrade
review and -0.29× 3.97%, or -1.2%, at rating downgrade. These results demonstrate that my
findings are not unduly influenced by differences in the informational effects of announcements
pertaining to investment-grade and high-yield issuers. The decrease in price effects that we ob-
serve are therefore more likely common to both classifications in support of my main hypothesis;
if the information effects of rating announcements have decreased due to the rating crisis, they
should have decreased across the rating spectrum. The previous negative news dummy (PNED)
is both highly statistically and economically significant for downgrade reviews in the standardized
cumulative abnormal return specification. The negative coefficient of -1.81 implies that at down-
grade review on the average firm, there is a differential abnormal CDS return of 8.0% if no prior
negative announcements were made in the preceding eight months. However, this result does not
hold in the gross spread change specification. For actual downgrades, I find PNED to be insignif-
icant. Given that typically a downgrade is preceded by a review or negative outlook, this result is
not surprising. Lastly, the notches changed dummy (NCD) is weakly statistically significant with
a coefficient that implies that on average, a rating change of greater than one notch yields a dif-
ferential abnormal CDS response of -1.5%. The CDS market does appear to value the size of the
rating change. This finding is at odds with previous studies. Hand, Holhausen & Leftwich (1992)
and Steiner & Heinke (2001) find no reliable evidence that it effects the magnitude of excess bond
returns and Norden & Weber (2004) come to a similar conclusion with respect to both abnormal
equity returns and CDS spread changes.
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With regards to the influence of the costs associated with rating changes on spreads, the crosses
boundary dummy (CBD) in the rating downgrade regressions carries a positive sign in both spec-
ifications, as expected. The coefficient of 0.46 in the standardized cumulative abnormal return
specification implies that a rating change which reclassifies a firm as high-yield invokes a differ-
ential CDS price response of 1.8% over those that do not, but is statistically insignificant. The
boundary dummy (BD) in the downgrade review regressions, is not statistically significant and
its signs are inconsistent between the two specifications. The differential average abnormal CDS
reaction of firms most at risk of being downgraded to high-yield is -1.6%. Therefore, it is unlikely
that the costs associated with ratings changes, or sample differences between them across our two
periods, play a major role in mean CDS price effects. To conclude, the finding of a reduction in the
CDS market’s responses to rating announcements since the onset of the rating crisis is robust to
the inclusion of these rating-related characteristics. It is also robust to our abnormal performance
specification. I turn now to the influence of the business cycle.
B. Business Cycle Considerations
Disentangling the influence of the business cycle from that of the rating crisis is complicated by the
fact that our post-crisis period includes the recent economic recession, widely cited as being the
most severe since the first half of the 20th century. According to the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER), it began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009. One might argue that the
rating crisis dummy is therefore correlated with the business cycle and simply picking up other
confounding effects unrelated to the rating crisis. For instance, as demonstrated in both Chapters
2 and 3, the financial crisis saw dramatic increases in markets wide correlations. A reasonable
interpretation of my result is that increases in correlation have resulted in a lower sensitivity of
CDS spreads to firm specific rating shocks. I endeavour to alleviate such concerns here.
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Regression Specification
For downgrade reviews I estimate the regression:
ŜCAR
RRD
i,4 = γ0+ γ1NBERDi+ γ2IGDi+ γ3PNEDi+ γ4BDi+ηi (4.20)
For rating downgrades I estimate the regression:
ŜCAR
RD





i,4 are the announcement day standardized cumulative abnormal return
for downgrade review and rating downgrade. In these regressions, I only consider observations
from the post-crisis sample period, July 11, 2007 to December 14, 2009. In total there are 89 in-
stances of downgrade review and 50 instances of downgrade. I use a National Bureau of Economic
Research Dummy (NBERD), which takes a value of one if the observation is from the months
spanning December 2007 to June 2009. The other variables are as defined in Section A.
Interest here is focused on the coefficient of NBERD. If the economic downturn and market-
wide increases in correlation play an important role in the magnitude of mean CDS responses to
rating announcements in the post-rating crisis sample, I expect significantly negative coefficients
in both regressions. To ensure that the NBER dummy proxies for market wide increases in cor-
relation, I first regress it on the VIX volatility index. It is well known that when volatility spikes,
so do correlations. This regression results in a highly statistically significant coefficient, giving a
p-value of less than 1%, which indicates that the NBER dummy is a sufficient proxy for changes
in the average level of market volatility and in turn correlation. Alternatively, significantly positive
coefficients would suggest that a decrease in information effects due to the rating crisis is to some
extent counteracted by the influence of the business cycle. Again, for robustness, I repeat these
regressions using standardized gross spread changes as defined in Equation (4.19).
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Results
Table 4.10 presents the results of the cross-sectional regressions. The average estimated standard
error of cumulative abnormal announcement day returns in the post-crisis period for downgrade
review is 4.31% and that of rating downgrade is 4.14%. In all four regressions the coefficients on
NBERD are insignificant. This finding increases my confidence that it was the rating crisis and
not the confounding effects of market-wide increases in correlation during the economic recession
that was the main factor in the decrease in market reaction to negative rating announcements. With
regards to the control variables, the results are consistent with those of Section A. IGD typically
carries a negative sign and is statistically insignificant in all regressions. PNED has explanatory
power for the magnitude of abnormal CDS response to downgrade reviews but not actual down-
grades. NCD is insignificant during this period but continues to carry a negative sign. BD and
CBD remain insignificant.
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Table 4.10: The results of the multivariate cross-sectional regressions of announcement day CDS perfor-
mance during the post-rating crisis period. Panel A relates to downgrade reviews (RRD) and Panel B rating
downgrades (RD). Columns 2-4 correspond to mean standardized cumulative abnormal returns and Columns
5-7 correspond to standardized gross spread changes. HAC standard errors (S.e) are reported. Significance
is denoted by: ∗ (10%), ∗∗ (5%) and ∗∗∗ (1%).






Coeff. S.e. t-stat Coeff. S.e. t-stat
Const. 2.52 0.90 2.80∗∗∗ 2.45 1.22 2.00∗∗∗
NBERD -0.09 0.77 -0.12 0.06 1.26 0.05
IGD -0.39 0.65 -0.60 0.11 1.05 0.10
PNED -1.80 0.52 -3.46∗∗∗ -1.54 0.92 -1.67∗
BD -0.37 0.84 -0.44 0.15 1.11 0.14
R2 (%) 11.2 3.9
No. Observations 89 89






Coeff. S.e. t-stat Coeff. S.e. t-stat
Const. 1.14 0.45 2.53∗∗∗ 0.66 0.46 1.43
NBERD -0.76 0.47 -1.61 -0.64 0.48 -1.33
IGD -0.23 0.36 -0.64 -0.35 0.53 0.66
PNED -0.22 0.33 -0.67 0.06 0.26 0.23
NCD -0.31 0.32 -0.97 0.05 0.41 0.12
CBD 0.72 0.55 1.31 0.68 1.06 0.64
R2 (%) 11.9 7.0
No. Observations 50 50
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VII. Conclusion
The credit rating crisis, stemming from the flawed ratings of structured products in the buildup to
the global financial crisis, had systemic consequences for financial markets. One of the hitherto
unexplored implications of this episode is how it has affected the role of the major CRAs in the
price formation process of corporate credit risk.
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter indicates that the rating crisis altered the in-
formation effects of Moody’s corporate bond ratings, as captured by the CDS market. I find that
the price impact of their rating announcements has diminished significantly since the mass struc-
tured products downgrades that began in July 2007. Particularly for downgrade reviews, upgrade
reviews and downgrades, which invoked the largest spread responses prior to the crisis. Whether
or not these effects are short-lived and transitory remains to be seen given the proposed changes to
the credit rating industry under the Dodd-Frank Act.
Having explored various alternative explanations of the decrease in market reaction to Moody’s
announcements, I attribute to a loss of information in corporate credit ratings. This mechanism
is consistent with reputational damage inflicted on the major CRAs following their role in the
structured products collapse. This could have transpired into a market-wide loss in confidence in
the integrity of the rating scale and the incentives and expertise of Moody’s analysts in gathering,
processing and assessing price-relevant information about corporate credit risk. In light of these
findings, I believe that a prudential policy recommendation is the separation of bond and securitized
product rating symbols. In theory bond ratings provide a useful economic function by reducing
problems of asymmetric information, and in practice have been independently validated through a
long history of empirical testing. Maintaining the integrity of the bond rating system is important,




This thesis has provided a set of studies which look at the interaction of credit ratings and credit
default swap spreads. I have created and analyzed one of the most comprehensive data sets hereto
available and shed new light on the empirical relationships between one of the largest markets for
credit sensitive securities and the flagship product of the institutions that have historically acted as
gatekeepers to global debt markets.
I have shown that the interplay between CDS and credit ratings is rich; credit ratings are not
only integral to the price formation process of credit risk but also central to the architecture of
credit markets and the trading behaviour of market participants. The main empirical contribution
of this thesis cuts right to the heart of one of the premises of modern financial theory; excess co-
movement in CDS spreads represents a direct violation of traditional views of market efficiency.
Guided purely by the data, I have come to believe that markets contain behavioral phenomena such
as this that deserve far greater attention by financial economists in future research.
I have contextualized my findings, where possible, using the events that unfolded over the four
years that I conducted this body of work; both CDS markets and credit ratings were at the center
of the financial tsunami which began as a run on credit in mid-2007. At this juncture, the future
of CDS markets, credit rating agencies, and the global financial system in general, are clouded
in uncertainty as governments in the developed world battle to implement sweeping regulatory
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reforms that aim to avoid a repeat of this episode. Careful, robust, scientific evidence should form
the basis of legislative changes and the body of evidence I have presented aims to contribute to this
end. At a minimum, I hope to have furthered our understanding of two of the corner stones of our
credit-based financial system.
In my opinion, Chapter 3 of this thesis, that is the study of excess co-movement in CDS spreads,
presents the most fruitful avenue for further research. In particular, a study of bond indexation
based on rating changes could significantly boost our understanding of this inefficiency in credit
markets along several dimensions. The hypothesis of excess co-movement lends itself to a study
of the cash market where investors are frequently constrained to invest in either investment-grade
or high-yield debt, whereas CDS investors are typically not. Then, by jointly examining bonds
and CDS, one can attempt to explain excess co-movement by decomposing it into a cash market
effect, i.e. a style effect, and the derivative effect related to hedging pressure on the indices from
structured products. The results of Chapter 3 provide some support for this second force at work,
as the effect of indexation on CDS is asymmetric; index exclusions do not result in decreases
in co-movement with the index. In the current framework, including bonds is entirely feasible
through the usage of Markit’s iBoxx cash bond indices. There is also scope to extend the analysis
to European and Asian credit markets. It is hard to imagine excess co-movement is US-centric
In a broader sense, the key question for researchers in this field going forward is whether
regulatory changes to CDS markets under Dodd-Frank are beneficial on net for the stability of
financial markets. CDS will become an exchange traded product, which raises serious concerns
about how a central clearing house will be collateralized and managed. If it is constructed or run
poorly, and fails, a $3tr hole would be left in global derivative markets. This would have truly
devastating consequences for the global economy and more empirical work is needed in order to
better understand, ex ante, what lessons can be learnt from similar moves in other products. One
avenue is to look at what can be learnt from when dividend swaps were moved onto exchanges in
2007. Key questions to be considered include what the net impacts on liquidity, price discovery,
execution, settlement and transparency are likely to be.
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